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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to examine two issues related to the defence of self-defence in
criminal law. Firstly, it is an investigation into the theory of excessive force in self-
defence. The essence of the theory is to have a person who excessively applies force
in his defence to be convicted of manslaughter. The arguments in favour of the theory
are compelling; however, in practice, the issue of excessive defence has always been a
brain-teaser for judges. This thesis elaborates the controversies surrounding the
application of the theory in the courts. The reason for its demise and arguments for its
revival are discussed.
Secondly, this work analyses the incorporation of the doctrine of the "battered
woman syndrome" into the defence of self-defence. This doctrine has recently been
introduced where, upon its acceptance by the court, an accused will be successful in
pleading self-defence despite the fact that the traditional requirement of imminence
has not been satisfied. There is discussion whether the doctrine has always been
necessary for battered woman in claiming self-defence.
This thesis focuses, in the main, on decided cases and, wherever necessary, a
comparison is made of the two theories mentioned above in the law of self-defence in
England, Australia and Canada.
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This dissertation is a study of the criminal law defence of self-defence. The
term "private defence" is sometimes considered preferable to that of self-defence as it
projects more accurately the nature and scope of the defence itself. In essence, the
defence of self-defence is claimed by one who kills another, or inflicts harm upon
another in protecting his own life or bodily integrity, in defending the life of others -
whether one's family members or a complete stranger - or in defending his property.
Whether the defence is one of "justification" or "excuse" is a matter of debate, but the
majority of the lawyers prefer to classify it under the theory of "justification". In
relation to the arguments of "justification" and "excuse", even though not denying its
significance for the theoretical aspects of the defence, I would rather incline to the
view that the discussion is of little legal practicality. After all, it is the final outcome
of the defence which matters most to those who seek to invoke the defence.
The most important aspect of the defence is the fact that if it is successfully
pleaded the accused will be entitled to a complete acquittal. As such, throughout the
historical development of criminal law, the defence of self-defence has always
remained firmly entrenched as one of the best established defences an accused can
raise. Various considerations, nevertheless, require to be satisfied before an act of
killing or causing others severe bodily injury may be exculpated under the doctrine of
self-defence. The traditional test of imminence, the necessity of using force, the
manner in which the repelling force is employed, the test of proportionality and the
duty to retreat are among those which have substantially formed the features of a
successful plea of the defence.
Despite being one of the most settled defences in criminal law, some issues
related to the defence are worthy of investigation. This dissertation is primarily an
examination of the issue of "excessive defence in self-defence" and an inquiry into
the recently developed theory of the "battered woman syndrome" and its
incorporation into the defence of self-defence. In the course of the discussion, I will
also focus on the question of the belief of the accused in pleading the defence. This
dissertation is also intended to provide, where appropriate, a comparison between the
English, Australian and Canadian law of self-defence and the effect of the two issues
mentioned above on the basic law of self-defence in the courts in these jurisdictions.
The second chapter is an attempt to examine the roots of the doctrine of
excessive defence, the principal thrust of the defence, and its mixed fortunes in the
courts. In the process of examining these issues, a detailed analysis will be made of
relevant cases. This chapter concentrates on English and Australian cases and the
law applicable in the two jurisdictions.
In the earlier part of chapter two a detailed analysis is made of cases in which
the idea of excessive defence originated and this shows that the idea of a "middle
path rule" can be traced back to old English cases. The reason why the doctrine has
always been hailed as an Australian invention will then be explained.
This chapter also focuses on the Australian case which, as claimed by many,
signify the demise of the doctrine in the Australian courts. The reasons affecting this
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development are discussed. In the later part of the discussion, there is an
examination of a case in which the doctrine seems to have been re-applied.
The third chapter concentrates on the development of the doctrine with
particular reference to the experience of the Canadian courts. Reference is made to
the provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code related to the defence of self-defence
and the discussion then proceeds to deal with the issue of whether the application of
the doctrine of excessive force in the Canadian courts has been influenced mainly by
Australian cases. A series of cases at the provincial courts level is discussed in
detail, particularly the cases prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Brisson v. The Queen.1 Reference is also be made to a series of Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Brisson. The latter part of the chapter highlights the
reception of the doctrine in the Canadian provincial courts in the aftermath of
Brisson. Several issues are discussed. The main point is whether the law of
excessive defence was abandoned because of the demise of the doctrine in Australia
and England, or whether there are other reasons for this which are peculiar to
Canadian law. Throughout the discussion, a comparison with the Australian and,
where necessary, English cases is made.
In any discussion of the defence of self-defence it is inevitable that the issue
of the belief of the accused plays an important part. In a plea of self-defence, the
belief of the accused will be relevant in two situations: firstly, his belief as to the
situation entitling him to exercise his right to self-defence - at this stage it could be
said that it relates to the requirement of imminence in the defence - and secondly, his
belief as to the amount of repelling force necessary in the defence - the issue which is
related to the test of proportionality in the defence. The fourth chapter examines on
the approach taken by the Australian and English courts in relation to the issue of the
1 139 D.L.R. (3d) 685.
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accused's belief in the two situations mentioned above. The essential issue is
whether to apply an objective theory of reasonableness or whether a purely subjective
beliefof the accused will be enough to justify a belief in self-defence.
The discussion occupying the fifth chapter focuses on the issue of the
incorporation of the theory of the "battered woman syndrome" in the law of self-
defence. In the first part of this chapter an attempt is made to clarify the essence of
the theory, its origin and the criticisms made of it. The discussion then proceeds to
deal with the application of the theory in the courts. This chapter concentrates on the
reception of the theory in the Canadian courts. The theory of the "battered woman
syndrome" consists of two main ingredients, namely, the "cycle theory" and the
theory of "learned helplessness". This chapter analyses the applicability of the two
theories in criminal cases involving a battered woman.
The law on self-defence in Canada is set out in several provisions in the
Canadian Criminal Code. The question is raised as to whether different provisions
will lead to different consequences in the Canadian courts as far as the introduction
of the theory is concerned. The conclusion is reached that different provisions will
necessarily affect the application of the theory in courts.
Chapter six is composed of two parts: part (A) is an analysis on the
application of the theory in English courts, and part (B) is an examination on the
theory in Australian courts. It is noted that battered women in England, in most
cases, plead either provocation or diminished responsibility, or both together, rather
than arguing their cases on the basis of self-defence. Hence, it could be said that the
theory of battered woman syndrome has been treated quite differently in England
from the way it has been treated in Australia and Canada. In this part of the
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discussion, two popular decisions of the English Court of Appeal are examined in
some detail. In the course of examining the theory in England, reference is made to a
recent decision of the Privy Council which could have an important impact on the
application of the theory in future cases in English courts.
The second part of the chapter is an attempt to illustrate the experiences of the
Australian courts with regard to the application of the theory. A detailed analysis is
made of the development of the defence of self-defence prior to the cases in which
the theory have been introduced. For this matter, several cases are referred to and the
main focus is on the attitude of the Australian judges in dealing with the question of
the accused's belief as to the circumstances entitling one to take action in self-
defence. In the last part of this chapter, several cases are highlighted where the
theory itself was successfully introduced. To conclude the discussion of Australian
developments, reference is made to a recent case decided in the Supreme Court of the
Northern Territory. In this case, a battered woman pleaded self-defence, but without
supporting her case with the theory of battered woman syndrome. The arguments put
forward in the judgement of the Supreme Court is particularly attractive to those who
do not wish to "syndromatise" battered women in courts.
This thesis is an enquiry into two issues related to the defence of self-defence,
namely the doctrine of "excessive force in self-defence" and the theory of the
"battered woman syndrome". The final chapter is therefore divided into two parts,
each part a conclusion in relation to one of these issues. Murder is the most serious
crime in the criminal law; the doctrine of "excessive defence in self-defence" and the
theory of the "battered woman syndrome" - if accepted for incorporation in the
defence of self-defence - in their very essence potentially completely exonerate those
who have been charged with murder. However, whether the theories can fit
5
comfortably with the contemporary law of self-defence is a matter of controversy.
This thesis addresses that controversial and sometimes emotive issue.
6
CHAPTER TWO
THE DOCTRINE OF EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of excessive self-defence manslaughter, despite being a
"halfway house"1 or a middle path, has also proved to be a controversial doctrine.2
The simplest explanation of the concept would be that where a plea of self-defence to
a charge of murder fails only by reason of excessive force, the proper verdict is
manslaughter not murder.1 Despite being a benevolent doctrine, it has been
described as seriously defective, in that in cases where it does apply it will often add
little more than an unnecessary complication to the issues of self-defence and
provocation.4 The doctrine is also said to be essentially flawed. The rule in Viro v.
The Queer,i5 ( one of the cases where the concept originated) has been described as
lacking in coherence and consistency.6
P. Gillies, "Criminal Law" (3rd ed. 1993), at p. 306.
The writer in his comment regarded the concept of self-defence as a "concessional
doctrine."
P.A. Fairall, "The Demise ofExcessive Self-Defence Manslaughter in Australia:
A Final Obituary?" (1988) 12 Crim.L.J. 28.
Ibid., at p. 28.
l.D. Elliott, "Excessive Self-Defence in Commonwealth Law: A Comment."
(1973)22 I.C.L.Q. 727 at p. 736.
(1978) 141 C.L.R. 88. This case will be discussed in detail later in this work.
Supra, fn. 2 at p. 29.
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2.2 THE RATIONALE OF THE CONCEPT
As necessity and proportion are the two ingredients of self-defence,
excessive self-defence provides a compromise in cases where the proportionality rule
has been violated. The basic idea centres on the assumption that in pursuing one's
right to defend his life any over reaction on the part of the defender is excusable. Mr.
Justice Mason (as he then was) in Viro v. The Queen1 explained the rationale of the
concept in the following terms:
"The underlying rationale of R. v. Howe is to be found in a conviction that the moral
culpability of a person who kills another in defending himself but who fails in a plea
of self-defence only because the force which he believed to be necessary exceeded
that which was reasonably necessary falls short of the moral culpability ordinarily
associated with murder. The notion that a person commits murder in these
circumstances should be rejected on the ground that the result is unjust. It is more
consistent with the distinction which the criminal law makes between murder and
manslaughter that an error of judgement on the part of the accused which alone
deprives him of the absolute shield of self-defence results in the offence of
manslaughter."8
Thus, the major argument in upholding the concept lies in the degree of
culpability of the accused. It is accepted that a distinction has to be made between a
person who acts with a clear intention of committing the crime of murder and an
accused who committed it as a result of finding himself in a pressing situation. The
degree of moral culpability of an accused committing such a crime in exceptional
circumstances is undoubtedly lower than that of a premeditated murderer. Therefore,
Supra, fn. 5.
Ibid., at p. 139.
8
as it has been argued,9 to treat such a person as an ordinary criminal is unjust, and
justice calls for leniency in dealing with such an offender. Hence, a "middle ground"
has to be found, and to reduce the crime to manslaughter seems to be the proper
approach.
It was argued that: "The moral culpability of the man who honestly believes that he
needs to use lethal force to defend himself - no matter how mistaken his belief - is surely
very much less than that of the man who kills deliberately and in cold blood. It is
submitted that society ought to reserve its major condemnation for the cold blooded killer,
and to have the mistaken victim of an attack convicted of the same crime tends to weaken
this condemnation."
P. Smith, "Excessive Defence-a Rejection ofAustralian Initiative?" [1972] Crim.L.R. 524
at p. 533.
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2.3 THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT
The doctrine of excessive self-defence manslaughter has been described as
one of the major contributions to the law of homicide by the Australian courts.10
Two cases have been identified as being the source of the doctrine, R. v. McKayu
and The Queen v. Howe.12 However whether the rule really derives from these two
cases is a matter of some obscurity. The issue is now discussed.
2.3.1 The origin of the middle path rule
Mead's and Belt's case13
The principle of reducing murder to manslaughter can be traced back to an
English case decided in 1823, the case of Mead and Belt. In this case, as a result of
some altercation, the accused was threatened with having his house pulled to the
ground. The night after the threat, a number of persons came to his house, menacing
him verbally. The accused, under the apprehension, as he alleged, that his life and
property were in danger, fired a pistol, fatally wounding one of those menacing him.
In his direction to the jury the judge said that, if it were satisfied that the shot
was fired without any reasonable apprehension of danger but for the purpose of
Morris and Howard, "Studies in Criminal Law" (1964), at p. 113.
[1957] V.R. 560.
[1958-1959] 100 C.L.R. 448.
(1823) 168 E.R 1006.
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killing out of anger and resentment, that would render the accused guilty ofmurder.14
On the other hand, if the jury were satisfied that the accused fired the pistol in the
belief that his life and property were in serious danger, and that the party of attackers
was on the point of breaking in to put into effect the threats of the day before, the
accused was justified in firing the shots.15 By the word "justified" it would probably
be meant that the accused would be entitled to a complete acquittal on the ground of
self-defence. The judge went on to instruct the jury that if they are of the opinion
that the accused only intended to frighten the attackers, then the case was one of
manslaughter. On these terms of instruction the jury found the accused guilty of
manslaughter.
It is quite clear that the case did not specifically mention the doctrine that
could render an accused guilty of manslaughter in a case where defensive force went
further than necessary. However, the significant point is that this case allowed an
accused under special circumstances to be convicted only of manslaughter. In the
light of this case, the jury was clearly directed that either the accused's act was one of
justifiable self-defence, which would result in no criminal liability at all, or the shots
were fired in anger and with the intention of punishing the attackers. In this situation
it would be an act of murder. Alternatively, the act was the result of the accused's
fear for his life and the safety of his property and the firing of the shots was not done
with the intention of killing the attackers but rather for the purpose of frightening and
chasing them away. If in pursuit of this objective he caused the death of one of the
intruders the accused would be guilty only of manslaughter.
Ibid., at p. 1006.
Ibid.
R. v. Scully16
In this case it was decided that if a person who was employed to watch his
master's premises feared that his life was in danger or felt that there was an actual
threat to his life from a trespasser, and so killed the apprehended assailant (the
trespasser), his act of killing the purported assailant would be justifiable under the
principle of self-defence. However, if there were no threat to his life or no reason to
fear that his life was seriously threatened, and the accused rashly killed the intruder,
his crime would be one ofmanslaughter.
This is, in fact, a "middle ground" principle. The accused was not to be
completely acquitted because the basic condition of self-defence was not met, namely
his life was not in danger, but at the same time the killing did not smack of murder;
the accused had the responsibility of watching the garden for his master and the
deceased had unlawfully entered into the premises without due permission.
Though it was not really a case of excessive self-defence as such, the
important fact is that the decision was clearly a compromise between the two extreme
positions.17 This case shows that the idea of reduction from murder to manslaughter
was acceptable long before it was critically debated.
(1824) 1 Car & P. 319.




Not very long after Scully, the idea of having a middle ground solution was
again approved. This time the accused was attempting to resist illegal violence
against him by a person who thought he had the right to arrest him. It was decided
that the attempted act of arrest was illegal and that if a person encounters illegal
violence, and he resists that violence with anything he happens to have in his hand,
and death ensue, that would be manslaughter.
It appeared in this case that if the accused took up a weapon - in this case a
knife - after seeing the attacker come at him, it might be evidence of previous malice;
however, if the knife was already in his hand when the attack occurred, this is a clear
case of self-defence without malice aforethought. Therefore, if death ensued the
killing was manslaughter not murder.
R. v. George Smith19
The facts of the case were that the accused and his brother were attacked by
the deceased with whom they had a fight not very long before the killing. The
evidence strongly suggested that the deceased intentionally followed the accused and
his brother for the purpose of continuing the fight. This resulted in another
encounter, following upon which the deceased met his death from a bayonet wound.
The accused's brother admitted to possessing the weapon before the fight took
place, but in the ensuing struggle with the accused he lost possession of it. The
deceased then used it in his attack upon the accused.
18
(1837) 7 Car & P. 775.
19 (1837) 173 ER 441.
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In his summing up, Bosanquet J. told the jury that if it was satisfied that the
accused brought the weapon for the purpose of entering into a fight with the
deceased, then he would be guilty of murder. If it was satisfied that the accused did
not enter into a fight with the intention of using the weapon, then the question would
be: did he use it in the heat of passion in consequence of an attack made upon him?
If he did then it would be manslaughter. The judge went on to say that if the jury
were satisfied that the accused did only what he thought to be necessary at that point
to defend himself from a murderous assault or an assault that the accused believed
would cause him serious bodily injury, and that the accused has no other means of
escape, then his defensive act would be justifiable, entitling him to a complete
acquittal.
These instructions were clearly based upon a middle path approach.
Nevertheless what is not specifically clear is whether the judge intended to formulate
a new binding concept, departing from the traditional approach of the murder or
nothing rule, to allow an accused to be convicted of manslaughter in a special case
such as this. The English courts did not look at it in this way. The Australian and
Canadian courts by contrast have certainly felt that this case provides support for the
doctrine of excessive self-defence.
R. v. John Bull20
In this case the accused met the deceased and his friends on the street where
they were heading home after an evening of drinking. A quarrel started and the
accused stabbed the deceased to death. There was some discrepancy in the testimony
of the witnesses as to the conduct of the deceased and his friends prior to the
infliction of the wound by the accused. The court, in its summing up, made it clear
20
(1839) 9 Car & P. 22.
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that the killing could not be justifiable homicide unless there was an intention on the
part of the deceased and his companions to rob or murder the accused, or to do some
serious bodily injury to him. It was also not the law that a man would be justified in
taking away the life of another merely because he feared that he might be assaulted
or indeed if he were actually assaulted.21 The jury concluded that the case was not
one of justifiable self-defence. The accused was found guilty but received a very
strong recommendation from the jury for mercy, due to the fact that the accused
committed the act under the apprehension of personal danger.
As it appeared, the reason for the recommendation for mercy was made out of
a belief on the part of the jury that the accused had a reasonable apprehension of
danger to his life. Nevertheless, it was not made clear in the report that the act of
going beyond what would be necessary in his defence was also debated and became
one of the reasons for the jury's recommendation for mercy. Despite this uncertainty,
however, what was clear is the fact that the idea of avoiding the extreme punishment
for murder under special circumstances was suggested and accepted by courts long
before any sophisticated argument was made out to this effect.
R. v. Biggin22
In the present case the accused (appellant) was indicted with murder. The
defence set up was that the act was done in self-defence, namely to repel a violent
homosexual attack by the deceased. The appellant was then convicted of
manslaughter. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground that cross
examination as to character contrary to section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act,
1898, was improperly addressed to him. In delivering the judgement of the court,
21
Ibid., at p. 724.
22 [1920] 1 K B. 213.
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Lord Reading C.J. said: "It is quite clear, as the learned judge said in his summing up
to the jury, that if the appellant was really placed in the dilemma that Gregory (the
deceased) would kill him unless he killed Gregory and then he made up his mind to
kill Gregory and killed him, that would justify the jury in returning a verdict of not
guilty. The judge also directed the jury that if the appellant used more violence than
was really necessary in the circumstances that would justify a verdict of
manslaughter." The appeal focused on other grounds, but nowhere is exception taken
to this clear direction by the trial judge, Darling J., that excessive and lethal self-
defence should in such circumstances create liability for manslaughter and not for
murder.23
The direction by the trial court to the jury was indeed a clear explanation of
the excessive self-defence concept. However, it was not because of the doctrine of
excessive self-defence that the accused's appeal succeeded. It is perhaps for this
reason that this case was not considered as an authority on the doctrine of excessive
self-defence in English courts.24
2.3.2 Australian roots of the doctrine
An Australian case on the doctrine of excessive self-defence has been traced
back to 1871. This is the case of Griffin 25 In this case the deceased aware that his
pig had been shot dead by the accused, ran towards the accused's house to carry out
Supra, fn. 10 at p. 130 - 131.
The case of R v. Biggin was cited in the Privy Council's decision in Palmer v. R. [ 1971 ] 1
All ER 1077, but the judges refused recognition of the trial court's direction on excessive
self-defence. In the English Criminal Court of Appeal's decision in Mclnnes [1971] 3 All ER
295, R. v. Biggin was not even cited.
25
(1871) 10 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 91.
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an act of revenge. The accused was at that time standing alone at his door, holding a
gun usually used for fowling purposes. When he saw the deceased coming in his
direction, he called out to the deceased to stop, and shortly thereafter fired a shot
which caused the death of the deceased. The accused admitted in court that he fired
the shot under a nervous but reasonable apprehension of danger. It was the view of
the majority of the court that a manslaughter verdict was open to the jury in these
circumstances, and not merely a compromise.
Eighty six years after the case of Griffin was decided, the concept of
excessive defence was then resurrected in the Australian case of R. v. McKay.26
(Before elaborating the case of McKay it is necessary to point out here that Griffin
was indeed cited by the Supreme Court of Victoria. However, the court's direction to
the jury in the Griffin case, which is in line with what would now be known as the
doctrine of excessive self-defence, was not elaborated. The case was cited for the
purpose of supporting the test of reasonableness in cases of self-defence against
illegal violence to the person.27)
In R. v. McKay the facts were that the accused was the caretaker of a poultry
farm belonging to his father. Having had his fowls stolen several times, the accused
decided to take steps to secure the property. The accused's father had installed a
system of bells which rang in the house some distance away from the fowl pens when
intruders entered the pens, but the thefts continued. There was also evidence that the
accused had had for some time a loaded rifle in his room. One day at around dawn
the alarm bells rang and the accused saw a person come into his premises. He fired
one shot at the intruder, who then tried to escape. The accused fired four more shots
Supra, fn. 11.
Ibid., at p. 573.
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and it was suspected that one of these shots killed the intruder. In the trial court, the
judge directed the jury as follows:
"If you think that the accused fired with the intention of killing the thief, and that at
the time when he fired he was under the influence of resentment or a desire for
revenge or a desire to punish the thief, then he is guilty of murder. If you think he
was honestly exercising his legal right to prevent the escape of a man who had
committed a felony and that the killing was unintentional but that the means which
the prisoner used were far in excess of what was proper in the circumstances, then
you should find him guilty ofmanslaughter."28
In the light of this direction, the accused was found guilty of manslaughter.
Mr. Justice Lowe said in his judgement:
"If the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the
apprehension of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of
the occasion and kills the offender, the crime is manslaughter not murder."29
From this judgement it seems that the direction given to the jury was without
any qualification and eminently straightforward. It is either the case that the accused
in firing at the deceased, did it out of resentment or the desire for revenge or to
punish the thief, or he honestly thought that he was exercising his legal right to
prevent a felony, but the means which he used were in excess of what was necessary
in the circumstances. The former would hold him guilty of murder and the latter
would convict him of manslaughter. Such a judgement would also mean that in
every case where the right of self-defence arises, as long as the defender could prove
Ibid., at p. 564.
Ibid., at p. 563.
18
that he is acting in his defence and without intention of punishing the deceased or
acting out of resentment, he could never be convicted of murder. This would be so
even though the accused employed more force than was necessary in the
circumstances.30
The jury appears to have been convinced that the four shots were fired in the
accused's attempt to protect his property and were therefore within the ambit of self-
defence. Hence, as long as the act originated in the context of self-defence, even if
later it went beyond what seems to be proper, the law in McKay suggests that the
accused could not be convicted ofmurder.
The decision in McKay was later approved by the High Court of Australia in
The Queen v. Howe,31 in which Sir Owen Dixon C.J. in his judgement posed a
question:
"Had he (the accused) used no more force than was proportionate to the danger in
which he stood, or reasonably supposed he stood, although he thereby caused the
death of his assailant he would not have been guilty either of murder or
manslaughter. But assuming that he was not entitled to a complete defence to a
charge ofmurder, for the reason only that the force or violence which he used against
his assailant or apprehended assailant went beyond what was needed for his
protection or what the circumstances could cause him reasonably to believe to be
necessary for his protection, of what crime does he stand guilty? Is the consequence
N.C. O'Brien, in his article " Excessive Self-Defence: A Needfor Legislation." 25 (4)
(1983) Criminal Law Quarterly (Ontario) 441 at p. 443 regarded the judgement as a bald
statement which could lead to absurd results in that an accused could kill another without
regard to whether he honestly or reasonably believed such force was necessary and the
result would always be manslaughter.
Supra, fn. 12.
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of the failure of his plea of self-defence on that ground that he is guilty of murder or
does it operate to reduce the homicide to manslaughter?32
It is interesting to note that in responding to his own question the Chief
Justice admitted that there is no definite judicial decision providing the exact
answer.33 The Chief Justice however found it "reasonable" in principle to regard
such a homicide as being reduced to manslaughter. In supporting his approval of the
excessive defence concept, several judicial statements were referred to and, not
surprisingly, these included the judgement of Mr. Justice Lowe in R. v. Mckay. "If
the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the
apprehension of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of
the occasion and kills the offender, the crime is manslaughter - not murder."34 The
Chief Justice emphatically approved the concept when he asserted: "from the
foregoing authorities it appears that in substance the Supreme Court took a correct
view of the consequences of the failure of a plea of self-defence to a charge of
murder when it fails only because the deceased's death was occasioned by an
excessive use of force, that is to say by force going beyond what was necessary in the
circumstances or might reasonably be regarded in the circumstance as necessary."35
The law thus says:
". . . . a person who is subjected to a violent and felonious attack and who, in
endeavouring, by way of self-defence, to prevent the consummation of that attack by
By saying this, it is suggested that the Chief Justice had approved the fact that there is no
clear cut case which could be safely claimed as the case where the doctrine originated. By
this, it also means that the court did not regard the case ofMcKay as the pioneer of the
doctrine, even though this decision was highly referred to and approved.
Supra, fn. 11 at p. 563.
Supra, fn. 12 at p. 462.
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force exercises more force than a reasonable man would consider necessary in the
circumstances, but no more force than he honestly believes to be necessary in the
circumstances is guilty ofmanslaughter and not murder."36
It appears in R. v. Howe that the reason for approving the concept of
excessive self-defence laid down in R. v. McKay was the fact that the Chief Justice
"deemed it reasonable" to apply the concept. In other words, the benevolent idea of
reducing murder to manslaughter in a case where a defence is in excess of what
would be necessary in the circumstances, was regarded as the best solution available
in dealing with such cases, being the solution that best served the requirements of
justice.
The High Court also quoted a number of old English cases in which the
decisions were based on a compromise rule/7 However, the judge gave no indication
of the existence of any formal authority for excessive defence except that ofMcKay's
case. Therefore, it could be said that even though there were several cases decided
in line with the doctrine of excessive defence, none of those cases was specific
enough to be considered as the first authority for the doctrine. The cases ofMcKay
and Howe therefore serve as significant authorities in so far as the discussion of the
origin of the doctrine is concerned.
Ibid., at p. 456.
Some of these cases have been discussed at p. 10 - 16 in this chapter. Other cases which
were also quoted by the High Court are: R v. Whalley (1835) 7 Car.&P. 245, Reg. v.
Weston (1879) 14 Cox C.C., Mancini (1942) A.C. 1.
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2.4 PALMER v. R.: A SET-BACK TO THE DOCTRINE?
Nearly ten years after the decision in The Queen v. Howe,38 the High Court of
Australia was once again faced with the question of the validity of the doctrine of
excessive self-defence. However, unlike in the two previous cases,3 the High Court
in Viro v. The Queen40 was confronted with arguments in favour of rejecting the
doctrine. The reason for the doubts that had now crept in lies in the fact that in 1970
the Privy Council, in an appeal from Jamaica, came out against the doctrine which
was by then entrenched in the Australian courts. The case is now discussed in full.
2.4.1 The Privy Council decision in Palmer v. R.41
The fundamental question for the court's determination in the present case
was whether in cases where, on a charge ofmurder, an issue of self-defence is left to
the jury, it is in all cases obligatory to direct the jury that if it finds that the accused
had used more force than was necessary in the circumstances it should return a
verdict of guilty of manslaughter.42 In other words, the issue was whether the
doctrine of excessive self-defence as proclaimed in the Australian High Court case
of R. v. Howe - which reduces murder to manslaughter in a case where the accused
employed more force than would be reasonably necessary in the circumstances - was
sound in principle. In this case, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest found the concept not
sufficiently attractive to follow. He observed that self-defence is a "straightforward
Supra, fn. 12.
39




[1971] 1 All ER 1077.
42
Ibid., at p. 1078.
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conception" and no qualifying formula is to be employed in reference to it.43 The
proper method in dealing with self-defence would thus be: the defence of self-
defence will only fail if the prosecution shows beyond doubt that what the accused
did was not by way of self-defence. If the prosecution shows that what was done was
not done in self-defence then the issue is eliminated from the case 44 It was also
stressed that if the jury considered that an accused acted in self-defence, or if the jury
is in doubt as to this, then it should acquit: "The defence of self-defence either
succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved in which case as a defence it
is rejected."45
In short, this case had clearly rejected the doctrine of excessive defence
though both Australian cases propounding the concept were referred to. As
repeatedly stressed by the court, there is no formula to be adopted. The court would
rather prefer the case to be left to the good sense of the jury. The approach suggested
by the court would therefore be: when there is a plea of self-defence, if the
prosecution satisfies the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not
acting in self-defence, then the jury should convict of murder. In the event that the
jury has even the slightest reasonable doubt as to the prosecution case, the accused
should be acquitted.
Having said that, however, there are other elements which in the opinion of
the court should be considered by the jury where the accused is proven beyond doubt
On this matter the preconditions for excessive self-defence laid down in The Queen v.
Howe were not necessary. Which would also mean that the direction to the jury to decide
whether the prosecution had successfully proved beyond doubt that the accused had not
honestly believed that the force used was reasonably necessary to avert the danger, is not a
proper direction. The case is now up to the good sense of the jury, based on the facts of the
case.
44
Lord Morris in Palmer v. R., supra, fn. 41 at p. 1088.
45
Ibid., at p. 1088.
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not to have been acting in self-defence. It may be that in some cases the jury will
have to consider whether the accused acted under provocation. If, based on the
evidence, the jury is satisfied that the accused was provoked, then he would be
convicted ofmanslaughter and not murder.
Moreover, in a situation where the prosecution satisfies the jury that the
accused was not acting in self-defence and was also not provoked, it would be open
to the jury to conclude that although the accused acted unjustifiably, he had "no
intent to kill" or "to cause serious bodily injury" - then again, manslaughter should be
left to the jury. Therefore, even though the accused could not be convicted merely of
manslaughter for excessive defence, there are other considerations for the jury to take
into account which could have the effect of avoiding a murder conviction. Indeed,
the Privy Council seems to take the view that this approach would accord the accused
better opportunities to avoid a murder conviction in a case where his plea of self-
defence is eliminated.
With regard to the issue of intention, the Privy Council was of the opinion
that if the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was
not acting in self-defence, even if from the evidence the accused intended to kill the
deceased in his defence, that intention would not require him to be convicted of
murder. In other words, if there is a clear intention on the part of the accused to kill
the deceased, but the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his act went
beyond what was necessary in defence of his life, that act of killing is justifiable in
the name of self-defence.46 But if the prosecution proved that the intention to kill
had existed before the quarrel - before the situation which necessitates the need for a
defence arises - it suggests quite strongly that the accused was not acting in self
defence. Similarly, if the attack is over, there is no reasonable apprehension of death
46
Plankettv. Mitchell [1958] Crim.L.R. 252.
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or bodily injury on the part of the accused, but the accused still persists in using force
and kills the attacker, this act clearly suggests that it is an act of revenge or
punishment or pure aggression. There is no longer any link with the necessity for
defence.
In this case it was contended on behalf of the appellant that if the jury came to
the conclusion that the act of an accused person was done solely with an intent to
defend himself, then an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm would be
negatived.47 Therefore, in a case where the jury concluded that excessive force had
been used the verdict should be one ofmanslaughter.
The Privy Council took the view that in repelling the attack in self-defence,
one would have an intention to inflict grievous bodily injury or even an intention to
kill the attacker, and if the prosecution satisfies the jury that the accused had one of
these intentions in circumstances in which, or at a time when, there was no
justification or excuse for having it, then the prosecution would have shown that the
question of self-defence is eliminated. Thus the intention to kill must either be
justified or excused. If that intention is not justified or excused, there will be no case
of self-defence even if the accused was originally the party resisting the attack.
In short, the judgement shows that self-defence can involve intentional and
unintentional killing. If the jury is satisfied that the killing was unintentional, the
proper verdict is one of manslaughter. At the same time a valid case of self-defence
could also involve a deliberate act of killing on the part of the accused person and it
would be a justification if the deliberate action to kill was within the acceptable
boundaries of self-defence, in other words, the killing is unavoidable and necessary;
Supra, fn. 41 at p. 1084.
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in such a case the killing is justifiable even if on the facts of the case it looks
excessive.
2.4.2 Palmer v. R.\ some comments
The Privy Council decision of Palmer v. R. was criticised with some
stringency. It was described as a firm, uncompromising negative.48 It was a
retrograde and regrettable decision.49 It has been argued that English law has a long
tradition of recognising justifiable or exonerating homicide. Therefore it would not
be inappropriate to accept the concept of excessive self-defence as another form of a
defence to avoid a murder conviction. This concept would be of particularly great
importance in a jurisdiction where capital punishment was still in practice. (In this
regard, however, the question remains, would the doctrine be of less importance in a
judicial system where capital punishment has been abolished?)
Two situations have been suggested where the defence of excessive self-
defence could arise; "where the accused is acting in self-defence, and reasonably
believes he is acting in self-defence, but in the opinion of the jury he goes further
than the circumstances warranted, he goes beyond the necessity of the occasion. Or
alternatively: if the accused is faced with a situation in which some action in self-
defence would be lawful, and he intentionally kills another by using excessive force,
he is guilty of manslaughter only, provided that he did not know that the force used
was excessive."50







With regard to the first formulation, one could argue that if the accused was
said to have "reasonably believed" that his act was within the limits of self-defence,
the jury would not, on the contrary, be faced with as an unreasonable act. This is
because it is the jury which decides if the belief is reasonably held. In other words,
the formulation would be tantamount to saying: if the accused reasonably believed
that his act was necessary in his defence, but on the contrary the jury found it
unreasonably held, he should be convicted of manslaughter.
There can never be a situation where the accused reasonably believed that his
act was justifiable but in the opinion of the jury it was in fact not. The
reasonableness or otherwise of the accused's belief is judged by the jury based on a
hypothetical person test. Therefore, if the jury found that the accused's belief was
unreasonably held, it could not possibly be said that the accused had "reasonably
believed" it was. Perhaps the proper formulation would be, if the accused "honestly"
believed that his act was in self-defence but that belief was held by the jury to be
unreasonable, he goes beyond the necessity of the occasion and thus should be
convicted of manslaughter. The issue of belief in this formulation, would have to be
elaborated further before it is intended to be a conclusive formulation in court.
In relation to the second formulation, it has been suggested that, in a clear
case of self-defence, the accused "intentionally killed another by using excessive
force", he would be guilty of manslaughter. However, this could only be so, if he did
not know what he did was excessive.
Now. the question arising out of this formulation is this: could there be a case
where one, in using excessive force, intentionally kills his attacker, not knowing the
fact that the force used was indeed excessive? Take, for example, a case where a
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person is attacked on a street by a drug addict who does not have a weapon. The
accused has a knife at the time and deliberately stabs the attacker with the intention
of causing his death. In this case, any reasonable person would appreciate that using
a knife to stab and kill an attacker in such circumstances is in excess of what is
reasonably necessary. Therefore, if a person did use a knife or anything else as a
weapon to kill an attacker who was impaired as a result of taking drugs, the former
would know that he was doing more than what would be necessary at that point.
Therefore, under the suggested formulation, it seems that only in very extreme cases
would a jury be likely to be convinced that an accused did not know his act had
indeed exceeded what he should reasonably done, otherwise this formulation would
be of no practical use.
The formulation would also seem to suggest that if, in a case of a minor
attack the accused intentionally kills the attacker by using excessive force, but he did
not know the force was excessive, he would still be "rewarded" with a manslaughter
verdict. In contrast with the formulation in R. v. Howe, the doctrine of excessive
self-defence would only be sought as a defence in a case where violence is used to
prevent the consummation of a felonious and violent attack, an attack of a serious
nature which causes a person reasonable apprehension of death or bodily injury.
In conclusion, the idea of having murder, manslaughter and complete
acquittal options in the law of self-defence is indeed desirable. However, any
attempt to replace the present law must be carefully formulated if unnecessary
complications are to be avoided. The formulations suggested above are too brief and
need more detailed analysis.
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Another probable implication of the Privy Council's decision in Palmer v. R.
arises in the context of resisting unlawful arrest. It was submitted that this decision
disapproved strongly of those English cases which appeared to suggest that a verdict
of manslaughter was proper where the accused killed another simply to avoid being
arrested on an illegal warrant. And the consequence of it would be, that the citizen,
is in a sense, be required ultimately to submit to an unlawful arrest.51
It was also said that as a result of the Privy Council's decision, the law
relating to defence of property could also be rendered uncertain. It is admitted that
self-defence could successfully be pleaded in a case where the accused has an
intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm. But it seems that the intent to kill
must be a response to the necessity which the accused feels to defend himself. To
take away the life of another just because of defending one's interest in his property
would not seem to be justifiable. Therefore it seems unlikely that lethal force can
now be used simply to defend property.
2.4.3 The Criminal Court of Appeal case of R. v. Mclnnes52
Despite being the subject of criticisms, the Privy Council's rejection of the
doctrine of excessive self-defence was approved and followed in R. v. Mclnnes, an
appeal case in the English Court of Criminal Appeal. In this case the accused
stabbed the deceased with a knife which penetrated deep into his heart and
consequently led to his death. The accused in his evidence claimed that the whole
incident was an accident and that he had no intention of causing death.
L.H. Leigh, " Manslaughter and the Limits ofSelf-Defence" (1971) 34 M.L.R. 685 at p.
687.
52 [1971] 3 All ER 295.
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The issue of excessive force in self-defence was discussed and the primary
point for the court's determination was whether or not the doctrine, which at that
point was well - established in Australian courts, was recognised in English common
law. Lord Justice Edmund Davies saw no reason to follow the doctrine and took the
view that the rejection of the doctrine would not necessarily disadvantage the
accused. If the plea of self-defence was unsuccessful, under the present English
criminal law system it would still be possible for a jury to conclude that the accused
"may have acted under provocation or that, although acting unlawfully, he may have
lacked the intention to kill or cause serious bodily harm, and in that way render the
proper verdict one ofmanslaughter."53
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal not only approved the Privy
Council's approach, it also in a way repeated the conclusion arrived at by the Privy
Council.34 This case evidently approved the unwillingness of the English courts to
adopt the reduction from murder to manslaughter principle in cases where the force
employed by the accused was excessive.
2.4.4 Viro v. The Queen:55 the revival of the doctrine in Australia
By virtue of Lord Justice Edmund Davies's decision in R. v. Mclnnes, it is
clear that the English courts were not attracted by the doctrine of excessive defence
Ibid., at p. 301.
Reference here is made to page 1084 of Palmer v. R., supra, fn. 41 and page 301 of R. v.
Mclnnes, ibid. The argument is that if the plea of self-defence is eliminated, the jury would
be allowed to consider the other mitigating factors: firstly, whether there was an element of
provocation in the case. In the absence of any provocative action on the part of the attacker,
the accused could still be avoiding a murder conviction if the jury is satisfied that he lacks
intention to kill. This argument was reinstated in the case of R v. Mclnnes.
55 Supra, fn. 5.
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which had been consistently accepted in Australia. Some seven years after the
doctrine's rejection by Privy Council and the English Court of Criminal Appeal,
however, the High Court of Australia was once again confronted with the issue. In
Viro v. The Queen,56 the High Court found it necessary to decide two primary
questions:
1. Was the High Court bound by the decision of Privy Council in Palmer v. R.
notwithstanding the court's earlier decision in R. v. Howe; and
2. What would be the proper directions to the jury when the defence of self-defence
is raised?
In respect to the first question, Chief Justice Mason stated that neither the
Privy Council's decision nor the previous decision of the High Court of Australia
binds the court.57 The issue now was whether or not the doctrine of excessive
defence was still sound in principle and should be followed. Mason C.J. concluded
that despite the fact that the High Court was not bound to follow its previous
decision, the judgement in The Queen v. Howe was correct and the court should
continue to follow the decision.
However the High Court, in deciding the present case, found itself compelled
to formulate directions to guide the jury in deciding cases of this nature. It is
important to note at this stage that these directions qualified the doctrine of excessive
Mason C.J. in his judgement called for the re-examination of the question as the High
Court was not bound by both the law in Palmer v. R. or R. v. Howe. Viro v The Queen,
ibid., at p. 137.
31
defence as proclaimed in Howe and McKay?* Because of their importance, it is
necessary to set out these propositions in full:
1. (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the
deceased he reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him
with death or serious bodily harm was being made or was about to be made
upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable
man would have believed, but what the accused himselfmight reasonably
believe in all the circumstances in which he found himself.
2. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable
belief by the accused of such an attack, no question of self defence arises.
3. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such
reasonable belief by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in
fact used by the accused was reasonably proportionate to the danger
which he believed he faced.
4. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used
than was reasonably proportionate, it should acquit.
5. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then
its verdict should be either manslaughter or murder, depending upon the
answer to the final question for the jury-did the accused believe that the force
N.C. O'Brien, Supra, fn. 30 at p. 443.
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which he used was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed
he faced?
6. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have
such a belief the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused did not have that belief the verdict
will be manslaughter.
From the six propositions stated above, it may be observed that the directions
are divided into two sections. The first four propositions mainly concern the belief of
the accused regarding the existence of an unlawful attack which threatens his life or
bodily integrity and the proper manner in which the defence is to be employed. It is
to be noted that in the absence of such a belief (the belief on the part of the accused
relating to the situation occasioning the right to defend) there will be no question of
self-defence at all. Those propositions in other words are concerned with the
occasion which necessitates the right to defend.
The fifth and the sixth propositions talk about the doctrine of excessive force
in self-defence. The direction says that if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused used more force than what would be reasonably necessary, the
verdict should either be murder or manslaughter. In this regard, attention is paid
fully to the belief of the accused. Mason C.J. concluded that if the jury is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt, or in other words the prosecution successfully proved the
case (to the jury) beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused did not believe that his
defence was reasonably proportionate59 he should be convicted of murder. However,
if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused believed that the
59
Probably in a case where the accused, knowing that the danger had passed, still continues
using force and as a result kills the attacker.
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force used (though excessive) was reasonably proportionate, (or if the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had no such belief) he should be
convicted ofmanslaughter.
2.4.5 Two preconditions of excessive defence in Viro's formulation
It is also to be observed from the same test that there are two elementary
conditions before the defence of excessive self-defence may be pleaded successfully.
1. The requirement of reasonable belief in the existence of an attack threatening
death or serious bodily injury.
As mentioned earlier, this test applies at the initial stage of the proceedings,
failing which no question of excessive self-defence can arise at all. With reference to
proposition (1), the accused must have a reasonable belief as to the existence of a
threat endangering his life or bodily integrity. The meaning of reasonable belief here
is described in section (b) of the same proposition to mean not what a reasonable man
would have believed but what the accused himself "might reasonably believe in all
circumstances in which he found himself." From the explanation given, the
requirement of reasonable belief becomes quite distinct from the traditional
understanding. The common understanding of the words reasonable belief would
mean the belief of the accused must be in accordance with the belief of a hypothetical
person presumed to be in his position. If the hypothetical person would act in the
same manner in which the accused had done, then he is said to have passed the
reasonable belief test in that sense. However, reasonable belief in the first
proposition in Viro's case was explained as what the accused himself might think
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reasonable based on the circumstances on which he found himself. Which also
means it is the state of mind of the accused which is now made the subject for the
jury's examination.
The question is if reasonable belief of the accused is what he might think to
be reasonable in the situation, what then is the difference, if any, between the
reasonable belief of the accused as explained in the High Court's direction, and an
"honest belief" of the accused? The question arises because when the direction says
that the reasonable belief of the accused is not to be judged according to the
reasonable man test, and specifically mentioned that it is the belief of the accused in
the circumstances in which he found himself that should be considered, this suggests
that the objective test has been replaced by the subjective test of the accused's belief.
If this is the correct interpretation, what is then the difference between the concept of
"honest belief' of the defender - which is a subjective test - and his reasonable belief
as explained in the High Court's direction?60
It seems difficult to differentiate between the general test of "honest belief'
and "reasonable belief of the accused in all circumstances in which he found himself'
as explained in the direction. If reasonable belief is ascertained according to what
the accused might personally have thought to be reasonable (and not the belief of
other hypothetical persons presumed to be in the accused's position as normally
understood) it has the same meaning as the test of "honest belief of the accused. Or
even if there is a difference, it would cause considerable difficulty for the court to
explain it in plain terms to the jury. Therefore, even though the requirement says that
the accused has reasonably to believe that a situation calling for the defence has
arisen, the terms "reasonable belief' in the context of this direction are ambiguous.
This is perhaps among the reasons why the six propositions laid down in Viro v. The Queen
were said to be "more of a hindrance than a help".
P.A. Fairall, supra, fn. 2 at p. 33.
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The ambiguity of the meaning is the result of the description of the phrase
'reasonable belief itself as explained in the second part of the direction.
Mason C.J. provides no clear explanation of this, but in his judgement he
states:
"A distinction is to be drawn between the accused's belief as to the danger which
beset him and his perception of the proportionality of his response to the danger. For
the offence to be reduced from murder to manslaughter it must appear that the
accused reasonably believed in all the circumstances in which he found himself that
an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily injury was
being or was about to be made upon him. But when it comes to the accused's belief
as to the appropriateness of his response it is sufficient that he honestly believed that
the force which he used was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he
believed he faced. There is no additional requirement that his belief in this respect
should be based on reasonable grounds. It is enough, as I have said, that the belief is
held."61
This statement makes a clear distinction regarding the two situations where
the requirements of belief becomes necessary, namely, the belief as to the danger
confronted by the accused and the belief as to the appropriateness of the amount of
force used by the accused in response to the danger. It is not difficult to understand
that it is the honest belief of the defender which is decisive in determining the
legality of his act of defence. Even if the amount of force used was more than what
would be necessary in the circumstances, if he honestly thought the force was
necessary and proportionate, the crime committed is to be reduced from murder to
manslaughter.
61
Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen, supra, fn. 5 at p. 143.
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However, with regard to the question of belief as to the existence of a danger
threatening the accused's life and bodily integrity, the test here would be a reasonable
belief in all the circumstances in which the accused found himself. There is no
further explanation to elaborate the true meaning of the direction. Hence, the only
explanation of the issue is found in the directive which was quoted earlier, that is, the
meaning of reasonable belief in the present context does not mean what other
reasonable men would believe. Thus, by literal interpretation, it set aside the
objective test of reasonableness.
The second condition before the defence of excessive defence could be made
a successful plea, by virtue of the six propositions in Viro is:
2. The requirement of a belief as to the appropriateness of the defence used by the
accused.
Regarding the requirement of belief as to the appropriateness of the defence,
the above quoted judgement ofMason C.J. made it absolutely clear that the belief has
to be measured according to the honest belief of the accused. He stressed that:
"There is no additional requirement that his belief in this respect should be
reasonably held or that it should be based on reasonable grounds."62 Thus, the test is
now what the accused actually believed.63 The situation therefore would be, if the
jury found that more force than required was employed by the accused in his defence,
but such excess in defence was honestly believed to be necessary in the
circumstances of the case, the verdict would be one of manslaughter. Nevertheless,
62
Ibid., at p. 143.
"Whatever the degree of force intentionally of recklessly employed by D (the accused), the
question was whether he actually believed it to be warranted by the situation, or as it was
sometimes put, proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced."
Howard's "Criminal Law" (5th. ed., 1990), at p. 101.
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if the accused did not honestly believes that the excess in force was necessary he will
be convicted of murder.
In summary, if the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
when he killed the deceased the accused did not reasonably believe, taking into
account the circumstances in which he found himself, that an attack was being made
or was about to be made against him, the accused's act is within the scope of self-
defence. However if the jury is satisfied that more force was used than was
necessary then the next question would be whether the accused honestly believed that
the force employed was reasonably proportionate to the danger he encountered. If
the accused has such a belief, he should be convicted of manslaughter only.
However if the prosecution satisfies the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused did not have that honest belief, under the sixth directive, he is guilty of
murder.
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2.5 THE DOCTRINE OF EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE UNDER
ZECEVIC
The whole concept of excessive force in self-defence was again scrutinised
by the Australian High Court in the case of Fadil Zecevic.64 The appellant and the
deceased were neighbours in a block of flats. The relationship of their two families
deteriorated as a result of the deceased's failure to close the security gates to the
courtyard around which the units were erected and his failure to place his car in the
garage provided.
On the day of incident, the appellant and the deceased were involved in an
altercation flowing from the disagreements. The appellant's version of events was
that he went to the deceased's apartment to ask the reason for the deceased's refusal to
close the gate. The deceased was hostile, and stabbed the appellant in the chest. The
deceased then shouted, "1 blow your head off and went towards his car. The
appellant, having admitted that he was very angry and scared, went into his house
took a gun and shot the deceased. He justified his act by asserting that having been
stabbed already and having been threatened to have his head blown off, he had every
reason to believe the seriousness of the threat. His life, as well as the well-being of
his family, was in danger, and therefore even though admitting that he did not want
to kill the deceased, he did so for the purpose of self protection.
The trial judge rejected outright the issue of self-defence,66 obviously after
having regard to the first proposition laid down by Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen.
The plea of self-defence was therefore withdrawn from the jury on the ground that
the only inference open upon the evidence was that the appellant did not reasonably
64
[1986-1987] 25 A.Crim.R 163, (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645.
65
Ibid, at p. 169.
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believe that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm was being or was about to be made.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the requirement of reasonableness in the
first proposition laid down in Viro v. The Queen was flawed in its essence. A
reasonableness requirement was entirely inappropriate in a plea of self-defence which
operates as a defence to offences requiring mens rea: it is enough to consider the
case on the basis of the actual belief of the appellant. This argument was rejected by
the majority of the judges in the High Court on the ground that self-defence was
essentially exculpatory in its effect and the fact that it now falls to be excluded by the
prosecution rather than proved by the defence does not alter its true nature.
The judges in Fadil Zecevic, however, found it necessary to re-examine the
six propositions in Viro v. The Queen. This was done not because of the contention
by the appellant's councel on the requirement of reasonableness in the first
proposition but, rather, on the following grounds:
1. The six propositions enunciated by Mason C.J. which were accepted by
Gibbs J., Jacobs J., and Murphy J. were accepted only for the purpose of
achieving a measure of certainty in a situation of diversity of opinion and
Barwick C.J. was in dissent.6'1
2. The directions particularly the fifth and the sixth propositions in Viro (the
directions on excessive force in self-defence), apparently caused great
difficulties for judges in instructing juries.
Ibid., at p. 175.
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As the result of this re-examination, the court in the end rejected all the propositions
which were originally supposed to be the guiding factor in self-defence cases.
2.5.1 Two differences between Viro and Zecevic
There are two specific differences between the High Court decision in Viro v.
The Oueen and the majority judgement in Zecevic:
1. As was laid down in the first proposition in Viro, the accused's entitlement to act
in self-defence will only arise on the occasion where there is an "unlawful attack"
which causes him to believe, on reasonable grounds, that his life is threatened. In
Zecevic on the other hand, the entitlement was not so confined. In this case, the
judges gave the example of an attack of a serious nature against someone made by an
insane person who was incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit a crime.
Under the guidelines in Viro, it seems that the person attacked would not be able to
exercise his right to self-defence apparently because the attack was not unlawful as
the insane person was incapable of committing a crime in its true sense. In Zecevic,
the real test was whether or not the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it
was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. Thus, in a case where an accused's
life was seriously threatened, even if that threat came from an insane person, the
accused will have the right of self-defence.
Nevertheless, the judges recognised that the right of self-defence may not
always available against lawful attack. The example given was of a case where the
defendant provoked an attack by his own conduct. In this case if the person so
provoked used lawful force in his own defence and in so doing the original trouble
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maker felt that his life was in turn threatened, he cannot lawfully kill in self
defence.67
It is important to state here that the difference discussed above mainly
concerned the first part of the requirement of a successful plea of self-defence laid
down in Viro's rule, that is, in the situation where the right of self-defence begins.
Therefore, as to the requirement of reasonable belief in the existence of a danger,
both Viro and Zecevic were in agreement that this fell to be satisfied on the basis of a
reasonable man test.
2. The second difference lies in the treatment of the use of excessive force or
disproportionate force. As stated in propositions five and six in Viro v. The Queen,
if the accused honestly believed that the amount of force employed in his defence
was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced, even though
if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was excessive, the accused
would be held guilty of manslaughter and not murder. Only if the accused did not
have that belief, will he be convicted of murder.
However such was not the case in Zecevic. Wilson, Dawson and Toohey, JJ.
in their joint judgement concluded that the use of excessive force in the belief that it
was necessary in self-defence will not automatically result in a verdict of
manslaughter. If the jury concludes that the manner in which the defence was made
was not reasonably necessary, the defence of self-defence will fail and the
circumstances will fall to be considered by the jury without reference to that plea.68
Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ. in their judgement stated: "A person may not create a
continuing situation of emergency and provoke a lawful attack upon himself and yet
claim upon reasonable grounds the right to defend himself against that attack." Ibid., at p.
175.
68
Ibid., at p. 175.
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The immediate outcome of the judgement, apart from rejecting the reduction
of murder to manslaughter principle as set out in Viro, is that where the plea of self-
defence is rejected on the ground that the force was excessive, it is now open to the
jury to consider other mitigating factors. In their judgement the majority quoted with
approval the decision of the Court ofAppeal in England in the case ofMclnnes: "it is
important to stress that the facts upon which the plea of self-defence is
unsuccessfully sought to be based may nevertheless serve the accused in good stead.
They may, for example, go to show that he may have acted under provocation or that,
although acting unlawfully, he may have lacked the intent to kill or cause serious
bodily harm, and in that way render the proper verdict one to manslaughter."69
Having explained the legal position of a case where the jury concludes that
the accused had not been reasonable in his defence, the court proceeded in its
judgement by stating that, in the event that the jury is satisfied that the defensive
conduct of the accused is reasonably necessary at the time to avert a danger to his life
and bodily integrity, his defensive act would be completely justifiable and he would
be acquitted on the basis of the defence of self-defence. This would be so even if on
the face of it the defensive act would appear to be excessive. In that particular
instance, it is the reasonable belief of the accused which really matters. If the jury is
satisfied that the repelling force employed was reasonably necessary, there will be no
question of excessive defence at all. The case would be a traditional self-defence
case without having to deal with the doctrine of excessive self-defence as in Viro v.
The Oueen. And this is the point where the two cases differed in their substance.
Whereas, in Viro, the law is that where the accused honestly believed that the amount
of force used was proportionate to the threatening attack, this would allow him to be
convicted ofmanslaughter on the ground of excessive force in self-defence, the result
of Zecevic is that there is no proportionality requirement. By virtue of Zecevic, the
6:>
Ibid., at p. 176.
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primary concern for the jury is the reasonable belief of the accused. If the jury is
satisfied that the amount of force applied was reasonably necessary, the accused
would be entitled to a complete acquittal. However, if it is satisfied that the repelling
force was not reasonably necessary, the accused should be convicted of murder. The
"new concept" simply recognises no qualified defence of excessive self-defence.
2.5.2 The effect of Zecevic on the doctrine of excessive self-defence
By the abolition of the concept of excessive force in self-defence, the task of
the trial judges as well as the juries apparently becomes easier, particularly in
determining the question of belief of the accused. By virtue of the six propositions
laid down by Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen, there are two different situations
where the belief of the accused became the subject of examination. First, at the stage
of determining the belief of the accused in the existence of an attack threatening the
accused's life and bodily integrity. At this stage, the reasonableness test is
applicable. Even so, as discussed, by "reasonable belief' was not meant what a
reasonable man would have believed but what the accused himself might reasonably
have believed in all circumstances in which he found himself.70
The second stage relates to the appropriateness of the response by the accused
to the attack. At this stage, the jury will have the task of determining whether the
accused honestly believed the amount of force used was really necessary and
proportionate to the danger he faced. As it was concluded in Zecevic, the test is now
whether the accused reasonably believed that a situation had arisen which
D. Lanham, in his article," Death ofa Qualified Defence? " (1988) 104 Law Quarterly
Review at p. 243, while discussing the requirement of accused's belief in Zecevic and Viro,
said that "in any event it is difficult to know what practical difference there is between the
two test of reasonableness."
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necessitated the use of force in his defence. The law is now entirely based on the
necessity to defend.
2.5.3 Mason C.J. in Zecevic
The development of the excessive defence concept becomes more interesting
as Mason C.J. was present and involved in the decision making (in the High Court of
Australia) in both of the two important cases involved. Mason C.J., who delivered
the majority judgement in Viro v. The Queen, had clearly given much emphasis to the
aspect of morality in cases of self-defence. This is evidenced in his judgement when
he asserted:
". . . the moral culpability of a person who kills another in defending himself but who
fails in a plea of self-defence only because the force which he believed to be
necessary exceeded that which was reasonably necessary falls short of the moral
culpability ordinarily associated with murder."71
To him the moral culpability of a person committing the act ofmurder under pressing
conditions such as self-defence was lower than the ordinary murder case. However
by abandoning the concept that he himself developed, does it means that the moral
aspect in the law self-defence becomes less important? On this question, Chief
Justice Mason had this to say:
" I still believe that the doctrine enunciated in Howe and Viro expresses a concept of
self-defence which best accords with acceptable standards of culpability, so that an
accused whose only error is that he lacks reasonable grounds for his belief that the
71
Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen, supra, fn. 5 at p. 139.
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degree of force used was necessary for his self defence is guilty of manslaughter, not
murder."72
From the above quoted passage, it is clear that Mason C.J. was still of the
opinion that the doctrine of excessive self-defence was the best way to deal with the
case where an accused was excessive in his defence; however he conceded that "in
the light of experience since Viro I recognise that the doctrine imposes an
onerous burden on trial judges and juries"73 and therefore accepted the joint
judgement by the majority judges in that case, which ultimately means abandoning
the concept that he propagated in Viro. Deane J. and Goudron J. in Zecevic,
however, in their dissenting judgement were still of the view that the moral
culpability argument was compelling in favour of the retention of the qualified
defence.
One criticism of Chief Justice Mason's attitude in Zecevic is, as it appeared in
his judgement in Viro, that he regarded the concept of excessive force in self-defence
enunciated in R. v. Howe as capable of being refined, elaborated and developed in
accordance with the tradition of the common law in future cases.74 However as he
admitted,75 the uncertainty of the concept remained unresolved and trial judges had
continued to encounter difficulties in explaining the elements of Viro formulation to
juries. Having stated the opinion that the concept would be refined and elaborated in
later cases, one would have thought that by having the opportunity to judge the case
72 • r
Mason C.J. in Fadil Zecevic, supra fn. 64 at p. 167.
Ibid., at p. 168.
74
Supra, fn. 5 at p. 144.
75
Mason C.J. in Zecevic, supra, fn. 64 at p. 167, admitted that the uncertainty of the doctrine
of excessive self-defence, particularly the six directions formulated in that case, failed to be
elaborated and refined as he had hoped. He then cited the case ofMcManus (1985) 2
NSWLR 448, and Lawson and Forsythe [1986] V.R. 515, where the trial judges found
difficulties in directing the juries in accordance with the directives expounded in Viro.
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of Zecevic, which also concerned the issue of excessive defence, he would have been
the best person to clarify and, using his own words, "refine and elaborate" the
doctrine. Nevertheless, instead of doing what he would want others to do, he agreed
on the abolition of the concept and accepted the decision ofPalmer v. The Queen, a
case he had previously rejected.
Nevertheless, even though the doctrine was abolished by virtue of the joint
judgement of the majority in Zecevic, with the approval of Mason C.J., there is
nothing whatsoever in the judgement to suggest any serious defect in the basic idea
of the concept itself. As was stated, two judges, namely Deane J. and Goudron J., are
still favoured the retention of the excessive defence concept on the basis of moral the
culpability argument. The rejection was rather because of technical issues which the
judges found it difficult to resolve.76 So, as it can be abandoned, it can also be
revived when there is a need to do so.77
It was commented that: "The principal difficulty with the formulation of Viro v. The
Queen by Mason C.J., was that it attempted to incorporate the substantive law of
excessive self-defence and the law relating to burden of proof. This resulted in the use of
double negatives which juries found difficult to follow."
D. Lanham, supra, fn. 70 at p. 240.
D. Lanham, ibid., at p. 249. The writer strongly favoured the revival of the doctrine in the
following suggestion: "It is to be hoped that English law, having so firmly set its face
against the qualified defence when it was alive and well in Australia, will embrace it with
enthusiasm now that it had gone."
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2.6 BRIEF REVIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE
As has been discussed above, the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence
was popularly regarded as the creation of Australian Common Law.78 It originated in
the case of McKay79 and not very long after the decision of the full Court of the
Supreme Court of Victoria, the principle of reducing murder to manslaughter was
approved and followed by the High Court of Australia in The Queen v. Howe.so
The concept of excessive self-defence was however rejected in the Privy
Council decision of Palmer v. The Queen81 which was an appeal from the Court of
Appeal of Jamaica. The decision of Privy Council was later approved by the English
Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Mclnnes,82 The decision of the Privy Council, and
its approval by the English Court of Criminal Appeal, influenced the decision¬
making process in Australian courts. This was due to the fact that judgements in
Privy Council cases, whether or not originating from Australia, were considered
binding upon the common law courts of Australia. Therefore, there were cases
during this period where the doctrine of excessive force was not followed even by the
Australian courts.8'
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S. M. H. Yeo, "The Demise ofExcessive Self-Defence in Australia"








S. M. H. Yeo, supra, fn. 78 at p. 349. The writer cites a number of Australian cases which
followed the decision of Palmer v. The Queen, namely the trial judge's decision in R v. Viro,
supra fn. 5, Bennett v. Dopke [1973] V.R. 239. and Cf R. v. Olasiuk (1973) 6 S.A.S.R. 255.
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The situation changed as a result of the decision in Viro v. The OueenM
where the court unanimously held that Privy Council cases were no longer binding
on the High Court. Mason C.J. approved the concept of excessive force in self-
defence and formulated six propositions to be directed to the jury in cases involving
the issue of self-defence. Such was the law applicable in the Australian states with
common law jurisdiction.85
However, the High Court in Fadil Zecevic86 rejected the doctrine and in turn
applied the "straightforward conception" of the law of self-defence as in Palmer.
This decision was described as a great shock to the criminal law fraternity in the
common law jurisdiction of Australia.87 The law after Zecevic thus says:
"The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused
believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he
did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left
in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this
form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of
homicide."88
Mason C.J. in his judgement in Fadil Zecevic supra, fn. 64 at p. 165 explained that until
Viro, the judges directed juries in accordance with Palmer v. The Queen.
Supra, fn. 5.
The states with common law jurisdictions are New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia and the Australian Capital Territories. The states with a Criminal Code are
Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania.
Supra, fn. 64.
S. M. H. Yeo, supra, fn. 78 at p. 349.
Fadil Zecevic, Supra, fn. 64 at p. 174.
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The ups and downs of the doctrine can best be summarised as "a rule which
as a matter of abstract justice is right but which in practice leads to the confusion of
juries is not one that can be realistically defended."89
D. Lanham, supra, fn. 70 at p. 241.
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2.7 EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND THE QUESTION OF
MISTAKEN BELIEF
The doctrine of excessive force in self-defence was once a particular feature
of the law relating to homicide in Australia. Now that this doctrine has been
abandoned in favour of English law, the question arises as to how close is the
concept now in Australia to that of English law.
As discussed above, the six directives formulated in Viro v. The Oueen by
Mason C.J. specify two situations where the issue of the belief of the accused
becomes relevant. The first of these is the belief of the accused in the existence of
the attack which potentially threatened him with death or serious bodily harm. In
this respect, the jury is under the duty to test the lawfulness of the accused's act on
the reasonable belief of the accused based on the circumstances in which he found
himself.
The second stage where the question of belief will again become the subject
of concern to the jury is in the question of the amount of force used by the accused in
exercising his right of self-defence. For this matter, the test of belief is purely
subjective - what the accused honestly thought necessary in protecting his life and
bodily integrity.
By the abolition of these propositions, the High Court in Zecevic had adopted
what was usually referred to as a straightforward conception of self-defence. The
position now is: what would the accused think necessary in his defence? And was
the force used in exercising his defence more than a reasonable man would consider
necessary? If the amount of force used by the accused was judged objectively as
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more than what a reasonable man would do, even though it was honestly thought to
be necessary by the accused, the defence of self-defence has to be rejected and the
circumstances will fall to be considered by the jury without reference to that plea.
However, the Zecevic and Palmer's conception of self-defence leaves one
crucial point unresolved. What would be the test required in the event where the
accused acts under a mistaken belief as to the situation occasioning the right to
defend? For example, a person walking on a street at night time is suddenly
approached by someone whom he thinks will endanger his life. That person happens
to carry a small hand bag which the accused thinks contained a weapon to be used
against him. The accused, believing at that point that his life is in danger, picks up
an iron bar which is on the street and hits the deceased with it on the head. It was
this blow which causes the death of the deceased. However, it is later discovered that
the victim was actually a friend of the accused, trying to frighten him in jest.
In these circumstances, what criterion is to be used by the jury in judging the
mistaken belief of the accused? In answering this question, English courts have not
been entirely consistent in their solutions.90 In the case of Colin v. Chisam,9] the
Criminal Court of Appeal held that an honest belief of the accused needs to be based
on reasonable grounds. In the absence of such honest belief, whether or not that
belief satisfies the reasonable man test will not be a subject of discussion by the
92
courts.
Ibid., at p. 242.
[1963] 47 Cr.App.R. 130.
Ibid., at p. 135.
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In the House of Lords decision of D P. P. v. Morgan93 it was held that if an
accused in fact believed that a woman had consented to the act of sexual intercourse,
whether or not that belief was based on reasonable grounds, he could not be found
guilty of rape. Even though this was not a self-defence case, its decision had a great
impact on the later cases which involve the issue of the belief of the accused.
However, in the case of Albert v. Lavin94 the Divisional Court took the view that it
was no defence to a charge of assault that the accused honestly but mistakenly
believed that circumstances existed which would have justified his action as being
undertaken in reasonable self-defence unless there were reasonable grounds for that
belief.95
The decision of the Divisional Court was later disapproved in the case of
Gladstone Williams,96 The view taken by Lord Lane C.J. in the Court of Appeal in
that case was:
"The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is material to the
question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in
fact held, its unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned is neither
here nor there."97
This decision was later referred to and approved in the subsequent case of
Beckford v. R.,98 where the Privy Council in approving Lord Lane C.J. commended
93
[1975] 2 All ER 347.
94
[1981] 1 All ER 629.
95
Lord Justice Donaldson in Albert v. Lavin, ibid., at p. 640. In this case the House of Lord's
decision of D.P.P. v. Morgan, supra, fn. 93 was not followed.
96
[1984] 78 Cr. App. R 276.
Ibid., at p. 281.
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the decision as correctly stating the law of self-defence. The law as upheld in
Beckford said: "If a plea of self-defence was raised when the defendant had acted
under a mistake as to the facts, he was to be judged according to his mistaken belief
of the facts regardless of whether, viewed objectively, his mistake was reasonable."99
Supported by these decisions, there is a strong tendency in the English courts
to judge the mistaken belief of the accused based on a subjective test of
reasonableness. The Australian courts on the other hand were adopting a quite
different solution to the problem. In Viro v. The Queen, the High Court required the
mistaken belief to be a reasonable one, but defined reasonableness not in terms of
what a reasonable person would have believed but what the accused might have
thought to be reasonable taking into account all the circumstances in which he found
himself. It is admitted that the doctrine of excessive force was disapproved in
Zecevic but as far as the test of reasonableness of the accused's belief is concerned,'00
nowhere in the case is it suggested that this has also been rejected. In fact counsel for
the appellant argued for the rejection of the reasonable belief test in favour of the
subjective belief of the accused. This contention was conclusively turned down in
the majority judgement in Zecevic. The test of reasonable belief was still applicable
in ascertaining the reasonableness of the accused's conduct.101
It is a peculiarity of Australian law that the meaning of reasonable belief
could lead to two different perceptions: whether it is a purely objective test of
reasonable belief or, as defined by Mason C.J. in his first proposition in Viro,
[1987] 3 All ER 425. However the position of Beckford's case in Australian Courts was
said to be uncertain. P. A. Fairall, supra, fn. 2 at p. 47.
Ibid.
Reference is made to proposition (1) of the directive in Viro v. The Queen, supra, fn. 5.






reasonable belief in the sense that what the accused would have reasonably believed
taking into account the circumstances in which he found himself. The judgement in
Zecevic had given no clear ruling on this issue. However, since the view of self-
defence taken in Palmer v. The Queen was the one which was approved and followed
in Zecevic - and in Palmer, reasonable belief means the belief of other reasonable
men - it could be said that the Australian courts accept the interpretation of
reasonable belief as in the English court.
The meaning of reasonable belief was also discussed in Glen William
Conlon^02 which was an appeal by the Crown in the Supreme Court of New South
Wales. In this case. Hunt C.J. asserted that in order for the Crown to eliminate any
possibility that the accused was acting in self-defence, it must prove either the
accused did not believe that it was necessary in self-defence to do that act with that
intention, or that there were no reasonable grounds for that belief.103 The Crown
contended that the test of reasonableness here means a completely objective one. The
Chief Justice rejected this argument and was of the view that the question of
reasonable belief is to be assessed not by the hypothetical person presumed to be in
the accused's position but it is essentially a mixture between the objective and
subjective belief of the accused. It is interesting to mention here that Hunt C.J. in
deriving that conclusion made a special reference to the case of Zecevic where he
said:
"But it is clear from the formulation of the issue in Zecevic v. D.P.P. that it is the
belief of the accused, and not that of the hypothetical reasonable person in the
position of the accused, which has to be reasonable."104
102
[1993] 69 A.Crim.R. 92.
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Ibid., at p. 93.
104
Ibid., at p. 98.
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Thus the Chief Justice was of the view that the reasonable belief of the
accused in Zecevic means the same as it was understood in Viro. Hunt C.J., came
into this conclusion based on the presumption that Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
did not intend to depart from the nature of the analogous decisions posed in relation
to self-defence in Viro - which means the judges took the reasonable belief test as a
mixed objective and subjective belief of the accused.105
The position could not be made clearer when Hunt C.J. proclaimed:
"It seems to me that it would require a very clear statement by the High Court that it
had intended to substitute a completely objective assessment for that of a mixed
objective and subjective nature as had been posed in Viro. No such statement has
been made, and the issue does not appear to have been discussed in any case since
Zecevic v. DPT."106
Thus, from Chief Justice Hunt's perspective, by virtue of the judgement in
Zecevic, the conclusion that can be arrived at was that the assessment of reasonable
belief in that case was in conformity with the definition of reasonableness stated by
Mason C.J. in Viro. However, this conclusion could still be debated on the basis that
even though it was admitted that the majority was not explicit in its intention to
substitute a completely objective assessment for that of a mixed objective and
subjective nature, at the same time it is also unclear whether the reasonable belief
was intended to mean exactly the same as the definition of reasonable belief in Viro.
Mason C.J. in his separate judgement in Zecevic, talked about the similarity
between Palmer and Viro in their insistence on the requirement of reasonable belief
105
Supra, fn. 102 at p. 98.
106
Ibid., at p. 99.
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before an accused could successfully plead the defence of self-defence.107 However,
what was unclear in his judgement was the kind of "reasonable belief' which was
adopted in assessing the belief of the accused in Zecevic.
We are left, then, with the following alternative conclusions:
1. The requirement of reasonableness of the accused's belief is of a mixed objective
and subjective nature, as enunciated in Viro. This is supported by the facts that none
of the judges in Zecevic makes clear the need for a purely objective test of
reasonableness; or
2. It is a reasonableness test based on the hypothetical person's perception. This is
based on the fact that as the law in Viro was rejected, and it was the Privy Council
decision of Palmer v. R. that was followed, therefore it is reasonable to presume that
it is the belief based on the interpretation of objective reasonableness that has to be
adopted.
In conclusion, the decision in the New South Wales Court of Appeal was
clear on one aspect - the court accepted the importance of the reasonable man test in
judging the reasonableness of the accused's mistake as to the situation occasioning
self-defence. (At this point there is a dissimilarity between the present trend in the
English courts and the Australian approach as to the matter). And it was also clear
that the meaning of reasonable belief adopted is a mixture of objective and subjective
nature. However, it is the argument in favour of the said reasonable belief in the
context defined in Viro which was not entirely convincing. It is to be stressed that
the Supreme Court's argument in rejecting a complete objective test of
Mason C.J. in Fadil Zecevic, supra, fn. 64 at p. 165.
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reasonableness was based entirely on a mere presumption. This presumption lacks
coherence and is liable to challenge.
Nevertheless, by virtue of the decision in Glen William Conlonm whether a
purely objective reasonableness or a mixed objective and subjective reasonableness
test is adopted, this does not alter the fact that the doctrine of excessive self-defence
has lost its ground even in the country where it originated.
108 Supra, fn. 102.
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2.8 THE CASE OF GILLMA^: THE REVIVAL OF THE
DOCTRINE?
Despite its rejection by majority of the judges"0 the doctrine still commands
the support of the majority of commentators. Lanham has admitted that the law was
"too complex" and "too limited" but has rejected the move to completely dismiss the
doctrine."1 Yeo challenged the High Court's decision in Zecevic to abolish the
doctrine on three grounds: 1) the argument by the majority that the doctrine lacked
support from judicial precedent was doubted by the existence of strong support of the
concept, notably in Howe and Viro; 2) the doctrine is supported by the legal
principle which declares that a person who honestly believes himself to be applying
necessary force in self-defence lack the malice required for murder; 3) the doctrine is
more in conformity with the moral culpability requirement of the criminal law."2
There has also been criticism of the decision-making process of the English
courts in their examination of this doctrine. It has been suggested that the qualified
defence merited more serious consideration than the treatment which it received in
the English courts."3 The most serious criticism perhaps comes from the same
writer when he said: "in their approach to other areas of criminal law our courts have
exhibited a boldness which is regrettably lacking here."114
109 (1995) 19 Crim.L.J.38.
Wilson , Dowson and Toohey JJ. in their joint judgement in Zecevic, supra fn. 64. Mason
C.J. in separate judgement in the same case. Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, in the Privy
Council case of Palmer v. The Queen, supra fn. 41. Edmund Davies L.J. in delivering the
judgement in R. v. Mclnnes approved the Privy Council decision in Palmer thus rejecting the
doctrine of excessive self-defence.
111
D. Lanham, supra, fn. 70 at p. 249.
'12
S.M.H. Yeo, supra, fn. 78 at p. 366.
113
P. Smith, supra, fn. 9 at p. 534.
114 Ibid., at p. 534.
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There was also a suggestion that the confusion and complexity surrounding
the doctrine could be resolved by statutory intervention. It is obvious from the
writer's point of view that the moral culpability of the accused who reacts "honestly"
but "unreasonably" needs to be adequately dealt with in legislation."'' Elliott wrote
that there is a need for the qualified defence in common law jurisdictions but
expressed his regret that the rules defining the qualified defence seem to destroy its
usefulness in those cases where it is needed most."6 Sornarajah viewed the concept
from a different perspective; to him in jurisdictions where capital punishment remain
unabolished, the need for having the qualified defence as a mitigating factor proves
essential in avoiding the extreme punishment of the death penalty."7
In 1994 the doctrine of excessive self-defence was reasserted in the
Australian courts in Gillman,us an appeal case in the Court of Criminal Appeal of
South Australia. The appellant in this case struck a blow or blows to the head of the
deceased with an iron bar and with intention to kill. The appellant did not give
evidence but, according to the Crown, had told the police that he had been attacked
by the deceased who struck him with an iron bar and kicked him. The appellant
claimed that he wrestled the iron bar from the deceased and struck him in self-
defence. The main issue was thus whether the appellant had acted in self-defence at
the time of striking the blows which killed the deceased. In the trial court the
appellant was acquitted ofmurder but was found guilty of manslaughter.
N. C. O'Brien, supra, fn. 30.
I. D. Elliott, supra, fn. 4 at p. 740.




It is to be noted that the law as regards self-defence in South Australia since
12 December 1991 has been embodied in s. 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation
Act 1935 (SA). The section was said to have abrogated the common law of self-
defence as found in Zecevic and takes the following form:
" (1) Subject to subsection (2)-
(a) a person does not commit an offence by using force against another if that
person genuinely believes that the force is necessary and reasonable-
(i) to defend himself, herself or another;
or,
(ii) to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself, herself or
another; and
(b) a person does not commit an offence if that person, without intending to
cause death or being reckless as to whether death is caused, uses force
against another genuinely believing that the force is necessary and
reasonable-
id) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or
interference;
(ii) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises, or to remove from
any land or premises a person who is committing a criminal trespass;
or
(iii) to affect or assist in the lawful arrest of an offender or alleged offender of
person unlawfully at large.
(2) Where-
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(a) a person causes death by using force against another genuinely believing that
the force is necessary and reasonable for a purpose stated in subsection (1);
(b) that person's belief as to the nature or extent of the necessary force is grossly
unreasonable (judged by reference to the circumstances as he or she
genuinely believed them to be);
and
(c) that person, if acting for a purpose stated in subsection (1) (b) does not intend
to cause death and is not reckless as to whether death is caused,
that person may not be convicted of murder but may if he or she acted with criminal
negligence be convicted ofmanslaughter,"
One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had failed to direct the
jury properly as to the meaning of "criminal negligence" in the context of s. 15 (2).
This ground of appeal was accepted in the Court of Appeal; however the court did
not say in what way it was at fault, what the proper direction would have been, and
what the term "criminal negligence" meant in the context of s. 15. The Court of
Appeal asserted that the section was "completely unworkable" and ought to be either
repealed or reworded so as to make its meaning clear.
The significance of this section in the context of the discussion on the
doctrine of excessive force in self-defence is that by virtue of subsection 2 (a) and
(b), the provision suggests that if a person uses grossly unreasonable force resulting
in death, but genuinely believes the force used to be reasonable, stands to be
convicted of manslaughter - provided that person is found also to have acted with
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"criminal negligence". Thus, if a person acted excessively in employing force in
self-defence, he would be convicted of manslaughter if the jury is satisfied that he
genuinely believed the excessive force to be reasonable and also that he acted with
criminal negligence. This, on its appearance, resembles the doctrine of excessive
force in self-defence espoused in Howe and Viro. The only new requirement
stipulated in this provision is that the accused must also be negligence in acting in
self-defence.
The Court of Appeal in discussing both subsections found it "difficult" to
reconcile a finding by the jury on the one hand that there was a reasonable possibility
that the accused had the required genuine belief, with a finding on the other hand that
such a belief was, even on the facts as the accused believed them to be, "grossly"
unreasonable. The court was of the view that to put such an interpretation on the two
subsections was to offend against common sense, and could only serve to confuse the
jury.119 This difficulty is not, it has to be said, new. The very reason for the rejection
of the theory of excessive defence laid down in Viro was also mainly related to the
difficulty that the jury might have faced in comprehending the wording of the law.
Section 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act could be said as an attempt
to avoid an accused who genuinely mistaken as to the amount of force reasonably
required in his defence, to be convicted of murder. However, it is quite unfortunate
that this attempt, like that in Viro, still causes great difficulty for the judge to explain
119 The court's view on this point was criticised by one commentator when it was said:
"Such interpretation does not, as Mohr J. asserts, offend against common sense. It appears
that what his Honour finds repugnant to common sense is the notion that a jury can, on the
one hand, find that a belief was genuinely held, and then on the other hand, find that such a
belief was, objectively, grossly unreasonable. The two findings are not logically
incompatible. A wholly unreasonable beliefmay nevertheless be sincerely held. A
misguided accused may genuinely believe that the force used was necessary and reasonable
and yet be wholly unreasonable in holding such a belief. Why should this offend
common sense?"
M.Grant, Commentary on the case of Gil/man, supra, fn. 109. at p. 40.
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it in plain terms to the jury. Thus any satisfaction that the benevolent doctrine has in
the end revived should be tempered by the fact that the South Australian Court of
Appeal in its description of the law saw it as "completely unworkable" and took the
view that it "ought to be either repealed or reworded so as to make its meaning
clearer."
In conclusion, the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence is undoubtedly
logical in its essence. Perhaps the best argument supporting the benevolent doctrine
lies in common sense. If a person who, in exercising his legal right of self-defence
kills his attacker as a result of his misjudgement of the situation, is punishable in the
same way as a "premeditated murderer", and if the law-making process is unable to
formulate a system for distinguishing the culpability of the two offenders, there must
be a serious defect in the criminal law system itself.
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2.9 R. v. CLEGGm AND ITS EFFECT ON THE DOCTRINE OF
EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE
The accused in this case was a soldier serving with the armed forces of the
Crown in Northern Ireland. On the day of incident, the accused together with other
soldiers were manning several vehicle check points at a bridge. A stolen car, which
refused to stop at the first check point, moved in the direction of the place where the
accused and his unit were on duty. All four members guarding the accused's check
point opened fire; the accused himself fired four shots which he claimed to be in self-
defence and in defence of a colleague, Pte Aindow, who was standing on the other
side of the road. The trial court, divided the four shots into two categories. The first
of these covered the three shots which the court said were fired in self-defence or
defence of others, namely the defence of Pte Aindow. The second category, which
was crucial in these proceedings, consisted of the fourth shot, which was held to be
fired with the intention of causing death or serious bodily harm and was therefore not
in self-defence. As a result of a scientific finding, it was discovered that the fourth
shot was the cause of the deceased's death.
The fatal shot was fired after the car had passed some distance away from the
accused, and it was therefore held to be fired with the intention of causing death or
serious bodily injury. For this reason, the trial judge decided that the accused was
guilty of murder. It is to be stressed that, in the opinion of the trial court, the issue of
excessive self-defence did not arise and the case was one of straightforward murder.
The case was then brought before the Criminal Court of Appeal Northern
Ireland, and an argument based on Section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern
[1995] 1 All ER 334.
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Ireland) 1967, which was previously rejected in the trial court, was considered. This
Act reads:
"A person may used such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the
prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or
suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large."
This was taken into consideration because the accused repeatedly asserted
that he fired the fourth shot to stop the car, thinking that his colleague had already
been struck. In this matter, the question for the Court of Appeal was whether the
force used by the appellant was reasonable within the definition of the Act. The
Court of Appeal decided that the amount of force used, namely, the fourth shot fired
by the appellant, was "grossly disproportionate to the mischief to be averted" and
accordingly dismissed the appeal.
The importance of the judgement by in the Criminal Court of Appeal stems
from the fact that a distinction was suggested by Hutton L.C.J, between a killer
motivated by the need to protect himself or the life of others, and a killer with an
unmitigated intention to kill. The court accordingly emphasised that there is an
important difference between the killing committed by the appellant and other
murder cases involving an evil motive and an intention to kill. Thus it was said that
to uphold the conviction of the appellant for committing the crime of murder did not
actually reflect the nature of the offence which he had committed. The court in its
observations did not hide its preference for the accused to be convicted of
manslaughter,121 and indeed there was a sense of regret over the absence of a
121
The full citation of the Court of Appeal's decision was quoted at p. 338-339 in R v. Clegg,
ibid. The last part of the decision thus reads: "Whilst it is right that he should be
convicted for the unlawful killing of Karen Reilly, we consider that a law which would
permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence
he had committed."
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provision allowing for a manslaughter verdict.122 The Appellate Court, therefore,
called upon Parliament to consider making changes in the existing law relating to the
concept of self-defence.
This observation was given serious attention by the House of Lords in
considering the appellant's appeal. The question for the opinion of the court was
whether the existing law allows a verdict of manslaughter instead of murder where
the force used in self-defence is excessive. The Law Lords were also faced with the
question whether they were in the position to make such a ruling in the absence of a
provision in the current law.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick saw no reason to entertain such a mitigating factor.
The main reason put forward by him was that at the time when the fourth shot was
fired the car had already passed and the occasion conferring the right to defend was
accordingly over. The issue of self-defence, let alone the consideration of excessive
self-defence, had thus become irrelevant.
In the course of the judgement, the House however found it necessary to
discuss the issue of excessive force in self-defence. The House concluded that the
demise of the doctrine in Australia, by virtue of the case of Fadil Zecevic, the
rejection of the doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Geei23 and Brisson
v. R.124 and the complete rejection of the doctrine in English courts particularly with
Lord Lloyd in the House of Lords admitted: "I have already mentioned some of the
arguments in favour of changing the law when dealing with the third question. (the
question of the defence of excessive defence) They have never been expressed more
persuasively, or with greater insight, than they were by the Court of Appeal in the present
case." R. v. Clegg, ibid., at p. 345.
(1983) 139 D.L.R. (3d) 587.
(1983) D.L.R. (3d) 685.
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reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Palmer v. R.., meant that the
doctrine is now a matter of history.
Nevertheless a positive feature of the discussion of the doctrine in the House
of Lords as well as in the Court of Appeal was that despite the rejection of the
doctrine, there is nothing in the judgements suggesting that there is a serious defect
in the doctrine which makes it completely unacceptable. The rejection was rather 1)
related to the facts of the case based on the evidence produced in the courts
(particularly the scientific evidence suggesting that the fourth shot was the main
cause of the deceased's death) and, 2) based on the fact that the court found it
necessary to disregard the doctrine since it had never been formally recognised in the
English courts, and countries where the doctrine was once accepted, had now
returned to the mainstream of Commonwealth and particularly English Common
Law thinking on the matter. The judgements did not suggest that the application of
the doctrine would lead to results which were in any way repugnant to justice. 12?
It would not be an over-statement to claim that based on the manner in which
the judgements were concluded, both the Court of Criminal Appeal and the House of
Lords had realised and admitted the importance of the doctrine. This is significant in
that now the most authoritative body in the judicial system had at least recognised its
importance. Hutton L.C.J., in delivering the judgement in the Court of Appeal, was
S. Doran, in her article "The Doctrine ofExcessive Defence: Developments Past, Present and
Potential" (1985) 36 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 314 at p. 320 said:
"Furthermore, it is worth emphasising that in the leading Privy Council case of Palmer v R,
which is widely recognised as the most authoritative rejection of the Australian
development, counsel for the Crown did not launch a wholly unequivocal attack on the
excessive defence doctrine. Indeed, he began as follows: The Howe doctrine, if correct, is of
limited application only; it is inapplicable where (a) self-defence was totally unnecessary in
the manner in which the accused acted; and (b) the prosecution's case is totally opposed to
the case for the defence. . . " Clearly he saw some room for a middle-ground in a
factual situation which fell obviously into neither the murder nor acquittal bracket; but on
his view a direction on excessive force would be only very limited exception to the all or
nothing rule."
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quite direct in calling for Parliament to make a change in the law to allow the
doctrine. The House of Lords made it clear that without such a provision from
Parliament, the House was not in the position to alter the existing law.126 The
question now is: how much longer should the courts wait for legislative intervention?
2.9.1 Observations on R. v. Clegg
One aspect of the judgement which need further discussion is this: both the
House of Lords and the Court of Appeal paid very little attention to the belief of the
accused. The reason for the rejection of the excessive defence defence was, as
mentioned, primarily based on the fact that the danger which occasioned the right to
exercise force in defence had passed. However, did the accused in this case knew
about this fact? Did he fire the fourth shot in the belief that the life of his colleague
was in serious danger? Or did he fire the controversial shot with an intention to kill
the passengers or cause them serious bodily injury? These are the areas to which
attention should be paid.
According to Private Clegg, he fired all the four shots in the belief that the
life of his colleague was seriously threatened, or, as he asserted in the Court of
Appeal, he thought that Pte Aindow had indeed been struck by the car. This fact
would mean that his act was intended to allow for the apprehension of a criminal, or
one he believed to have been a criminal, and his act was thus within the meaning of
section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967. Should this belief not
deserve some consideration?
126
Lord Lloyd in his judgement said: "The reduction of what would otherwise be murder to
manslaughter in a particular class of case seems to me essentially a matter for the decision
by the legislature, and not by this House in its judicial capacity."
R. v. Clegg, supra, fn. 120 at p. 346.
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The accused's culpability in the case under discussion appears to have been
judged merely on the externals of his act without any reference to his belief at the
time. One would argue that to achieve a just result the accused's belief should be
given sufficient consideration.
Now, supposing the court had erred in not giving necessary consideration to
the accused's belief, would it make any difference to the final outcome of the case if
the belief were now to be considered? It could be argued that the distinction made in
the trial court between the first three shots and the fourth, a distinction accepted in
the Court of Appeal and approved in the House of Lords, is in itself arguable.
Would it be right to say that the first three shots were fired in self-defence whereas
the fourth was not? Or would it be necessary to make a distinction between each and
every shot at all?
It could be suggested that all four shots were fired by the accused "in the
belief' that they were necessary to prevent a felony or to arrest a felon. So whether
the first or the fourth shot caused the death of the deceased would not necessarily be
a deciding factor. The point is that, based on the accused's belief, all the shots were
fired in his attempt to arrest the offenders or those whom he believed to be the
offenders. (This argument is put forward taking into consideration the accused's
version of the story as accepted in the Court of Appeal, that is, that he fired all the
shots in the belief that Pte Aindow had already been struck). Therefore, his criminal
liability would also depend on the belief under which he was labouring in that
particular set of circumstances.
The point now should be whether the accused's belief could exonerate him
from being held criminally liable. When discussing the issue of belief, it is to be
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borne in mind that it has been accepted that necessity and proportion are the two
important ingredients in deciding the issue of self-defence. The belief of the accused
in any case of self-defence thus has to be determined in two situations:
1) the belief as to the situation occasioning the right to defend and
2) the beliefof the accused as to the amount of force necessary in the defence.
The present case particularly concerned the belief of the accused as to the amount of
force supposed to be used in his defence.
The answer to the question above would most likely be in the affirmative. If
so, the next issue would be: what kind of belief could absolve the accused from the
purported offence he had committed? By virtue of the decision in Palmer v. R.127
the belief of the accused is examined by a wholly objective reasonable man test. If
the jury is satisfied by the prosecution that the accused had done more than what
would otherwise be reasonably necessary, then it should convict. Conversely, if the
jury finds that the amount of force used was reasonably necessary, there is a good
chance of a complete acquittal for the accused.
By virtue of this decision there is a possibility that the prosecution could
successfully prove the case against the accused, which consequently would lead to
his conviction. But if the prosecution fails to exclude the accused's defence, there is
an equal opportunity for him to obtain a complete acquittal. It is up to the jury to
decide whether the accused's belief regarding the amount of force necessary in the
defence is reasonable or not. The positive aspect of this approach is that there is
always an equal chance for conviction and acquittal. This is different from the way
Supra, fn. 41.
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the present case was decided where the belief of the accused was completely
ignored.
In Australia, by virtue of the High Court's decision in Fadil Zecevic, the
doctrine of excessive defence has been abandoned. The High Court confirmed the
"all or nothing" principle as laid down in Palmer v. R.. However, there is a
dissimilarity between the Australian court and the English court in relation to the test
of the accused's belief. Whereas the English court viewed it as a wholly objective
test, the former adopted a mixed subjective and objective standard of reasonableness.
The situation in Australia would thus be: the accused's belief would have to be
reasonable, but it has to be reasonable based on the circumstances on which he found
himself. Even though there may be difficulty in understanding this test, the fact is,
the accused would not be judged merely by his act. It is possible that, if Clegg's case
arose in an Australian court, the jury might be satisfied that his act was reasonable
based on the circumstances on which he found himself, and so there would be a
chance of an acquittal.
2.9.2 Further points in R. v. Clegg
Another point for discussion in relation to Clegg's case is this: what would
happen if the accused fired ten shots at the deceased - which appears to be excessive -
but later it was discovered that the first shot was in actuality the main cause of the
deceased's death. Would the accused be acquitted by reason of the fact that the first
three shots were in self-defence? Would the court in this case make a distinction
between the first three shots (which were said to be within the ambit of self-defence)
and the rest (which were not)?
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To achieve a just solution in a situation such as this, the accused's belief has
to be properly taken into account. If the jury is satisfied beyond doubt that the
accused had reasonably believed the amount of force employed was necessary, or the
prosecution fails to prove beyond doubt that it was not reasonably done in self-
defence, even though ten shots were fired, the accused could still have a chance of an
acquittal. If on the other hand, the prosecution successfully proved beyond doubt
that the shots were unreasonable, he would be convicted. The process would be
different if the court started to ascertain the actual shot which caused the death of the
deceased. The situation would arise where even if in the belief of the accused the
amount of force used was reasonable, the accused would still be convicted ofmurder.
Another point which arises is what would be the consequences if the main
cause of the deceased's death were the fatal injury suffered by the deceased from the
first and the fourth shot? The case would thus be too complicated if the same
approach was taken as in the trial court. The first shot would entitle the accused to
rely on self-defence but the fourth shot would be said to have been fired with the
wicked intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm by reason of the fact that it
was too late and that the danger was over. The accused would then be acting in self-
defence as well as not acting within the scope of the defence. In this situation the
liability of the accused would be difficult to decide.
Therefore it seems that to reaching a conclusion without giving due
consideration to the belief of the accused is not the best way to deal with such a
highly controversial case. Even though by referring to the Palmer approach in this
case, the accused could still be convicted ofmurder, there is always a chance for the
accused to have his case for self-defence successfully pleaded and thus to be
acquitted.
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2.9.3 Looking at the courts' objective in the decision of R. v. Clegg
What intention has the court, particularly the Court of Appeal and the House
of Lords, in approving the trial court's reasoning behind the accused's conviction?
(namely the conclusion reached that the first three shots were in self-defence and the
fourth was not)? This question is vital, as it effects the future attitude of the court in
self-defence cases. The immediate thought that comes to the mind of every judge
would probably be that it serves as a reminder that the claim of self-defence should
be confined essentially to a genuine case of necessary self-defence. It has been
accepted as a good principle that self-defence must not be made a mean to justify
one's act of revenge or resentment towards others. A person must not take an
opportunity arising from necessity to execute his own private revenge. Perhaps the
requirement of having a detailed examination of the accused's use of force is intended
to safeguard the authenticity of the claim of self-defence. This idea is certainly well
understood and deserves support.
However, the intention to allow only a genuine claimant to succeed in a self-
defence plea should not at the same time be achieved by adding another strict
precondition to the doctrine. The requirement of having to examine each and every
blow struck, or shot fired or any other means of force used in the defence128- which
was the actual cause of the deceased's death - without looking at the belief of the
accused as to the occasion, would appear to be to the disadvantage of the accused.
As could be inferred from the decision of R. v. Clegg, supra, fn. 120.
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2.10 CONCLUSION
i. In R. v. Clegg, the main point of criticism centers on the fact that the court
rejected outright the accused's plea of self-defence and the doctrine of excessive self-
defence. This decision was arrived at after establishing that the four shots fired by
the accused were partly accepted as an act of justifiable self-defence and partly
unjustifiable and not within the ambit of self-defence. Since the actual shot which
caused the death of the deceased was the fourth one, and in the opinion of the court
fired after the need for a defence was over, it was a shot fired with the intention of
committing the crime of murder and thus the accused had committed a crime which
required to be punished severely by the law. In reaching this judgement it appears
that the accused's belief regarding the occasion was not sufficiently entertained. It
could be argued that, were the belief of the accused to be considered, the outcome of
the case would be more favourable to him and the distinction made between the four
shots fired by him would not be essentially necessary.
ii. It was unfortunate that Pte Clegg was convicted of murder at the time as the
Court of Appeal unhesitatingly recognised the reasonableness of the doctrine of
excessive defence which, if allowed, would render him guilty only of manslaughter.
It was more unfortunate that his appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed just for
the reason that the Law Lords found it not within their judicial powers to approve
officially the doctrine of excessive defence where unofficially, the House seems to
agree with the observation made in the Court of Appeal.
The rejection of the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence in this case
proves that there is an urgent need for the reconsideration of the law. A distinction
between a person of wicked intention killing his victim in cold blood and a person
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killing as a result of a misjudgement of a situation or having to make a decision at a
moment of unexpected anguish, without time for measured reflection, seems
compelling and unavoidable. To convict a person of murder under such pressing
circumstances, would be tantamount to putting him on the same footing as a cold
blooded murderer. This, as Hunt L.C.J observed, could not be accepted by any fair-
minded citizen who would prefer to see him be convicted of the lesser crime of
manslaughter.
It is also clear that the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence has never
been rejected on the ground of the basic principle underlying it. The merits of the
doctrine have long been appreciated. It is quite encouraging, particularly to those
who are in favour of the introduction of the doctrine in English courts, that now even
the highest body in the judicial system has appreciated the importance of the
doctrine. The only set-back is the absence of legislation on the doctrine. The
argument for reconsideration of the law will most probably continue in future cases,
and Parliament may in the end find it necessary to intervene.
Finally, the doctrine of excessive defence was rejected in the Privy Council in
the case of Palmer v. R., in the Criminal Court of Appeal in R. v. Mclnnes and now in
the present case, in the House of Lords. The rejection of the concept in the two
previous cases was quite firm and explicit. But twenty four years after it had
apparently been categorically rejected, there is evidence that the courts have started
to take a more lenient approach. Thus, the wish of one lawyer to have the English
court "embrace the qualified defence with enthusiasm" would now seems not to be
too ambitious.129
129 D. Lanham, supra, fn. 70 at p. 249. The writer states: "the principle of excessive self-
defence adopted in Viro was at the same time too complex and too limited. For that reason it
needed to be revised. It did not deserve to be rejected. It is to be hoped that English law
having so firmly sets its face against the qualified defence when it was alive and well in
Australia, will embrace it with enthusiasm now that it has gone."
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEFENCE OF SELF-DEFENCE IN THE CANADIAN
CRIMINAL LAW1
3.1 THE PROVISIONS ON SELF-DEFENCE IN THE
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE
The law of self-defence in Canada is explained in various provisions in the
Canadian Criminal Code. The Code distinguishes between the situation where the
accused is the victim of an unprovoked attack upon himself and that where he begins
the assault or provokes another person to attack him. The first category of the
defence of self-defence is contained in section 34 (1) and (2) of the Code.2 Section
34 (1) says:
"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted without having provoked the assault is
justified in repelling force by force if the force he uses is not intended to cause death
or grievous bodily harm and is no more than is necessary to enable him to defend
himself."
The defence of self-defence in this particular section, if successfully pleaded,
provides the accused3 with a full justification and a complete acquittal. Nevertheless,
I do not intend to elaborate every issue arising from the provisions quoted in this chapter.
The reason for highlighting those provisions, however, is to state the law of self-defence in
the Canadian Criminal Code as they might be relevant in the later discussions on the
doctrine of excessive defence in Canada.
2
D. Stuart, "Canadian Criminal law" (2nd ed. 1987), at p. 405. This section has been
described as the key provision upon which most defences of self-defence depend.
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for this result to be achieved, the law stipulates several prerequisites. The first
requirement emanating from this section is that those who intend to seek refuge
under it must be the subject of an unlawful assault, and it is important, too, that the
unlawful assault is not the result of one's own act of provocation. It is apparent from
the language of this part of the section that where the accused caused himself to be
assaulted it can scarcely be of any assistance to him.
The second condition is related to the repelling force exercised by the accused
in his defensive act. Here, the accused is required not to have intended to cause death
or grievous bodily harm to the victim. The third condition laid down in the above
quoted provision makes it obligatory upon the accused not to employ more force than
would be necessary at that particular point. It would not be erroneous to construe the
words "no more than is necessary" to mean the accused must be proportionate in his
defensive act.4
In short, even though this particular provision is meant to provide grounds for
the act of self-defence, it is only of limited application. The limitation is due to the
conditions explained within the language of the law itself.
Section 34 (2) also falls within the category of self-defence against
unprovoked assault. This subsection says:
The term "accused" in this work refers to the defender, that is, the one who claims to exercise
the right of self-defence.
It has been commented that:
"It would be a legitimate linguistic construction to interpret the section to require a test of
proportionality between the force used by the attacker and that used by the defender, judged
ex post facto on an entirely objective basis in which the belief of the defender is irrelevant."
D. Stuart, supra, fn. 2 at p. 407.
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"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous
bodily harm in repelling the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily
harm from the violence with which the assault was originally made or with
which the assailant pursues his purposes, and
(b) he believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that he cannot otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm."
As in the case with the previous provision, the accused relying on this part of
the law also must be the subject of an unlawful assault in the sense that the attack
confronted him must not be the result of his act of provocation or must not also be
the result of a retaliation on the part of the other party to the accused's original attack
against him. However, in contrast to subsection (1) of section 34, the accused would
be justified even if he intentionally kills or causes bodily harm to his assailant.
Whereas the previous provision does not specifically mention the result of the
accused's act of self-defence, this subsection makes it clear that the accused's
defensive act resulted in the death of his assailant or caused him (the attacker) serious
bodily injury.5
Under subsection (a) of the provision, the accused's act of causing the death
of the aggressor or causing him serious bodily injury would only be justified if the
jury were satisfied that the nature of the attack he encountered was so seriously
violent as to put him under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily
The previous subsection does not state the ultimate result of the accused's act. However, it
would be legitimate to interpret it as foreseeing the death or serious injury of the
attacker in the event where the jury is satisfied that the act of killing or causing the attacker
fatal injury is really "necessary" to ward off the attack. The fundamental requirement is that
the repelling force must be proportionate to the danger.
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harm. At this point, a question may be asked as to how the accused's reasonable
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm should be ascertained? It was decided
in the case of Regina v. Bogue6 that the applicable test is a purely objective one.
Referring to subsection (b) of the provision, in exercising his defensive force
resulting in the death of the attacker or causing him serious bodily injury, the accused
must have believed, on reasonable and probable grounds, that the act of killing the
attacker or inflicting on him serious injury is the only alternative available to him in
preserving his life and physical integrity. The point of discussion now is centered on
the test of reasonable belief of the accused. The case of Regina v. Bogue1 again
provides some clarification. In this case the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that
subsection (b) imported a subjective element based on an objective standard. In the
court's own words:
"There are two criteria to be satisfied under s.34 (2). The reasonable apprehension of
death or grievous bodily harm in s.34 (2) (a) must satisfy an objective standard. In
addition, s.34 (2) (b) imports a subjective element, the belief of the accused that he
cannot otherwise preserve himself form death or grievous bodily harm. However,
this belief must meet an objective standard that it is based on reasonable and
probable grounds."8
The application of section 34 (2) subsection (a) and (b) is best explained in
the case of R. v. Baxter,9 where Martin J.A., in delivering the judgement of Ontario
Court ofAppeal, concluded that:
6
[ 1976] 30 C.C.C. (2d) 402 at p. 407.
7 Ibid.
Ibid., at p. 407.
[1975] 27 C.C.C. (2d) 96.
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"Under section 34 (2) of the Code the ultimate question for the jury is not whether
the accused was actually in danger of death or grievous bodily harm, and whether the
causing of death or grievous bodily harm by him was in fact necessary to preserve
himself from death or grievous bodily harm, but whether:
1. He caused death or grievous bodily harm under a reasonable apprehension of death
or grievous bodily harm, and
2. He believed on reasonable and probable grounds that he could not otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm."10
The point of difference between the two parts of the section is that whereas
section 34 (1) requires a strict proportionality rule, tested objectively, section 34 (2)
(a) and (b) requires no such precondition. The consequence of this is that, in a case
where a direction is given in effect requiring the accused not to be excessive in his
defence, this direction is, in its substance, erroneous by virtue of the fact that section
34 (2) (a) and (b) only make it incumbent upon the jury to be satisfied of the
accused's reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and his belief on
reasonable and probable grounds that he cannot otherwise preserve himself from
death or grievous bodily harm. Therefore no proportionality test is necessarily to be
found in subsection (a) and (b) of section 34 (2).
In short, the application of this section has not always been as straightforward
as it appears to be. It has been stated that: "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that
section 34 (2) is too complex and that recent interpretations have resulted in intricate
and sometimes contradictory analysis."11
10
Ibid., at p. 107.
'1
D. Stuart, supra, fn. 2 at p. 410.
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As the law in section 34 (1) and (2) requires the accused not to be the party
starting the assault, section 35 of the Criminal Code provides a justification for an
accused who is originally the aggressor. The section says:
"Every one who has without justification assaulted another but did not commence the
assault with intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm, or has without
justification provoked an assault upon himself by another, may justify the use of
force subsequent to the assault if
(a) he uses the force
(i) under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm
from the violence of the person whom he has assaulted or
provoked, and,
(ii) in the belief, on reasonable and probable grounds, that it is
necessary in order to preserve himself from death or grievous bodily
harm;
(b) he did not, at any time before the necessity of preserving himself from
death or grievous bodily harm arose, endeavour to cause death or grievous
bodily harm; and
(c) he declined further conflict and quitted or retreated from it as far as it was
feasible to do so before the necessity of preserving himself from death or
grievous bodily harm arose."
From its wording, it is apparent that the section is specially intended to cover
the case of those who, in their act of defence, are in fact the original trouble makers.
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Nevertheless, if it is established in court that the accused, in his initial assault against
the attacker, intends to cause him death or grievous bodily injury, this provision will
offer no assistance. Perhaps this section presumes that those who assault others
without intending to cause death or serious bodily injury are at the same time only
attempting to commit a minor offence and those who intend to cause death are
planning to commit a major offence. Thus, this section is not designed to provide
justification for offenders who intend to commit a major offence.
The section, like section 34 (2), does not embody a proportionality test. This
means that, even though on the face of it the amount of force used is more than what
would seem to be necessary, if the jury is satisfied that it was reasonably done to
preserve the accused's life from death or serious injury, the repelling force will be
fully justified. It could also mean that where the accused reasonably believed that the
repelling force used is justifiable, there can be no room for it to be held excessive.
Only if he does not reasonably believe that his defensive act was necessary is his
defence excessive. In that situation this section again cannot provide him with any
ground of defence.
Despite the fact that this provision is capable of presenting the original
aggressor with a total justification, it lays down very strict conditions. It requires the
accused to have a reasonable belief that force is needed to protect himself against the
attack; the court must also be satisfied that the accused has not intended to cause
death or grievous bodily harm. In addition, it is also required that the accused has no
reasonable opportunity to retreat before the necessity arose. The fact remains,
though, that this section does not provide any room for the application of the doctrine
of excessive defence.
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Section 37 of Canadian Criminal Code is another provision which provides
justification for an act of self-defence. Section 37 reads:
"(1) Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any one under
his protection from assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary to
prevent the assault or the repetition of it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to justify the willful infliction of
any hurt or mischief that is excessive, having regard to the nature of the
assault that the force used was intended to prevent."
This section extends the scope of self-defence to the defence of others. It is
possible that in a case where the plea of self-defence relies on this section, the court
would have the task of ascertaining the meaning of "any one under his protection" in
the wording of the section. This subsection requires the application of the
proportionality rule to justify the accused's act of defence. Subsection (2) makes it
clear that any force used in the defence, if excessive, will jeopardise his chance of
getting the protection of this section. It is therefore essential to point out that where
the amount of force used is excessive, there is no suggestion that the doctrine of
excessive defence may then be invoked. The straightforward interpretation of the
section would suggest that, in failing the test of proportionality, the accused person
will fail in using this section as a defence and his culpability is then decided
according to his intention at the time of committing the act.
Another provision in the Canadian Criminal Code that is often used in the
plea of self-defence is Section 27.12 This is not specifically a provision relating to
In the case of Regina v. Gee (1983) 139 D.L.R. (3d) 587, the trial judge considered the
defence of self-defence under section 34 and justification under section 27 of the
Criminal Code.
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self-defence as such but, rather, provides a justification for the use of force in
preventing the commission of an offence. The law states:
"Every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary
(a) to prevent the commission of an offence
(i) for which, if it were committed, the person who committed it might be
arrested without warrant, and
(ii) that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person
or property of anyone; or
(b) to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable and probable grounds
he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph (a)."
This provision makes it a requirement that the force used, even though
considerable, be reasonable. If unreasonable force is used to prevent the commission
of a crime, section 27 is therefore inapplicable. By virtue of its reasonable belief
requirement, the provision provides no space for the introduction of the doctrine of
excessive defence.13
Section 8 (3)14 of the Canadian Criminal Code
This section provides the possibility of accepting any rule and principle of
common law in Canadian courts. The law states:
13
This was confirmed in the case of R. v. Gee where Dickson J. in his judgement said:
"In my view, it cannot be said that force can be partially justified. Success under s. 27 leads
to acquittal. If the defence under s.27 does not succeed, the jury should render the verdict
which would have been rendered absent s. 27."
14
Formerly section 7 (3) of the Code.
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"Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstances a
justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force and
applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act of
Parliament, except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or
any other Act of Parliament."
In the case of Regina v. Gee,15 McDermid J. in the Alberta Court of Appeal
upheld the view that the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence could be
introduced in the Canadian courts through this section of the code. But the position
is not as simple as it appears to be. As stated in the provision itself, very strict
conditions have to be fulfilled. The argument for the introduction of Common Law
principle in the courts has always been turned down, mainly on the grounds that the
section makes it a condition that the common law rule intended to be applied must
not contradict Canadian statutory law. The rule also cannot be invoked if the same
matters are already dealt with in Canadian statutory law.
In summary, despite the fact that it has been argued that section 8 (3) provides
room for the operation of the qualified defence in Canadian courts, it is evident that
not one of the quoted statutory provisions suggests that there is any place for the
direct application of the doctrine of excessive defence.
(1983) 139 D.L.R. (3d) 587 at p. 596. This case will be discussed in detail later in this
chapter.
86
3.2 THE DOCTRINE OF EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN
CANADA
The earliest case decided in Canadian courts returning a verdict of
manslaughter when an accused had acted to defend himself, but was excessive in his
defensive act is R. v. Barilla,16 a decision of the British Columbia Court ofAppeal.
The facts of the case were that the accused had joined in a party held in a
friend's home. An argument broke out between the accused's friend and his
neighbour. The accused later took part in the quarrel in his friend's side. The
argument became more serious and the accused fired three shots from his rifle into
the floor to frighten the friend of his neighbour with whom they had the argument.
The neighbour returned with two other men. They knocked at the door, the
accused opened it and with the revolver pointed at the deceased, (who was brought
by the neighbour to help him) said "get out or I will let you have it". The deceased
disregarded the warning and moved forward. The accused then shot him fatally.
The trial judge instructed the jury that if this account of the case were
accepted, the only possible verdict would be one of murder, of which the accused
was subsequently convicted. In the Court of Appeal, this direction was said to have
substantially influenced the jury in delivering their verdict. The direction was held
to be wrong. The Court of Appeal felt that the jury was not properly instructed. The
reason behind the shooting had not been properly dealt with by the trial judge.
[1944] 4 D.L.R. 344.
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In the opinion of the Appellate Court, the jury should have been told that if
they found that firing the revolver as the deceased did was an unnecessarily violent
act of self-defence, it was open to them to find a verdict of manslaughter. The Court
of Appeal concluded that murder was not the proper verdict and allowed the appeal
and substituted a verdict ofmanslaughter.
In its judgement, the Court of Appeal relied on a series of English cases
which returned manslaughter verdicts in cases of this nature.17 The Court concluded
that the accused should be convicted ofmanslaughter based on the argument that the
trial court had failed to give weight to the fact that the accused, in committing the act,
did so as a result of pressing circumstances. The fact that the neighbour brought two
other men - which would certainly have affected the accused's belief of the danger he
was facing - was not stressed to the jury.
In summary, three factors could be said to have influenced the Appellate
Court's decision: firstly, the failure of the trial judge to emphasise the importance of
the background of the case and its effect 011 the accused in exercising his defensive
act; secondly, the moral culpability argument, where the court expressed the view
that to have the accused convicted of murder did not truly reflect the accused's blame
worthiness in the case; and lastly the availability of the "middle path" rule, derived
from English authorities, convinced the Appellate Court that to hold the accused who
used, as the Appellate Court put it, "unnecessary violent act of self-defence", guilty
ofmanslaughter is not a completely new departure.
Mead's and Belt's case, 168 E.R 1006, R. v. Smith (1837) 8 Car & P. 160, 173 E.R 355, R.
v. Odgers 174 E.R 355.
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Reginav. Ouellette.'8
The Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Barilla19 was approved and reasserted
in the subsequent case of R. v. Ouellette. In the trial court, the judge in his direction
to the jury, explained at great length the conditions of self-defence. He insisted, first
of all, on the importance of the defence as derived from the concept of necessity.
Secondly, the force used, according to him, must not be more than was necessary.
Thirdly, the jury must be satisfied that the accused was acting under reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from the violence with which the
assault was originally made. Over and above these requirements, the trial court
stressed the importance of the requirement of what would now known as a "duty to
retreat".
Even though the trial court in detailing the conditions of the defence did
mention the point that the defence must not go beyond what would be necessary, the
outcome in a case where the defence was indeed more than necessary was not
discussed. On this point the Appellate Court found the decision, or rather the trial
judge's direction, to be insufficient and defective.
Sloan C.J.B.C criticised the trial court in failing to direct the jury on
excessive self-defence. He ruled that in a case of self-defence, the verdicts open to
the jury should be, either guilty of murder, guilty of manslaughter and not guilty,
stating:
[1950] 98 C.C.C. 153. This case was decided on the 5th of October 1950 in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.
Supra, fn. 16.
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"You have three verdicts you can render in this case: guilty of murder, guilty of
manslaughter, and not guilty. I have advised you that provocation reduced murder to
manslaughter, that self-defence in the circumstances I have indicated was a
justification and entitles the accused to an acquittal They (the jury) were not
instructed, as they ought to have been, that if they found the appellant acted in self-
defence but used more force than was necessary under the circumstances, they should
bring in the verdict of manslaughter. In my view on the facts and circumstances of
this case, depriving the appellant of this defence was prejudicial to him."20 The
majority judgement quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
O'Halloran J.A., in a minority judgement, expressed the view that the accused
should directly be convicted of manslaughter and there was no need to order a new
trial. The reason for this was that in a new trial there would still be a possibility that
the accused could have been convicted of murder, whereas the facts showed that
there could be no true verdict of murder. At the same time, the case showed that the
accused had done more than was necessary in his defence and he could not believe
that any jury acting rationally could acquit the accused. Thus the only proper verdict
should be one ofmanslaughter on the ground of excessive self-defence.
Accordingly, even though there was some conflict of judicial view as to the
final judgement,21 the judges were in total agreement as to the need for the trial
judge to give instruction to the jury in line with the principle embodied in the
doctrine of excessive self-defence.
R. v. Ouellette, supra, fn. 18 at p. 157.
The majority judgement delivered by Sloan C.J.B.C. ordered a new trial whereas in his
minority judgement, O'Halloran J. expressed the view that the accused should be
convicted ofmanslaughter.
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The issue of excessive self-defence was again dealt with in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in the case of Regina v. Stanley 22 In this case "uninvited
guests" intruded into the accused's house at about two o'clock in the morning. Five
people altogether, all of whom were heavily intoxicated, some of whom the accused
knew and some he had not recognised, forcefully entered his house. The accused in
his defence of himself and, as he also claimed, defence of his dwelling, fatally
stabbed one of the intruders.
At the trial court, the accused was found guilty of murder. In the Court of
Appeal the trial judge's direction was held to be erroneous. It was decided that a new
trial should be conducted and that the charge should be the lesser one of
manslaughter.
The Appellate Court admitted that there was ample authority to support a
strong theory of self-defence and of a defence of one's home or real property.23 The
question then presenting itself for solution by the court was, in the event that the jury
was not satisfied that the accused was acting within the definition of section 34 and
40, what crime did the accused commit? The trial court had found him to be guilty
ofmurder. The Court of Appeal on the other hand, in its judgement elaborated:24
"The real question for determination by the jury in this case was whether or not
Stanley in the circumstances proven in evidence used excessive force under section
34 (1) or caused the death of Blosky by the use of excessive force without a
[ 1977] 36 C.C.C. (2d) 216. This case was decided on the 10th of May 1977 in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.
23
At this stage the court referred to the case of Semaynes 77 E.R. 194, in which case a general
rule was approved: "That the house of every one is to him as his (a) castle and fortress, as
well as his defence against injury and violence as for his repose. ..."
24
Regina v. Stanley, supra, fn. 22 at p. 232.
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reasonable apprehension of death and without a belief based upon reasonable or
probable grounds that he could not otherwise preserve himself or Debbie from death
or grievous bodily harm.
If the force used was not excessive and/or if the death was caused with the
justification offered in s. 34 (2) (a) and (b) then he, Stanley, was justified in killing
Blosky and was not criminally responsible.
On the other hand if the force used was excessive or if the death was caused
in circumstances not coming within the justification offered in s. 34 (2) (a) and (b)
and if there was not an intent within s. 212 (now 229) then the death was caused by
an unlawful act but not in circumstances amounting to murder."
The Appellate Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on an
indictment for manslaughter only and not murder. Although this decision was not a
new approach to a case of such a nature, Branca J.A., in delivering the court's
judgement, made no reference to previous authorities, particularly the case of R v
Barilla. The judgement in line with a "middle path" rule was based essentially on
moral culpability reasons. Nevertheless, the importance of this case lies in the fact
that the doctrine of excessive-defence was once again upheld in the Appellate Court
of British Columbia The moral culpability argument again seemed overwhelming.
In the case of Regina v. Basabaras and Spek25 those cases approving the
doctrine were referred to and discussed.26 The court acknowledged the availability of
[1981] 62 C.C.C. (2d) 13. This case was decided on the 18th of August 1981 in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal.
The court referred to the cases of R. v. Barilla, supra, fn. 16, R. v. Ouellette, supra, fn. 18,
R. v. Deegan[ 1980] 49 C.C.C. (2d) 417 and R v Crothers [1979] 43 C.C.C. (2d) 27 where
the doctrine was approved.
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the qualified defence and its acceptance in the Canadian Courts. Nevertheless, no
formal approval was accorded to it in the discussion. The court dealt with this
question on the basis that there was such a doctrine. They observed that "charges on
self-defence in a case of this kind are always very difficult" but concluded that while
some passages in the charge of the trial judge tended to be confusing, the charge read
as a whole was correct on the issue of self-defence.
In Saskatchewan, the doctrine has met with a similar reception. The leading
case decided in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, as far as the middle path rule is
concern, is in the case ofRegina v. Crothers.21
In this case, the accused shot dead a woman in his farm house. The woman
and her husband had gone to the accused's dwelling for the purpose of obtaining
marijuana which the accused was said to have been keeping there. They failed to get
the marijuana even though a thorough search was said to have been made. This
greatly upset both the deceased and her husband. They began to behave violently
and as a result of some altercation the accused shot the deceased and fatally wounded
her. The accused also fired towards the deceased's husband but did not kill him.
In the trial court, the accused was charged on indictment with first degree
murder. He was acquitted of that charge but was found guilty of manslaughter, on
the grounds of excessive force in self-defence. This was the main reason for the
appeal by the Crown. It was submitted in the Court of Appeal that the trial judge was
wrong in directing the jury on the point of excessive self-defence. The trial judge
said:
[1979] 43 C.C.C. (2d) 27. This case was decided on the 18th of July 1978 in the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.
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"If you conclude on the balance of probabilities not beyond a reasonable doubt, if
you think that it is more likely than not the accused acted in self defence or in the
defence of his home, but that the Crown has shown you beyond a reasonable doubt
that he used too much force you convict of manslaughter. It becomes the same rule
as provocation really. This is another example of the law permitting a crime which is
culpable homicide to be reduced to the lesser of the two crimes, that is,
manslaughter."28
On appeal, the Crown referred to the Privy Council decision of Palmer v. The
Queen,29 stressing its rejection of the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence, and
on the English Criminal Court of Appeal case of Mclnnes v. The Queen30 which
followed the decision in PalmerP The Crown submitted that the judgements in
those two cases, precisely their rejection to the middle path rule, should be followed.
The Court of Appeal, nevertheless, was not persuaded by this argument.
Those two cases were held to be 'not in accord with the law of Canada'. The law
applicable, as affirmed by the Appellate Court, is that set forth in the case of R. v.
Stanley. 32
The Court of Appeal then quoted with approval the judgement of Branca J.A.
when he asserted:
Ibid., at p. 28.
(1971) 55 Cr.App.R. 223.
(1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 551.
Supra, fn. 29.
Supra, fn. 22 at p. 216.
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"... .If the force used was excessive or if the death was caused in circumstances not
coming within s. 34 (2) and if there was not intent within s. 42 of the Criminal Code
then the death was caused by an unlawful act but not in circumstances amounting to
murder Accordingly, the new trial should not be on a charge of murder, but
rather on manslaughter only."33
The significance of this case is not only that the middle path rule was
endorsed but also that, it is perhaps one of the very few cases where the Privy
Council decision in Palmer v. R,34 and the judgement of English Court of Appeal in
Mclnnes35 were rejected. The judgement that a verdict of manslaughter should be
returned in a case where the accused's defensive act was more than what would be
required derived its authority from the previously decided cases, namely the cases of
R. v. Stanley36 and R. v. Barilla 31 The court also accepted the view that an accused
who committed homicide in such pressing circumstances is criminally less culpable
than a cold blooded killer. These arguments were to the Appellate Court highly
persuasive, rendering the need to consider whatever arguments had been adduced in
the two cases decided by the Privy Council and the English Court of Appeal as of no
significance.
The position of the middle path rule was discussed in the Alberta Court of
Appeal in the case of Regina. v. Deegan,38 There was evidence to show that the
R. v. Crothers, supra, fn. 27 at p. 30.
34 Supra, fn. 29.
35 Supra, fn. 30.
36 Supra, fn. 22.
37 Supra, fn. 16.
t2 0
[1980] 49 C.C.C.(2d) 417. This case was decided on the 20th of July 1979 in the Alberta
Court of Appeal.
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accused had struck the deceased before the killing. The deceased went after the
accused, attempted to force a door open and nearly broke it down. The deceased got
into the house and became involved in a fight where he met his death. The accused
pleaded self-defence, defence of property and provocation. The trial judge did not
instruct the jury that it was open to them to bring in a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter, in considering the defence of self-defence where the accused used
more force than a reasonable man in the same circumstances would consider
necessary. The result of this direction was that the accused was convicted of
murder. The accused appealed.
Prowse J.A. concentrated on the point of intention to commit culpable
homicide. He stated that it is incumbent upon the trial judge to consider the intent of
the accused in committing the act of killing and to direct the jury accordingly. From
his judgement, it is abundantly clear that there is a need to differentiate between
intention to kill as stated in section 212 (now 229) and a case where the accused had
the intention to kill in exercising his right of self-defence in section 34 (1) and (2).
In his separate judgement, he concluded by saying:
"If the accused's mind was consumed with an apprehension of death or grievous
bodily harm, his act thereafter "being the purely physical product of such passion,
can it be said that he formulated the requisite specific intent for murder? In my view,
in such circumstances he could not be said to have formed a genuine intent of the
nature required to support such a conviction."39
He explained the view that the trial judge had not given careful attention to
this particular issue, and this, he ruled, was a misdirection. Had the issue been
Ibid., at p.424.
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considered a manslaughter verdict would have been the only reasonable solution. In
the final stage of his judgement, the appropriate direction for excessive defence was
formulated in these terms:
"If you find that the accused's actions were dictated by a fear of death or grievous
bodily harm, or if you are left with a reasonable doubt on that point, then you should
bring in a verdict of manslaughter although you found he used excessive force."40
The significance of this case is that the Court of Appeal emphatically upheld
the need for the trial court to give instructions to the jury in accordance with the
middle path rule. The failure of the trial court to do so was held to be substantially
erroneous. The judgements in R. v. Barilla,41 R. v. Ouellette42 and R. v. Stanley43
were quoted with approval. Here the moral culpability argument is the main
justification for the middle path rule.
In a more recent case, R. v. Fraser,44 the Alberta Court of Appeal approved
the doctrine of excessive self-defence. In this case the accused had been sexually
attacked by the deceased in his house. He initially invited the deceased for a drink
but later became involved in a fight. The accused beat the deceased with a walking





19C.R. (2d) 193. This case was decided on the 21st of November 1980 in the Alberta
Court of Appeal.
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The Crown's theory in the trial court was that the accused attempted to rob the
deceased and that he ran into some difficulty and assaulted the deceased in order to
achieve this criminal purpose. This theory was rejected by the trial judge. The trial
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that the accused was
sexually attacked and the trial judge was also satisfied with the fact that the accused
had justifiably been exercising his defensive act to repel the unlawful attack against
him by the deceased. Having said that, however, it was the opinion of the trial court
that the accused had been excessive in his defence and that he knew that the amount
of force used in his defence was more than necessary. On these grounds, the accused
was convicted ofmanslaughter.
When the matter was brought before the Court of Appeal, the trial judge's
findings were not upheld. The Appellate Court decided that in every case of self-
defence, the court has to consider the six propositions laid down in the Australian
case of Viro v. The Queen.45 Particular reference was made to paras 5 and 6 of the
formulations where it is suggested that where the jury is satisfied that the accused
employed more force than necessary, he must have the belief that the force used is
reasonably proportionate to the danger he is facing. If he did not have such a belief,
the verdict should be murder. If he has that belief, however, it is open to the court to
convict him of manslaughter. The formulations stressed the importance of the belief
of the accused at the time of resisting the attack that it has to be reasonably
proportionate to the danger he faces. If the jury is satisfied that he has that belief, he
should be convicted ofmanslaughter, otherwise, he should be convicted of murder.
Now, by adopting the propositions formulated in Viro v. The Queen, it is
required that in a situation where the accused believes that the amount of force used
is not "reasonably proportionate" (which means he knows that it was excessive) at
45
(1978) 141 C.L.R. 88, (1978) 52 A.L.J.R. 416.
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the time of exercising his defensive act, this will require him to be convicted of
murder.
The trial court, however, in the course of its judgement assumed that the
accused knew the fact that his act was indeed excessive.46 At this point, the
Appellate Court decided that the trial court's direction was substantially erroneous. If
this direction were to be accepted, by virtue of directive 5 and 6 of Viro's formulation
which the Appellate Court adopted, the accused could never have been convicted of
manslaughter but would have to be convicted of murder.
Moir J.A.'s judgement deals quite extensively with the doctrine of excessive
force in self-defence. He describes the doctrine in Canada as "in a very
unsatisfactory state".47 Having said that, however, the judge in his majority
judgement refers to the decision of Supreme Court of Canada in Linney v. The
Queen,48 The decision in that case, though not expressly approving the principle of
middle-path rule, did not disapprove it. This, according to the Court of Appeal,
allows for the application of the doctrine.
In the course of the judgement the Court of Appeal quoted the trial court's decision:
"However the accused did know what he was doing at the time, and I refer here to the fact
that he knew that he was hitting the deceased and he knew he was inflicting harm upon
Bjornson.
"It does sound to me to be reasonable and logical, as was postulated by detective Barrow,
that the accused found himself in a situation where he felt things had gotten out of hand and
was striking out to defend what he thought was a difficult position for himself.
"In my view, I accept the case which suggest that, in a situation where elements of
provocation and self-defence exist, the use of excessive force does not constitute
murder but constitutes manslaughter.
"I therefore come to the conclusion that, under the peculiar facts of this case and under the
evidence, interpreted as best as 1 can, the accused is not guilty ofmurder but is guilty of
manslaughter." R. v. Fraser, supra, fn. 44 at p. 214.
In his judgement he said that the acceptance of the doctrine was inconsistent in the
Canadian Courts. Decisions of various Courts of Appeal go in both directions and,
indeed, may be inconsistent within the same court. Ibid., at p. 218.
[1978] 73 D.L.R. (3d) 4.
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The judge also makes reference to the cases of R. v. Howe49 and R. v.
McKay,50 the two Australian cases where the doctrine was said to have originated.
The court in its conclusion accepted with approval the six propositions enunciated
by Mr. Justice Mason in Viro v. The Queen.51 In addition to the six propositions,
which are now laid down as requirements for trial judges in dealing with self-defence
case, the Appellate Court also laid down three conditions for the defence of
excessive self-defence;
1. Certain serious circumstances must exist which led the accused to
reasonably believe that a situation involving danger existed.
2. The accused used unreasonable or excessive force.
3. The accused was acting honestly when he used excessive force, in that he
mistakenly believed that the degree of force he was using was reasonable.
Like Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen, Moir J.A. also justified his acceptance
of the doctrine by reference to the moral culpability argument. Moir J.A. thus stated:
" the defence of self-defence, which fails because of excessive force, operates
so as to excuse the intent to kill or injure where the surrounding circumstances are
such as to reduce the moral culpability of the accused, as it does in provocation, and
may make the crime manslaughter, not murder."52
(1958) 100 C.L.R. 448.
[1957] V.R. 560.
Supra, fn. 45.






Of all the explanations provided in the Canadian cases, the matter of utmost
importance is the acceptance of the excessive defence defence in the Alberta Court of
Appeal. With the acceptance of the six propositions set forth in Viro v. The Queen,53
the approval of the moral culpability argument, the implicit rejection of the case of
Palmer v. R. ,54 and the three conditions that have now been formulated, the doctrine
was now, following this case, set to be the law in the Alberta Court of Appeal.55
In the Province of Ontario, a similar discussion of the application of the
doctrine has taken place in its Criminal Court of Appeal. In the case of R. v. Hay56
one of the grounds of appeal submitted by counsel for the appellant was that the
accused was entitled to rely on the defence of excessive defence. The facts were that
the accused, in protecting his common law wife against an attack from the deceased,
fired several shots at him. The first shot was discharged at the time when the
deceased was approaching within arm's length of the appellant's wife. This shot
apparently had stopped the deceased from carrying out his intention to attack the
appellant's wife. He stopped and fell to the ground. However, when the appellant
was leaving the locus, the deceased tried to seize him by the foot; the appellant fired
two more shots, causing the deceased's immediate death.
The appellant counsel's submission of excessive defence was rejected.
However, it is to be stressed here that no attempt was made by the court to clarify
53 Supra, fn. 45.
54 Supra, fn. 29.
The approval of the six propositions laid down by Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Queen was
significant. The propositions had now been overruled by the case of Fadil Zecevic, (1986-
1987) 25 A.Crim.R. 163, in the High Court of Australia. In was not clear whether this
decision affected Moir J.'s judgement. However, since the doctrine itself was disapproved in
the Canadian Supreme Court, the need to elaborate on the controversial propositions seems
unnecessary.
22 C.R.N.S 191 (Ont.C.A.). This case was decided on the 16th ofApril 1973 in the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
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the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence. This was apparently because the
Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the nature of the accused's repelling
force did not qualify him for even the defence of self-defence.
Similarly in the case of R. v. Balasiuk,57 the Ontario Court of Appeal did not
make any meaningful contribution to discussion of the doctrine. This is probably
due to the fact that the appellate court in its judgement did not believe that there was
evidence upon which it could be found that the force used by the accused was more
than was necessary to enable him to defend himself. 58 Hence, even though
excessive defence was in issue, no significant discussion appears in the judgement in
this case.
The Ontario Court of Appeal was once again confronted with the same issue
in the case of Regina v. Trecroce.59 Having dealt with the issue very briefly in the
previous cases, this time the doctrine of excessive force was discussed at
considerable length. Counsel for the appellant in this case urged as a ground of
appeal that the trial judge had erred in failing to instruct the jury that excessive self-
defence leads to a conviction for manslaughter. It was held that the accused had no
substantial ground on which to plead the defence of excessive self-defence since his
main defence was, in actual fact, not excessive defence but rather that the shots
which caused the death of his wife were discharged accidentally. However the court
still found it appropriate to elaborate on the doctrine because of its importance for
future cases.
28 C.R.N.S 263 (Ont. C.A). This case was decided on the 17th of January 1975 in the
Ontario Court of appeal..
Ibid., at p. 264.
[1981] 55 C.C.C. (2d) 200. This case was decided on the 29th of September 1980 in the
Ontario Court of Appeal.
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The court recognised that the doctrine had been the subject of considerable
discussion in Canadian courts. As appears from the judgement, the Appellate Court
itself was not prepared openly to declare the availability of the doctrine, even while
acknowledging the approval of the qualified defence by some provincial courts.60
Martin J.A., in delivering the courts judgement, was cautious in his
discussion of the defence but nevertheless expressed the court's willingness to accept
it as a substantive doctrine if a genuine case of that kind were to come before the
court for its determination.61 This is shown by the fact that he laid down three
requirements for the defence:
1. The accused must have been justified in using some force to defend himself
against an attack, real or reasonably apprehended.
2. The accused must have honestly believed that he was justified in using the force
that he did.
3. The force used was excessive only because it exceeded what the accused could
reasonably have considered necessary.
In this case the court did not formally pronounce on the validity of the
doctrine. However, at the same time it did not indicate any disagreement with the
essence of the qualified defence. One might conclude, then, that if a genuine case
The court referred to the case of R. v. Barilla, supra, fn. 16, R. v. Ouellelte, supra, fn. 18 and
R. v. Crothers, supra, fn. 27.
It has to be noted that even though the qualified defence was thoroughly discussed, the facts
of the case itself did not really relate to the doctrine. The court repeatedly stressed that the
accused's defence was not that he shot the deceased three times in self-defence honestly
believing that he was justified in doing so but, rather, that the gun discharged accidentally in
a struggle with the deceased for possession of the gun.
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arose which necessitated the court's taking account of the doctrine, there is a strong
possibility that it would be applied.
Two years after Trecroce62 was decided, the Ontario Court of Appeal was
once again faced with the question of the validity of the qualified defence. In R. v.
Reilly63 the point faced by the Appellate Court was whether the trial judge erred in
not giving directions on the qualified defence to the jury. It was unanimously held
that there was no substantial error on the part of the trial judge in not directing the
jury on the defence of excessive defence.
4
However, the significance of this case lies in the clear approval accorded by
Arnup J.A. to the qualified defence. As the judge said:
"In the light of the decisions of the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia, Alberta,
and Saskatchewan, and upon considering of the careful review of the subject by
Martin J.A. in Campbell, supra, and Trecroce, supra, I have reached the conclusion
that the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence rendering the accused guilty only
ofmanslaughter instead of murder should be recognised in Ontario."64
Arnup J.A. also accepted the three prerequisites of excessive defence laid
down by Martin J. in R. v. Trecroce.65 The court went on to find that the appellant
had not honestly believed that he was justified in using such amount of force (the
first test) and also that the force used was greatly in excess of what the appellant
62 Supra, fn. 59.
[1982] 66 C.C.C.(2d) 146. This case was decided on the 9th ofMarch 1982 in the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
64
Ibid., at p. 160.
65 Supra, fn. 59.
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could have considered reasonable (the second test). And it is on this basis that the
appeal was dismissed.
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3.3 EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN THE CANADIAN
SUPREME COURT
3.3.1 The case of Brisson v. The Queen66
The doctrine of excessive self-defence was discussed quite extensively by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Brisson v. The Queen.61 The accused in his
statement to the police said that on the day of the killing, he picked up a tramp (the
deceased) with whom he later had dinner, and then drove around with him. The
accused was seated in the back of the automobile and had been drinking consistently.
They had a disagreement and started to quarrel. The deceased was said to have
struck the accused with a half-full bottle but did not cause him any serious injury.
The accused tried to calm him down but was not successful. He then pushed the
deceased into a corner, stretched his arm over the back seat, took a bottle and hit the
deceased on the head. It was proved that the deceased met his death as a result of the
severe injury sustained from the blow.
The accused was found guilty ofmurder in the trial court. His appeal in the
Quebec Court of Appeal was based inter alia, on the argument that the trial judge had
erred in not leaving to the jury the qualified defence of use of excessive force in self-
defence so as to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter. The Quebec Court of
Appeal turned down this argument. It was on the basis of the same submission that
he then brought the matter to the Canadian Supreme Court.




In the Supreme Court, Dickson C.J. reviewed in great detail the position of
the doctrine and its application in the common law and code jurisdictions. First of all
he referred to a series of decided cases in Canadian provincial courts which dealt
with the same question. The case of R. v. Barilla68 was first cited. He commented
that this was the main case on which later decisions were based in their search for
authority on excessive defence.69
After acknowledging the importance of R. v. Barilla, the judge then cited the
cases of R. v. Ouelllette,70 R. v. Basabaras and Spek,71 R. v. Stanley72 where
judgements were delivered approving the application of the defence as set forth in R.
v. Barilla.
The court discussed also the case of R v. Fraser73 where Moir J. made some
useful observations on the issue. Moir J. as well as many other judges and lawyers in
favour of the doctrine, based their approval predominantly on moral culpability
arguments. However. Dickson J. had his own opinion on this point. He shared the
same view as others in appreciating the need to find a middle path rule to deal with
the case of a person who in defending his life, used more force than was necessary.
However he also believed that there would be a need for Parliamentary approval74of
such a fundamental change in the law.
68 Supra, fn. 16.
69
The decision at the same time noting the fact that in R. v. Barilla, ibid., the middle path rule
was taken from English authorities.
70 Supra, fn. 18.
71 Supra, fn. 25.
72 Supra, fn. 22.
73 Supra, fn. 44.
74
Brisson v. The Queen, supra, fn. 66 at p. 696. Dickson J. explained that Parliament had
approved the verdict of manslaughter in a case involving an element of provocation. For this
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In its acceptance of the doctrine, the court in R. v. Fraser15
went on to adopt the six propositions set out by Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Oueen,76
On this issue, Dickson J. was as sceptical as were other judges as to the practicability
of the test; whether or not it could be translated into practice with the necessary
smoothness.77 On this issue the judge expressed the view: "If the law of Canada is as
above and judges must henceforth give juries instructions on the issue of
manslaughter arising from excessive use of force in self-defence along the lines of
those set forth by Mason J. in Viro v. The Queen, I cannot but think that the task of
the jury, presently difficult enough in a murder case, will be vastly more so."78
Dickson J., then proceeded to make reference to other provincial decisions
relating to the same issue. The decisions of Ontario Court of Appeal in the cases of
R. v. Hay19 and R v. Trecroce&0 were highlighted. It is implicit from his commentary
on those decisions that he acknowledged the fact that none of those cases
disapproved the basic principle of the doctrine.
matter, s.215 of the Canadian Criminal Code had therefore dealt with the issue of
provocation. The guidelines and conditions of the defence were hence articulated. From this
judgement, one might infer that in the opinion of the court, if the qualified defence of
excessive defence is to be applied the same standing must be set out. This would mean a
clear set of provisions explaining the application of the qualified defence must be made in
the Criminal Code. In the absence of this parliamentary approval, the qualified defence
could not be said to be part of Canadian criminal law.
Supra, fn. 44.
Supra, fn. 45.
It is to be noted here that this prediction was made before it was formally recognised in
the High Court of Australian case of FadU Zecevic. [1986-1987] 25 A. Crim. R. 163. The
six propositions of Mason C.J. could be said to have greatly contributed to the demise of the
doctrine of excessive self-defence in Australia.




The judgement of R. v. Reilly,S] where Arnup J.A. had openly approved the
doctrine, was discussed, but the Supreme Court was not entirely convinced by the
reasoning behind the Ontario Appeal Court's recognition of the qualified defence.
The court's criticism was primarily directed towards the question of the argument of
the real need for the existence of the doctrine itself. The Supreme Court was of the
opinion that what was lacking in the Appeal Court's decision was any acceptable
explanation of why the use of excessive force should reduce murder to
manslaughter.82 It appears, then, that the moral culpability argument, so often
regarded as a justification in support of the defence, was not acceptable or perhaps
was not strong enough to validate the middle path rule.
Another criticism made of the Appeal Court's judgement is that no reference
was made to the Criminal Code in the discussion of excessive defence. Dickson J.
did not elaborate on this point, but it could be assumed that this would mean, in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, that no provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code
provide any justification for the introduction of the qualified defence, and that not
referring to the Criminal Code amounted to a substantial error. Therefore, even
though the doctrine was accepted in the Appeal Court, the reasons for the acceptance
did not entirely satisfy the Supreme Court in the present case.
The unanimous decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Appleby83
is significant in the sense that it was the only Court of Appeal in Canada which has
81 Supra, fn. 63.
82
Dickson J. in commenting the judgement of Arnup J. in R. v. Reilly, ibid., said:
"The judgement does not say why the use of excessive force in self-defence should reduce
murder to manslaughter, nor is there reference to the Criminal Code." This statement shows
that in the opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court, any attempt to introduce the doctrine
needs to be laid down clearly in the Criminal Code as the main source of Canadian Criminal
Law. Brisson v. The Queen, supra, fn. 66 at p. 699.
83
[1979] 1 W.W.R. 664.
109
rejected the doctrine. The Appeal Court decided that the law applicable in Canada is
similar to that applicable in England. The court accordingly decided that the
decision of Palmer v. R..M correctly stated the law of self-defence. However, despite
the fact that reference was made to this case, there is no evidence to suggest that the
Supreme Court was overwhelmingly influenced by this conclusion in its rejection of
the doctrine in the present case.
Finally the Supreme Court ended its review on the availability of the doctrine
in Canada by referring to its own decision in Linney v. The Queen In his
commentary on this case, Dickson J. maintained that the only question in Linney was
whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that if they were in doubt as
to whether the act of killing was provoked it was their duty to reduce the offence
from murder to manslaughter. Therefore, excessive force in self-defence was not
essentially the main issue in the Supreme Court's judgement in that case.
Accordingly any attempt to say that that case implied the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the qualified defence was incorrect.86
After this extensive review, the court summed up by saying: "A review of the
Canadian authorities shows a singular lack of uniformity in result and in reasoning.
It is difficult to say that the cases follow any pattern, or the law of any country, or
that, to date, any clear statement of principle has emerged."87 This was concluded
after taking note that the majority of the Provincial Courts of Appeal had decided not
to reject the doctrine or not to comment on this issue.
84 Supra, fn. 29.
85
Supra, fn. 48.
In R. v. Fraser, supra, fn. 44, the Alberta Court of Appeal had by contrast decided that in the
absence of a clear disapproval of the qualified defence, the Supreme Court's decision in
Linney case provides justification for its acceptance.
87 -
Brisson v. The Queen, supra, fn. 66 at p. 700.
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3.3.2 Commentary
It is apparent from the judgement that the line of favourable decisions in the
Canadian provincial courts did not necessarily provide a convincing reason to
persuade the Supreme Court to apply lire doctrine atrd formally pronounce its validity
in Canadian Criminal Law. The lack of uniformity and consistency among the
Canadian courts in the application of the doctrine only strengthened the Supreme
Court's conviction against it. The primary reason, however, for the Supreme Court's
hesitation in adopting the doctrine was the Criminal Code itself. It was pointed out
that sections 25 to 45 of the Criminal Code sufficiently covered the occasions on
which the use of force was legally justified. The introduction of the doctrine would
substantially contradict the provisions of the Code, especially sections 25 to 45.88
Finally, section 34 of the Code, which specifically deals with the defence of self-
defence, does not provide any room for the doctrine.
In summary, the Supreme Court's judgement in this case was not in line with
many Provincial Court decisions, with the exception of the judgement of Manitoba
Court of Appeal in R. v. Appleby,89 The rationalisations of the doctrine in the
Provincial Appellate Courts were not sufficiently cogent to justify its formal
recognition. The decision was therefore a serious blow to the proponents of the
qualified defence; instead of waiting for formal recognition, it has now been rejected
in the highest court in the country.
The Supreme Court came to this conclusion after quoting the Tasmanian case of
Masnec v. The Queen [1962] Tas. S.R. 254, where it was said that Sections 46 and 47 of the
Tasmanian Criminal Code covered comprehensively the occasions on which the use of
force was legally justified. The Supreme Court thus said that Sections 25 to 45 of the
Canadian Criminal Code equally cover comprehensively and authoritatively the occasions on
which the use of force is legally justified. There would seem little room for competing or
supplementary common law doctrine. Ibid., at p. 702.
Supra, fn. 83.
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3.3.3 The case ofReiIly v. The Queen90
When this case came before the Ontario Criminal Court of Appeal, it was
decided by Arnup J. that the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence was plausible
in its essence and formal approval of it was accordingly made.91 However, when it
progressed to the Supreme Court of Canada, the qualified defence received a
different reception altogether. The Supreme Court, even though recognising the
weight of Arnup J.'s judgement, rejected the doctrine after detailed analysis. The
main reason for this was that the court felt bound by its previous decision in the case
of R. v. Faicf2 where, in the unanimous judgement delivered by Mr. Justice Dickson,
the doctrine was rejected.
3.3.4 The case of R. v. Gee93
The question of the validity of the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence
underwent an interesting development in the case of R. v. Gee. The facts of the case
were that on the day of the killing, the two accused persons, a male and female
prostitute, with one of their friends were at the deceased's home. They had a drink
together a short time before the killing. The accused/respondents claimed that while
[1985] 13 D.L.R.(4th)161. This case was decided on the first November 1984 in the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court of Appeal stated:
"In the light of the decisions of the Courts of appeal British Columbia, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan, and upon consideration of the careful review of the subject by Martin J.A. in
Campbell, supra, and Trecrose, supra, I have reached the conclusion that the doctrine of
excessive force in self-defence rendering the accused guilty only of manslaughter instead of
murder should be recognised." Regina v. Reilly, 66 C.C.C. (2d)146 at p. 160.
145 D.L.R. (3d) 67. This case will be discussed at p. 116 below.
Supra, fn. 15. This case was decided on the 9th of August 1982 in the Canadian
Supreme Court.
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they were in the dressing room a fight broke between the deceased and their friend.
In an attempt to stop the deceased, they then hit the deceased several times on the
head. These blows proved to be fatal. At the trial court they were convicted of
second degree murder.
McDermit J. in delivering his judgement in the Alberta Court of Appeal,
accepted that the law in Canada was the same as the law in Australia and that the
honest although mistaken belief that no more force is being used than is necessary is
a defence that reduces what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.94 This
amounted to ruling that the Australian doctrine of excessive force in self-defence is
recognised and applicable in Canadian courts. The decision was based on the
argument that section 7 (3) (now 8 (3)) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides
room for the introduction of the doctrine in Canada.95 The justification for the
reduction of murder to manslaughter was found in the moral culpability argument;
that a person who uses more force than is necessary but not more than he honestly
but mistakenly believes is necessary to prevent the commission of a violent crime, is
less culpable than a cold blooded murderer.
The doctrine received an entirely different reception when the case was
brought to Supreme Court of Canada. The validity of the doctrine as accepted in
Alberta Court of Appeal was, not surprisingly, the primary issue for the court's
determination. It was concluded that the doctrine could not be accepted under the
Canadian Criminal Code. The judge referred to the judgement of R. v. Brisson,96
where the doctrine was rejected, and the same arguments were reasserted.
Ibid., at p. 596.






The main reason for the rejection was simply that the Canadian Criminal
Code is self-sufficient. In other words the argument underlying the rejection of the
doctrine was based on the fact that the doctrine itself could not fit any of the
provisions in the Code. Whether an offence is murder or manslaughter had already
clearly been explained. The Supreme Court went on to explain that Section 205 of
the code is a clear provision regarding the category of homicide. The provision
stated that homicide is either non-culpable, in which case it is not an offence and
completely justifiable, or culpable. Culpable homicide thus is murder or
manslaughter or infanticide.
Section 212 (now 229) further explains that culpable homicide is murder
when the person who causes the death of a human being means to cause death or
means to cause bodily harm, or knows that he will cause bodily harm and is reckless
whether death ensues or not. In the absence of that intent or of recklessness, culpable
homicide is manslaughter or infanticide.
Now, returning to the case under discussion, it is to be noted that the
argument put forward by the respondents (accused) was that the killing was done in
an attempt to prevent the commission of a crime.97 In this regard therefore, the
relevant provision available in the Criminal Code is section 27, which reads:
"Every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary
(a) to prevent the commission of an offence
The main defence claimed by the accused was actually one of the prevention of the
commission of an offence. The gist of the respondent's argument was that, should the
qualified defence of excessive force in self-defence exist in Canada, then, by analogy, the
qualified defence of excessive force in the prevention of an offence should also be admitted.
Obviously in deciding the authoritativeness of this claim discussion has to be made
regarding the position of the defence of excessive defence in Canada.
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i) for which, if it were committed, the person who committed it might
be arrested without warrant, and
ii) that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the
person or property of anyone; or
(b) to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable or probable ground
he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph
(a)."
This provision, if successfully pleaded would entitle the accused to a complete
acquittal. Where it is rejected, the crime committed is one of murder, if the accused
has the required intent. In the absence of that intent, it would be manslaughter, not
because of partial justification under section 27, but because the special mental
element required for guilt of murder has not been proven.
Based on these arguments, the Supreme Court finally concluded that, the
defence of excessive defence as in Australia could not be applied in Canadian courts.
The Canadian Criminal Code has no room for the qualified defence. Section 27 of
the Code has therefore provided no space for the introduction of the half-way house
principle.
3.3.5 Commentary
The Supreme Court had again rejected the middle path principle, while
simultaneously rejecting arguments in support of it. The reason behind the rejection
was predominantly based on the fact that the Canadian Criminal Code provides no
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room for the adoption of the doctrine. In the course of the reasons for judgement,
however, the judge made special reference only to the case of Brisson v The Queen
and the reasoning elaborated in that case was found to be so compelling to follow.
3.3.6 The case ofR. v. FaicR%
The facts of the case were that the accused had a fight with the deceased in
the trailer which they were sharing, before the deceased was stabbed to death. The
accused admitted to having had a quarrel with the deceased and testified that he was
about to leave when the deceased stopped him. In the ensuing struggle the deceased
produced a knife but the accused managed to obtain this weapon after hitting the
deceased with a wrench. The accused then again tried to leave when, according to
his statement in the court, he saw the deceased heading for a loaded spear gun. At
that time, he thought that his life was in serious danger and accordingly stabbed the
deceased three times in the back.
He was convicted of second degree murder in the trial court. In the Alberta
Court of Appeal, the murder conviction was quashed on the basis that the trial judge
had failed to direct the jury on the defence of excessive force in self-defence and also
failed to leave the defence of provocation. A new trial was hence ordered on the
charge of second degree murder. The Crown appealed in order to test the validity of
the Appeal Court's decision in the Canadian Supreme Court. Among the issues
argued was that the judgement in favour of excessive defence defence was erroneous
and could not be justified under the Canadian Criminal Code.
Supra, fn. 92. This case was decided on the first of March 1983.
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In the Supreme Court, the Crown's appeal was allowed and the trial court
murder conviction was reinstated. Thus, the Alberta Court of Appeal's recognition of
the qualified defence was once again reversed by the Supreme Court's judgement.
3.3.7 Reasons for the Supreme Court's rejection of the doctrine
The Supreme Court, through the judgement of Dickson J., firmly stressed the
inapplicability of the qualified defence in Canada. The judgement implicitly
demonstrated the court's strong conviction that the Canadian Criminal Code has
sufficiently dealt with murder charges. Even though mention was made of the Court
of Appeal's references to cases stressing the importance of trial judges giving a
direction relating to the qualified defence, this did not necessarily demonstrate that it
had been part of the Canadian criminal law.
The leading case referred to was that of Brisson v. The Queen," and it is
clear that Dickson J.'s judgement amounted to a repetition of the majority judgement
delivered by himself in Brisson v. The Queen.
As a result of the judgement in this case, the Canadian Supreme Court's
approach towards the charge of murder could be explained thus: in a case where the
accused is proved to have acted in self-defence, satisfying section 34 of the Criminal
Code, he is entitled to a complete acquittal. Where the jury is not satisfied that he
could rely on this section as a defence - perhaps on the basis of the excessive force
used in the course of his defence - it does not automatically mean that a murder
conviction is the only verdict left for the court. The jury now has to satisfy itself that
he has the requisite intent, as laid down in section 229 (formerly 212 (a)) of the
99 Supra, fn. 66.
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Code, to commit murder. If the jury is not convinced that he had that intention, then
he will be held guilty of manslaughter. The central point here is that the reason for a
manslaughter verdict is not because there exists the qualified defence of excessive
defence, but rather because the Code itself provides the alternative of manslaughter
in section 212 (a) by virtue of lack of the necessary intent for murder and perhaps, if
successfully pleaded, the defence of provocation under section 215.
This judgement again crystallises the Supreme Court's conviction that the
Canadian Criminal Code is in itself complete in dealing with murder charges and
therefore the need to introduce the qualified defence should not arise.
3.3.8 Excessive force in self-defence in the case ofBayard v. ^..'00
This is a case where in a fight the accused stabbed the deceased thirteen times
with a pocket knife. The deceased met his death as a result of the serious injury
suffered from the stabbing. The accused admitted the stabbing, but pleaded self-
defence. In the course of the trial, the judge directed the jury that if they concluded
that the accused used more force than was necessary, their verdict would be
manslaughter. The accused was consequently acquitted of the charge of second
degree murder and manslaughter. The Crown appealed and the main ground of
appeal was that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury on excessive defence.
The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and
ordered a new trial. On the issue of excessive defence, Carrothers J.A. held that the
trial judge should have instructed the jury that a finding of excessive force should
100
(1989) 70 C.R. (3d) 95. This case was decided on the 22nd of March 1989 in the
Supreme Court of Canada.
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lead to a verdict of murder rather than manslaughter, subject only to a finding that the
accused lacked one of the two intents for murder. It is thus apparent from the
majority judgement that the use of excessive force in self-defence could not reduce
what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.
The judgement was strongly dissented from by Lambert J.A. and his
dissenting judgement was upheld in the Supreme Court. Lambert J.A. held that there
had been no misdirection on the part of the trial judge and the jury's verdict of
acquittal should be restored.
This judgement was based on the argument that where the use of force is
excessive, in applying section 34 (1), a manslaughter verdict could properly be
upheld.101 Section 34 (1) provides that someone is justified in repelling an
unprovoked attack, if the force used did not intend to cause death or grievous bodily
harm. In the event where one has the intention to cause death or grievous bodily
harm, (as stated in section 229 (a)), this subsection could not be used as a defence.
However, where the accused had no intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm,
but used an amount of force greater than was necessary, the verdict could be one of
manslaughter. Therefore, on this basis, the trial judge's instruction to the jury on the
possible verdict of manslaughter in a case where the use of force was excessive did
not lead to any substantial injustice in the final outcome of the trial.
This dissenting judgement of Lambert J.A., together with the reasoning he
employed, were fully ratified and adopted in the Canadian Supreme Court through
Wilson J. in delivering the court's judgement. The main question that arises from the
Supreme Court's judgement in this case is whether this judgement means that the
In this case it was accepted that the jury were considering section 34(1) in reaching their
conclusion.
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defence of excessive force has now been accepted in the Supreme Court after it was
previously, on many occasions, rejected? To answer this question it is necessary to
look at the main issue intended to be decided by the court. The main point for the
Supreme Court's determination was not to decide on the validity of the doctrine or its
application in the Canadian court. The case was rather confined specifically to the
interpretation of section 34 (1) of the Criminal Code. That particular section was, as
Lambert J. explained in his dissenting judgement, capable of allowing a person to be
convicted only ofmanslaughter where in his defence to an unlawful and unprovoked
attack, he had not intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm but judged
objectively, had exceeded the force that would actually have been required at that
particular moment. And the main reason for allowing manslaughter instead of
murder in this instance is because from the very beginning the accused had no
intention to cause death or bodily injury.
This case did not deal with the situation where an accused, while intending
to cause death or serious bodily harm, used excessive force in his act of defence, but
honestly (albeit unreasonably) believed that the force used was necessary. In the
light of previous authority, it seems that excessive defence has no application in
Canadian Criminal Law and the judgement in this case has not altered the position.
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3.4 EXCESSIVE DEFENCE IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
AFTER BRISSONv. THE QUEEN102
3.4.1 The case of R. v. Simon Wah Man Siunn
This was a murder case where the accused shot dead a person with whom he
had had an altercation. He testified that he was about to leave the place when he
heard someone yell a racial epithet at him. A moment after that, the deceased came
towards his car and pulled something metal from the side of his body. He felt his life
was threatened and in response to it, he fired shots into the air and started to drive
away. In so doing, he hit a telephone pole. According to the accused, the deceased
then started walking towards the car, reached in and nicked his cheek. That again
made him feel threatened and in consequence he fired several shots and drove away.
The deceased was killed by these shots. At trial the accused was found guilty of
second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for
parole for ten years.
In the course of the trial, the trial judge instructed the jury to the effect that if
they were satisfied that the accused had used more force than was required in
protecting his life and repelling the purported attack, he had thereby deprived himself
of the defence of self-defence.104
Supra, fn. 66.
12 C.R.(4th) 356. This case was decided on the 4th of March 1992 in the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.
The direction reads: "[Y]ou've heard evidence that the accused claimed that he acted in
self-defence when he killed Davies. You may find that the accused used excessive force in
the circumstances. Shouldyou find that, he thus deprives himselfofthe defence ofself-
defence." Ibid., at p. 367.
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This direction became one of the main grounds of appeal. In the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, section 34 (1) and (2) and section 35 of the Code were
given meticulous attention and the main task of the court was to decide the validity
of the trial judge's instruction to the jury on those provisions.
No objection was taken by counsel for the accused concerning section 34
(l).105 The appeal hence concentrated on the trial court's direction on section 34 (2),
and 35 the essence of which was to deny the accused the defence under section 34 (2)
and 35 if the jury were satisfied that his act of defence was excessive.
The Court of Appeal decided that this direction was erroneous in its
substance. The reason for this decision could be explained thus: the court explained
that there are major differences between section 34 (1) on the one hand and section
34 (2) and 35 on the other, that the trial court in directing the jury on these provisions
must take into consideration. The first difference lies in the fact that section 34 (1)
relates to cases where there is no intention on the part of the accused to cause death
or to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim, whereas the other two could protect
the accused even if he was proved to have an intention to kill or cause serious injury
to the victim.
Secondly, the language of section 34 (1) entails the proportionality
requirement. In contrast, the condition that the accused must be proportionate in his
defence does not exist in sections 34 (2) and 35.106 The trial judge in dealing with
The direction requires the jury to be satisfied that the accused used no more force than is
necessary to defend himself from the attack. The direction reads: " It must have been
proportional to the force launched against him by Davies. If the force was more than
necessary in the circumstances, then the defence of self defence isn't available to him."
Ibid.., at p. 362.
This difference was recognised in the case of R. v. Mulder (1978) 40 C.C.C. (2d) 1, where
the court says:
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these issues appeared not to have taken the distinction seriously when he instructed
the jury on the point that the accused must not be excessive in his act of defence
against the deceased. Whereas it is acceptable to require the accused not to be
excessive in his defence under section 34 (1), the same requirement could not arise in
considering section 34 (2) and 35.
The trial judge's direction on sections 34 (2) and 35 might have been
construed as an invitation, first to consider whether the conduct of the accused fell
within the protection of section 34 (2) or 35, and secondly, to consider whether an
additional unstated prohibition against excessive force disqualified the accused from
the benefit of that defence. This, as stated in the main ground of the judgement, was
held to be substantially erroneous.
3.4.2 The requirement of reasonable belief and proportionality in
section 34
Another reason for the rejection of the proportionality requirement as
suggested by the trial court stems from the fact that the law has made it a condition
that the accused should reasonably believe that his defensive act is really necessary in
resisting the attack. The position as required by the law could thus be explained: if
the accused reasonably believed that the amount of force used in his defence was
necessary at that particular moment, that reasonable belief, if accepted by the jury,
would in itself negate the possibility that his defensive act was excessive. The
"This section [s.37] introduces the concept of'proportionate force'; it must not be more than
is necessary to prevent the assault. There is no similar language in s. 34(2). The jury might
well draw the erroneous inference that the degree of force permitted under the two section
was the same,..."
The same conclusion was also made in the case ofRegina v. Bogue, supra, fn. 6.
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accused's act could only be excessive if he did not believe that the force used was
necessary, in which case, sections 34 (2) or 35 of the Code could not be relied upon.
Having said that, however, it was further elaborated that, on failing on
sections 34 (2) and 35 it does not follow automatically that the verdict must be
murder. The accused could still be convicted of the lesser crime ofmanslaughter, but
not on the ground of the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence, but on the basis
of lack of intent to kill or to cause serious injury as stated in other parts of the
Criminal Code.
3.4.3 The Court ofAppeal's decision and its effect on the doctrine
of excessive self-defence
The decision of the Appeal Court may also be viewed as indirectly
reaffirming the proposition that there is no room in the Canadian Criminal Code,
particularly in sections 34 (2) and 35, for the introduction of the doctrine of excessive
self-defence. As far as the two provisions are concerned, it is the belief of the
accused based on reasonable and probable grounds that his life and well being are
seriously threatened at the time of such an agonising situation that decides his
criminal liability. Even if the amount of force would appear, generally speaking, to
be more than necessary, if he believed that the manner in which he defended himself
was the only way for him to survive, and the jury were satisfied that the belief was
reasonably held, he would be acquitted under the terms of the section. However, if
the jury decided that his defensive act was unreasonable, he could be found guilty of
murder if he were found to have the necessary intent as laid down in section 229
(previously 212 (a)). There simply exists no middle path rule in this respect.
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3.4.4 Commentary
The main issue discussed in the Appeal Court was whether or not the trial
judge had erred in his charge to the jury regarding section 34 (1) and (2) and section
35 of the Canadian Criminal Code. The direction specified that the accused must
not, in his defence, do more than what would be necessary and if his repelling force
was excessive that would deprive him of the defence of self-defence.
This direction was, for the reasons already explained, held to be erroneous
and led to a substantial miscarriage of justice.107 The direction, if to be applied,
would be tantamount to imposing an unnecessary additional unstated condition to
section 34 (2) and 35 of the Criminal Code. This, in the opinion of the court is
something undesirable.
In the course of the judgement however, the doctrine of excessive defence
and its application in the Canadian courts was also elaborated. Here, the Appellate
Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's judgement in the case ofR. v. Brisson.m
The Appeal Court then said:
"Thus, Brisson was not a case where the court was pronouncing authoritatively upon
the effect of excessive force under section 34 (2)."
The court then quoted the judgement of Dickson J. where he said:
The Appellate Court said: "We are of the view that the charge delivered by the learned trial
judge in this case imposed an additional test which could well have persuaded the jury that
the accused was not entitled to succeed even though his conduct fell within the actual
requirements of the sections." (Emphasis added.)
R. v. Simon Wah Man Sin, supra, fn. 103 at p. 373.
Supra, fn. 66.
125
"On a reasonable statutory interpretation of section 34 it is apparent that a qualified
defence of excessive force does not exist."
Perhaps the strongest opinion regarding the doctrine was voiced when the
court urged the need to have clear parliamentary approval of the doctrine if it were to
be enforced. In the absence of such approval, there is no need to alter the law which
has clearly been laid down in the Criminal Code.109
Finally, it has to be said that the validity of the excessive defence defence was
not really the primary issue in the Appeal Court's judgement. The importance of the
case actually centred on the discussion of the validity of the trial court's imposition of
a requirement of proportionality in section 35 and 34 (2). In the course of discussing
this central issue, the position of the qualified defence was highlighted. It now
appears that there is a growing conviction within the provincial courts, particularly in
the aftermath of Brisson v. The Queen,1,0 that the doctrine which was once
unconditionally accepted, (e.g. R. v. Ouellete,lu R. v. Stanley112 and R. v. Barilla,113
all were decided in British Columbia Court of Appeal) has now been disapproved.
The Appellate Court said: "The obviously deliberate intention of the Parliament not to
impose a general limitation on the amount of force which may be justified under ss. 34(2)
and 35 other than such as the accused reasonably believes is necessary to preserve himself
persuades us that no additional limitation may judicially be implied."






3.5 THE LAW OF EXCESSIVE DEFENCE IN CANADA:
CONCLUSION
The defence of excessive force in self-defence in Canada had, before the
Supreme Court's decision in R v Brisson,114 found favour with several provincial
Appellate Courts. The judgement of O'Halloran J.A. in R. v Barilla115 is arguably the
most authoritative decision as far as the acceptance of the middle path rule is
concerned. The series of cases which followed only showed that the appellate court
judges saw no difficulties in adopting the essence of the doctrine.
Perhaps one of the most significant judgements accepting the validity of the
qualified defence was the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in R. v.
Crothers.U6 The judges in this case not only applied the doctrine but went further
and disapproved the Privy Council decision in Palmer v. The Oueenul and the
English Appeal Court case of R v. Mclnnes.n% This judgement is significant in the
sense that those two cases were often regarded as the highest authorities available, as
far as the rejection of the doctrine was concerned.119
What is particularly interesting about the excessive force defence in Canadian
Courts is the fact that it was introduced some thirteen years before the concept of the
middle path rule began to emerge in Australia in the case of R. v. McKay}20 On this
114 Supra, fn. 66.
115 Supra, fn. 16.
1.6 Supra, fn. 27.
117 Supra, fn. 29.
118 Supra, fn. 30.
119
The approach taken in the law of self-defence from these two cases were in the end approved
by the Australian High Court in Fadil Zecevic [1986-1987] 25 A.Crim. R. 163.
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basis, it could be said that the application of the doctrine in Canada was not, at least
for some time, influenced by Australian decisions. However, the development of the
doctrine was not always distinctive in the two jurisdictions. They were in agreement
in that firstly, the Australian court in R. v. Howen] derived the middle path rule from
old English cases, and equally the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R. v.
Barilla122 had drawn its justification from the same authorities.
A second matter of note is that both jurisdictions are in total agreement with
regard to the basis of the qualified defence. To have an accused convicted of murder
in a case where he reasonably believed, though mistakenly, that the amount of force
employed in his defensive act was necessary to preserve his life and physical
integrity, was accepted by lawyers in both countries as morally unacceptable. Both
jurisdictions were at one that the law needed to differentiate between an accused who
committed an unlawful act of homicide with a clear intention to commit murder, and
an accused committing homicide under extreme and agonising circumstances.
The rejection of the doctrine in Australia was predominantly based on the fact
that the six propositions laid down in Viro v. The Queen123 were altogether too
controversial and difficult to operate. Interestingly, the same point of reasoning
motivated the decision in R. v. Brisson.124 The rejection of the unpopular
propositions occurred even though they had been discussed and approved in the














subsequent cases seem to have taken the Alberta Court of Appeal decision seriously,
Dickson J., in the Supreme Court found it necessary to make it clear that those tests
were unworkable and hence not necessary in Canadian criminal law.
It is hard to say whether the demise of the doctrine in Canada was the result
of the Privy Council decision in Palmer v. R.d26 as it was, to certain extent, in the
Australian courts.127 The Supreme Court's rejection of the doctrine was very much
due to the unavailability of a clear provision justifying the doctrine in the Canadian
Criminal Code. It was strongly proposed that if ever the qualified defence were to
be applied in Canada, clear approval of the doctrine had to be made by Parliament.128
In the absence of such approval, the law remains as stated in the Criminal Code.
Based on the Supreme Court's judgement in R. v. Brisson,129 the provisions of
Canadian Criminal Code with regard to the law of self-defence evidently do not
provide any ground for the application of the qualified defence.
Finally, to date the doctrine of excessive defence has been three times
rejected in the Canadian Supreme Court. The judgement in R. v. Brissonm was
126 Supra, fn. 29.
127
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The Australian High Court case of Fadil Zecevic [1986-1987] 25 A.Crim.R. 163, officially
rejected the doctrine and it was then accepted that the law as regard to self-defence in
Australia is as in Palmer v. R.
N. C. O'Brien in his article "Excessive Self-Defence: A Need for Legislation." 25(4) (1983)
Criminal Law Quarterly (Ontario) 441, supported the introduction of the doctrine. While
accepting the fact that the doctrine has not been recognised as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in R, v. Brisson, the writer asserted that the issue of excessive force can only
be resolved by statutory intervention. The writer states: "Legislation could be enacted to
introduce the qualified defence of excessive self-defence upon the same lines as the defence
of provocation." In the later part of his analysis he reasserted: "The different opinions
expressed by many courts throughout the common law jurisdictions reflect the confusion and
complexity surrounding the issue and the time may be ripe for statutory intervention."
129 Supra, fn. 66.
130 ibid.
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approved in R. v. Gee131 and one year later in R. v. Faid.132 The Supreme Court's
perception on the doctrine is best explained in the judgement of Dickson J. where he
asserted:
"The position of Alberta Court of Appeal that there is a "half-way" house outside s.
34 of the Code is, in my view, inapplicable to the Canadian codified system of
criminal law, it lacks any recognisable basis in principle, would require prolix and
complicated jury charges and would encourage juries to reach compromise verdicts
to the prejudice of either the accused or the Crown."
In the light of these views, it has to be said that, until statutory intervention
takes place to introduce the qualified defence, the Canadian Criminal Code will
remain a bar to the doctrine of excessive self-defence.
131 Supra, fn. 15.
132 Supra, fn. 92.
130
CHAPTER FOUR
THE BELIEF OF THE ACCUSED IN SELF-DEFENCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In a case of self-defence, two aspects of the accused's belief are scrutinised:
first, the accused's belief concerning the situation entitling him to employ force in
self-defence; and second, the accused's belief as to the amount of force necessarily
required to combat the threat he faces. Mason C.J., in his popular but controversial
formulations in Viro v. The Queen,1 takes note of these questions. The first
proposition in his directive in that case suggests that the accused must reasonably
believe that a situation had come about when he has to use force to defend his life
viz., the existence of an unlawful attack which threatens him with death or serious
bodily harm. He elaborates further: a reasonable belief of the accused here means a
belief which is reasonable based on the circumstances in which the accused found
himself.2
With respect to the accused's belief as to the amount of force required in his
defensive act, the Viro formulations suggest that it must be "reasonably
proportionate". In other words, it must not be excessive when viewed in the light of
the attack threatening his life.3 The excessiveness or otherwise of his repelling force
1 (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88.
2 Proposition fib) of the formulations stated:
"By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himselfmight reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself." Viro v. The Queen, ibid., at p. 146.
3 Proposition 3 of the formulations stated:
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is to be decided by the jury. In a case where the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the use of force is excessive, the outcome of the case can either be one of
murder or manslaughter, this depending on the accused's belief in the excessive
force which he employs. If he knows that the force used is indeed excessive, he may
be convicted of murder. If he believes that his conduct is reasonably proportionate,4
he will be convicted only of manslaughter. Thus, in this part of the proposition, the
central point is the requirement that the accused must have reasonably believed that
his defensive force is proportionate.
These formulations have, of course, been revised. The majority decision in
the Australian High Court's case of Fadil Zecevic5 has essentially clarified many of
the uncertainties of the Australian law of self-defence which pertained at the time
when Viro was decided. The most significant outcome of Zecevic is the demise of
the doctrine of excessive force in self-defence. Nevertheless, the High Court retained
the traditional approach in dealing with self-defence defence; namely the distinction
between the accused's belief concerning the threat and the belief as to the force
requiring to be used in the defence. The English courts, on the other hand, also
presuppose the importance of this distinction as is shown in the decisions subsequent
to Palmer. The two sets of belief will now be dealt with in turn.
"If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such reasonable belief
by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used by the accused was
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced." Viro v The Queen,
ibid., at p. 147.
It is to be borne in mind that this consideration was made at the time when the accused has
already been considered by the jury to have been excessive in his self-defence.
[1986-1987] 25 A. Crim. R. 163.
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4.2 BELIEF CONCERNING THE THREAT6
4.2.1 The English courts and the belief
In English courts it has been consistently stated that an honest but mistaken
belief by a self defender as to the fact or nature of an attack on himself or another
will be no answer to a charge unless it is based on reasonable grounds - a purely
objective test was applied. This was the prevailing view until 1983, when the
landmark decision of R. v. Williams1 was handed down. Because of its importance,
the case needs some elaboration.
The distinction between the accused's belief in the occasion enabling him to use force in
exercising his right to defend himself and his belief in the necessary amount of force
required in the course of the defence has often been mixed. For instance, J.C. Smith in his
discussion on self-defence appears not to be particularly concerned with this distinction. The
cases of R. v. Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411 and R. v. Beckford [1987] 3 All ER 8, were
discussed in his work to ascertain the belief as to the amount of force in self-defence. (These
two cases will be dealt with later in this chapter.) J.C. Smith "Using Force in Self-Defence
and The Prevention ofCrime." (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 101. The question
concerning the accused's belief in these two cases, in actual fact, is more related to the
belief as to the threat in self-defence.
Marianne Giles in her article, "Self-Defence and Mistake: A Way Forward." 53 Modern
Law Review, 187, on the other hand makes a clear distinction between the two sets of
belief. The cases of R. v. Williams and Beckford v. R. were therefore cited in the discussion
of the first part of the belief.
S.M.H.Yeo in his commentaries on the development of the law of self-defence in
Australia makes a distinction between the two parts of the belief. "Self- Defence: from
Viro to Zecevic" 4 Australian Bar Review, 1988, "New Development in The Law ofSelf-
Defence in Australia" (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 489, and "The Element of
belief in Self-Defence", 12 Sydney Law Review 132.
In my discussion, the belief concerning the threat and the belief as to the necessary force
required will be separately elaborated.
[1987] 3 All ER 411.
The trend towards accepting the subjective belief of the accused as to the circumstances of
an alleged offence was first decided by the House of Lords in D P. P. v. Morgan, [1976] AC
182, a rape case. The decision in R. v. Williams is, nevertheless, a landmark decision in the
sense that the trend prevailing in D P. P. v. Morgan was for the first time accepted in a self-
defence case.
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M saw a youth rob a woman in a street. He caught the youth, but the latter
managed to break from his grasp. M chased and caught the youth for the second
time, knocking him to the ground. The appellant who had only seen the later stages
of the incident, got involved in trying to free the youth. M tried to explain the
situation. The only mistake he had made was, in explaining the true situation, he
claimed to be a police officer, which was untrue, and he therefore could not produce
the warrant card when asked for. A struggle followed, and the appellant assaulted M.
He was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of
the Offences against the Person Act 1861. He pleaded self-defence and in his
argument claimed that he honestly believed that the youth was being unlawfully
assaulted by M.
In the trial court the jury was instructed as to the effect that the appellant's
belief in the occasion has to be based on reasonable grounds. The appellant was
thereafter convicted on the basis that his honest beliefwas not objectively reasonable.
The appellant appealed on the ground that the judge misdirected the jury in telling
them that his mistake had to be reasonable. Lord Lane C.J. in the course of his
judgement stated:
"In a case of self defence, ... if the jury came to the conclusion that the defendant
believed, or may have believed that he was being attacked. . . . and that force was
necessary to protect himself. . . , then the prosecution has not proved their case. If
however the defendant's alleged belief was mistaken and if the mistake was an
unreasonable one, that may be a powerful reason for coming to the conclusion that
the belief was not honestly held and should be rejected. Even if the jury come to the
conclusion that the mistake was an unreasonable one, if the defendant may genuinely
have been labouring under it, he is entitled to rely upon it."8
8 R. v. Williams, ibid., at p. 415.
134
This judgement defends the proposition that the accused who sets up self-
defence is to be judged on the facts as he honestly believed them to be, whether or
not his belief was reasonable - a clear departure from the objective reasonableness
test.9
Lord Lane's judgement in favour of subjective reasonableness was approved
and followed by the Privy Council in the case of Beckford v. R.,i0 in which it was
decided that an honest albeit mistaken belief of the accused was a justification for the
use of force in self-defence. The facts of the case were that a police officer was
investigating a report that an armed man was terrorising and menacing people in a
house. When he arrived at the house, the suspected criminal ran off. There was
conflicting evidence as to the subsequent events. The accused claimed that he fired
towards the deceased in the belief that he (the deceased) was armed and intended to
fight for his escape to the extent of harming his (the accused's) life as well as the life
of a police colleague. (The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the deceased
was surrendering at the time when he was shot.) In the trial court he was convicted
of murder on the ground that the belief was not reasonable and that the accused failed
this purely objective test. In the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, it was held that a belief
that the circumstances required self-defence had to be reasonably, and not only
The facts of this case show that the accused was indeed reasonable in his belief that the
accused unlawfully assaulted the thief. This is based on two reasons:
i)The fact the accused only saw the later part of the incidence and therefore was not aware
of the true situation,
ii) The fact that M was lying in his claim that he was a police officer. The fact that he
failed to produce the identity card necessarily required to prove his claim was good
enough to suggest that the accused was not unreasonable in his belief (his belief that M was
lying and therefore unlawfully assaulting the thief). Thus, every reasonable man in his
position would have the same belief.
Now, what would be the position ifM was indeed a police officer and produced his
identification. However, because he was not in uniform and acted "violently" in public
against someone whom the accused believed to be innocent, the accused still disregarded his
(M's) claim and assaulted him in the belief that his act was in defence of others. Would his
honest belief under such circumstances fall within the scope ofjustifiable self-defence?
The decision in Beckford suggested that it might well be so.
[1987] 3 All ER 8.
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honestly held. On appeal to the Privy Council, it was held that when an accused acts
under a mistake as to the facts, he is to be judged according to his mistaken belief of
the facts regardless of whether, viewed objectively, his mistake is reasonable. The
substantial issue is what he actually believes at that moment; if his belief is a genuine
and honest one, that would itself justify his reacting in defence of his life,
irrespective of whether his belief falls within the requirement of the impersonal
objective reasonable test.
In the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in Gaynor Oatridge,u the same
issue came before the court. The accused was charged with the murder of her co¬
habitee. The accused claimed that on the night of the offence the victim was drunk
and abusive and had uttered threats to kill her. He had seized her throat and squeezed
it. In the belief that he was attempting to kill her, the appellant picked up a kitchen
knife and stabbed him. One of the grounds of her defence was that she acted in
defence of her life.
The trial judge in his summing up gave the conventional direction on the need
for proportionality between the force used and the nature of the attack. No direction
was made on the mistaken belief of the accused, and upon this direction, the accused
was convicted by a majority of manslaughter. In the Court of Criminal Appeal the
main argument against the trial court's decision was the rejection of the accused's
mistaken belief. This argument was extensively elaborated by the Appeal Court
judges. Mustill L.J. in reading the court's judgement elaborated:
"In many cases of self-defence the following questions must be asked:
(1) Was the defendant under actual or threatened attack by the victim?
11 (1992) Crim. App R. 367.
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(2) If yes, did the defendant act to defend himself against this attack?
(3) If yes, was his response commensurate with the degree of danger created by the
attack? In answering this question allowance must of course be made for the fact that
the defendant has to act in the heat of the moment and cannot be expected to measure
his response exactly to the danger There are however occasions where a
further question must be asked:
(la) Even if the defendant was not in fact under actual or threatened attack, did he
nevertheless honestly believe that he was? If this question was answered in the
affirmative (or, more correctly, the prosecution does not establish that it should be
answered in the negative), then the third question must be modified, so as to read:
(3a) Was the response commensurate with the degree of risk which the defendant
believed to be created by the attack under which he believed himself to be?"12
It was decided that the honest, albeit mistaken, belief of the accused was not
so fanciful as to require exclusion from consideration.
In the light of this decision, a plea of self-defence may be successfully
pleaded even where there is no actual threat, so long as the jury is satisfied that the
accused honestly believed that his life was in serious danger and that an act of
defence was necessary to protect the accused's life. In other words, the accused's
honest mistake may not be a bar to his plea of self-defence.
This decision, stressing, as it does, the importance of the accused's genuine
and honest belief, is in line with the Privy Council's judgement in Beckford's13 case,
12 Ibid., at p. 370.
13 Supra, fn. 10.
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although their Lordships in Gaynor Oatridge made no reference to the Privy
Council's decision. One may conclude, then, that the English courts have inclined
towards accepting the accused's honest belief and avoiding making decisions
predominantly based on the truly objective impersonal reasonable man test.
4.2.2 Belief concerning the threat: the Australian experience
In Australia, the first proposition laid down in Viro v. The Queen14 has been
the main source of reference in determining the accused's reasonable belief in the
threat. One line of authorities has sought to elaborate further the meaning of the
expression "reasonable belief based on the circumstances in which an accused's
found himself'. On this point, the court in Helmhout v. R. said:
"The test of whether an accused's belief was reasonable is not whether an unlawful
attack was being made upon him, nor even whether the hypothetical reasonable man
in the accused's position would have believed that an unlawful attack was being or
was about to be made on him. The test is whether the accused himself might
reasonably have believed in all the circumstances in which he found himself that an
unlawful attack was being or was about to be made upon him."15
This judgement was quite explicit in its rejection of the hypothetical
reasonable man test. The term reasonable, then, is confined only to what is
reasonable in the eyes of the accused himself and not according to the objective
standard of reasonableness.
Supra, fn. 1.
(1980)49 F.L.R. 1 at p. 4
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Another line of authorities, despite the clear wording in Viro v. The Queen,
seeks to replace reasonable belief with honest belief.16 In the case of Morgan v.
Colman,17 the Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reformulated the first proposition
in Viro in the following terms:
"It is both good sense and good law that where a person is subjected to, or genuinely
fears, an attack. ... he may use force to defend himself. .... In determining what
were the circumstances that a person believed to exist. . . . regard may be had to the
grounds of that person's belief and to whether they were reasonable. The
reasonableness or the reverse of such grounds is not, of itself, decisive of the
existence or non-existence of the belief."18
Uncertainty was in the end resolved by the decision of the Australian High
Court in ZecevicM An analysis of Zecevic discloses that the High Court has treated
the issue quite distinctly from the way in which it has been treated in the English
courts. In fact, the Australian courts have consistently maintained that under the law
of self-defence, the accused must have honestly believed, on reasonable grounds, that
he was being attacked. The first and second formulations in Viro had unambiguously
explained this. In Zecevic, despite the rejection of these formulations, the court still
retained the requirement of honest and reasonable belief. Counsel for the appellant
in Zecevic contended that the law relating to self-defence should not require that an
accused person's belief that he is being threatened with death or serious bodily harm
be a reasonable belief: it is sufficient, that an accused person had hold an actual belief
16 This would involve judging the accused's belief on a purely subjective reasonableness test.
The English courts have already adopted this approach. R. v. Williams, supra, fn. 1, R. v.
Beckford, supra, fn. 10, and Gaynor Oatridge, supra, fn. 11.
17 [1981] 27 S.A.S.R. 334.
18 Ibid., at p. 336-337.
19 Supra, fn. 5.
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of that kind whether reasonable or not.20 This argument was rejected by the High
Court. The court relied on the historical development of the law of homicide in its
conclusion that the accused's belief concerning the threat had to be reasonable and
therefore rejected the appellant's counsel argument. Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
in their joint judgement stated:
"[T]he history of the matter serves to explain why the requirement of reasonableness,
which was the requirement of excusable homicide, has remained part of the law of
self-defence. Moreover, it establishes why that requirement ought not to be regarded
as a definitional element of the offence in question but as going rather to
exculpation."21
This judgement demonstrates that the Australian courts differ in their attitude
from that of the English courts. They require a reasonable belief, but judge the
reasonableness not on a hypothetical person test, but rather on the accused's
perception of the circumstances he was under. This amounts to a mixture of
subjective and objective reasonableness.
Ibid., at p. 170.
Ibid., at p. 171.
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4.3 BELIEF AS TO THE FORCE APPLIED
4.3.1 The approach of the English courts
Another issue presenting itself for discussion in self-defence cases is the
belief of the accused as to the amount of force necessarily required in his defensive
conduct. The question here is: according to what measurement should this belief be
decided? The Criminal Law Act 1967 threw some light on this matter. This Act
stated that the accused may use, in his defence, "such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances".22 A glance at the case of Palmer v. R.23, also reveals the same
approach.24 Nevertheless, the question arises as to what kind of reasonable belief is
required by this test: is it a traditional, but orthodox, conception of reasonableness, or
a pragmatic mixture of subjective and objective test of reasonableness?25 This
question merits detailed discussion.
Criminal Law Act (1967) s. 3(1)
[1971] 1 All ER 1077.
Lord Morris in his judgement explained:
"In their Lordships view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily
understood by any jury It is both good law and good sense that a man who is
attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but
may only do, what is reasonably necessary." (emphasis added). Palmer v. R, ibid., at p.
1088.
It is important to note here that the debate as to whether a belief need only be honest or must
also be reasonable, is confined to the belief concerning the threat. With regard to the belief
as to the necessary force required in the defence, both English as well as Australian law
required that the belief be a reasonable one. Nevertheless, the word reasonableness here
conveys two different meanings; firstly, whether a reasonable person in the accused's
position would have believed the force applied by the accused to be reasonably necessary;
secondly, whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that the force applied by him
was reasonably necessary. The former advocates a purely objective reasonableness whereas
the latter is a mixture between subjective and objective reasonableness.
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A good starting point is the Privy Council's judgement in Palmer v. R.26
Most commentators commenting on this case seems to have agreed upon one thing -
an accused person taking shelter under self-defence has to have believed - on
reasonable grounds - that the amount of force used was necessary.
Having said that, however, Lord Morris in delivering the majority judgement
in the Privy Council stated: "if there has been an attack so that the defence is
reasonably necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action."27 This means
that, even though the accused's belief is required to be a reasonable one, the trier of
facts is required to take into consideration the accused's position in the agony of the
moment. The statement also means that, even though it has to be a reasonable
belief, the jury should not at the same time look at the case with excessive rigidity
and strictness. Allowance must be made for any excitement, affront and distress that
the accused might have experienced. Leniency was thus recommended in
considering the accused's reasonable act.
Taking this point further, Lord Morris elaborated: "If a jury thought that in a
moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly
and instinctively thought was necessary, that would be most potent evidence that
only reasonable defensive action had been taken."28 This statement had clearly
appealed to the jury in considering the accused's predicament at that difficult
moment. It seems that the court was asking for tolerance in favour of the accused
before any conclusion could be reached by the jury. The accused's honest belief, and
his spontaneous reaction to the attack are paramount at this point. As already stated,
26 Supra, fn. 23.
27 Ibid., at p. 1088.
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these could serve as the most potent evidence in determining the reasonableness of
his defensive conduct.
Now, what would be the effect of these two statements of law on the
determination of the authenticity of the accused's defensive act? If "reasonable
belief" is still interpreted as a purely objective reasonableness, perhaps Lord Morris's
statements would not be necessary. On the other hand, if the statements were to be
explained in accordance with the overall judgement in the case, it could lead to the
conclusion - the accused's defensive force is now judged by the test of
reasonableness, but, in ascertaining the reasonableness of this act, consideration must
also be given to his belief at that particular time. This would mean that the law of
self-defence envisages a mixed subjective and objective reasonableness in justifying
the accused's use of force in the defence.
This new conception of reasonable belief derived from Palmer's decision was
adopted in the English Court of Appeal case of R. v. Shannon.29 The judges in the
Criminal Court of Appeal emphatically stressed the need to have a logical and
practical interpretation of Lord Morris's statement of law in Palmer v. R.30 To judge
the accused's belief solely on the hypothetical person test was not regarded as truly
explaining the law as it had been interpreted by the Privy Council. The court
concluded that the logical interpretation of Palmer is to accept the need for a mixed
objective and subjective belief. Lord Ormrod L.J. in delivering the court's judgement
stated that in every case of self-defence a distinction has to be made between an act
essentially defensive in character and acts which are essentially offensive, punitive,
or retaliatory in character. In considering this distinction, the correct approach would
be to consider the fact that the accused could not be expected to weigh to a nicety the
29 [1980] 71 Cr. App. R. 192.
30 Supra, fn. 23.
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measure of his necessary act of defence and that the accused's honest and distinctive
belief that his act was necessary is also essential in judging the reasonableness of the
defensive conduct.31 This judgement of the Criminal Appeal Court laid down a
solid grounding in the application of the "partly subjective and partly objective
reasonableness".
The case of R. v. O'Grady,32 another decision by the Criminal Court of
Appeal, reaffirmed this view. In this case, even though the court was willing to
accept the honest albeit mistaken belief of the accused, it denied him the defence of
self-defence on the ground that the mistaken belief resulted from self-induced
intoxication.33 Thus, the reason for the court's rejection of self-defence plea was not
because of the application of a purely objective test, but rather because the accused's
state of mind denied him the defence.34
In the case of R. v. Whyte35 Lord Lane C.J. in his judgement referred to the
case of Palmer v. R.36 and R. v. Shannon,31 cases which he regarded as of substantial
binding authority. In relation to the issue of the accused's reasonable defensive
conduct, the court regarded the two previous decisions as requiring the jury to take
31 Supra, fn. 29 at p. 196.
32 [1987] 3 All ER 421.
33 Lord Lane C.J. in delivering the judgement stated:
"We have come to the conclusion that, where the jury are satisfied that the defendant was
mistaken in his belief that any force or the force which he in fact used was necessary to
defend himself and are further satisfied that the mistake was caused by voluntarily induced
intoxication, the defence must failed." R. v. O'Grady, ibid., at p. 423.
34 It appears that if the accused in this case had not been voluntarily intoxicated, there is a
possibility that he could have relied on the defence of self-defence.
35 [1987] 3 All ER 416.
36 Supra, fn. 23.
31 Supra, fn. 29.
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into account the honest and instinctive belief of the accused at the very moment of
his defensive action. Lord Lane C.J. said:
"In most cases, where the issue is one of self-defence, it is necessary and desirable
that the jury should be reminded that the defendant's state of mind, that his view of
the danger threatening him at the moment of the incident, is material. The test of
reasonableness is not, to put it at its lowest, a purely objective test."3*
This statement explicitly reveals the true interpretation of the reasonable
belief requirement in the English courts. As a result of Lord Lane's judgement, the
hypothetical person test can be said to have been replaced by a new test which
requires the jury to consider what the accused thought or perceived, and to decide on
the basis of how a reasonable man, with the accused's characteristics interpreted the
circumstances.
4.3.2 R. v. Scarlett39 and its effect on the question of the accused's belief
The decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal in R. v. Scarlett40 however,
signifies a departure from the Palmer principle. This decision appears to involve an
R. v. Whyte, supra, fn. 35 at p. 418. (Emphasis added).
It was commented by S.M.H.Yeo in his article "The Element ofBelief in Self-Defence" 12
Sydney Law Review 132 at p. 146 that in England the overwhelming preference by the
courts is for the purely objective reasonable test. The writer in his commentary referred
specifically and solely to the case of R. v. Williams. It has to be said that by virtue of Lord
Lane's judgement this observation was incorrect. The case referred to in his comment was
not essentially the most authoritative in discussing the accused's belief concerning the force
applied. As already discussed,{supra, at p. 133-135) the case of R v Williams, supra, fn. 7,
is best referred to in the discussion of the belief as to the threat.
[1993] 4 All ER 629.
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abandonment of the Palmer approach, which propagates a partly subjective and
partly objective reasonable test. The decision merits closer examination.
The facts in Scarlett can be stated briefly. The defendant, the landlord of a
public house, was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter following his use of force
to eject the victim, who had entered the public house after closing time the worse for
drink. In the trial court, the judge stated that if the jury concluded that the accused
had used more force than was necessary in the circumstances in the bar, and if they
were satisfied that he had caused the deceased to fall and strike his head, the
appellant was guilty of manslaughter; of which offence he was later convicted.
This was held by the Court of Appeal to be a misdirection. The decision was
reversed by the Court ofAppeal, where Beldam L.J. concluded:
"Further they (the jury) should be directed that the accused is not to be found guilty
merely because he intentionally or recklessly used force which they consider to have
been excessive. They ought not to convict him unless they are satisfied that the
degree of force used plainly more than was called for by the circumstances as he
believed them to be and, provided he believed the circumstances called for the degree
of force used, he is not to be convicted even if his beliefwas unreasonable."41
The question now is: has this judgement rejected completely the established
principle applied in previous cases? According to Scarlett, the defendant could
justify the most extravagant actions provided he subjectively believed the
circumstances warranted it. This would also mean that the accused's belief, based on
the circumstances in which the incident occurred, had been elevated from "potent
Ibid., at p. 636.
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evidence" as concluded in Palmer, to an overreaching new substantive defence. The
decision had clearly interpreted the case on a purely subjective term.
The effect of Scarlett on the test of accused's belief is that it leads to a
departure from the statement of law pronounced in Palmer and interpreted and
applied in cases following it. The judgement in Palmer retained the requirement of
necessity as well as proportionality in the accused's act. However, it also gave
considerable weight to the accused's belief based on the circumstances of the case as
the accused found himself. Therefore the test is not a purely objective one, although,
at the same time, it does not propagate an entirely subjective reasonableness. The
decision in Scarlett on the other hand, disregarded the need for the jury to decide on
the reasonableness of the accused's act, suggesting instead a purely subjective
reasonableness. This notion of supporting the subjectivist position on criminal
liability would appear to contradict the approach adopted in Palmer, and, for that
matter, the well established rule already applied in courts in other cases.
Some two years after Scarlett was decided, it was heavily criticised in the
case of R. v. Owino.42 The appellant in this case was convicted on two counts of
assaulting his wife occasioning her actual bodily harm (injuries to her head and her
thumb). The appellant's argument regarding these counts was that any injuries his
wife had sustained through his actions were caused by reasonable force used to
restrain her and to stop her from assaulting him. The members of the jury received
no direction on self-defence until, about an hour-and-a-half after retiring, they sent a
note in effect asking for such a direction. The judge then directed them on the issue
to the effect that the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not believe that he
was using reasonable force. On appeal it was argued that the judge inadequately
directed the jury on self-defence, by reason of (a) his failure to state that the test of
42 [1995] Crim. L. R. 743.
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what force was reasonable was subjective, and (b) the delay of an hour-and-a-half
before the direction was given.
The appellant's appeal was rejected, the Court of Appeal justifying its
decision by explaining the true nature of Scarlett's case. The court asserted that the
judgement of Beldam L.J. in Scarlett, when read in context and properly understood,
was not meant to say that a person was entitled to use any degree of force he believed
to be reasonable, however ill-founded the belief.43 This diplomatic treatment of
Beldam L.J.'s judgement was understandable. The fact of the matter was that, the
Court of Appeal in Owino did not want to allow the accused's subjective belief to be
determinant in considering the reasonableness of his repelling force. The Appeal
Court concluded that the law was as set out by Lord Lane L.J. in R. v. Williams: a
person may use such force as is (objectively) reasonable in the circumstances as he
(subjectively) believes them to be. This test was the one applied in Palmer v. R..
The question to be addressed now is this: what significance does Scarlett
have in the development of the law of self-defence, or more specifically, what
significance does it have for the issue of the accused's belief in his plea of self-
defence? It would also appear that, in the light of Owino, Scarlett had contributed
nothing to the law of self-defence at all.4'1 Alternatively, if Scarlett's principle were
to be strictly followed, the consequence of it would be to allow the accused's
mistaken belief, no matter how erroneous it was, as long as it was honestly and
genuinely held, to be a sole determinant factor in his self-defence claim. Hence the
accused's chance of getting away from any criminal liability would be greater than
Ibid., at p. 744.
It was thus commented: "It seems that we must now take it that Scarlett added nothing to the
law as stated in Gladstone Williams and is best not referred to in future, as far as this aspect
of the decision is concerned. "R. v. Owino, ibid,at p. 744.
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ever. On top of that, the long standing rule requiring a reasonable man test would be
completely abolished.
4.3.3 Summary
The English courts in determining the accused's belief as to the amount of
force acceptable in his defence have heavily relied upon the Privy Council's decision
in Palmer v. R. ,45 in which the approach taken was, that the accused's belief is to be
judged according to what he reasonably thought to be necessary. The reasonableness
of this belief then is decided by the jury. This is a mixed subjective and objective
test.
This principle was then applied in the Court of Appeal in a series of
subsequent cases. The case of R. v. Shannon,46 R. v. O'Grady47 and R. v. Whyte48
were included in these. Nevertheless, this notion of having a "half subjective" and
"half objective" reasonable test was then challenged in the case of R. v. Scarlett,49
The Court of Appeal in that case disregarded the prevailing test by adopting a purely
subjective standard of belief.
The decision of R. v. Owino50 has effectively returned to the principle already
in operation before Scarlett, which, though not necessarily expressly, rejects the
45 Supra, fn. 23.
46 Supra, fn. 29.
47 Supra, fn. 32.
48 Supra, fn. 35.
49 Supra, fn. 39.
50 Supra, fn. 42.
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Scarlett's purely subjective reasonableness approach. The law applicable since has
then reverted to a mixed subjective and objective reasonable standard of belief.
4.3.4 Belief as to the amount of force required: the Australian
experience
In Australia, by virtue of the Viro formulations, there is a legal rule that for
self- defence to apply, the force exercised by an accused against his assailant must be
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he reasonably believed he faced. The
Australian High Court's case of Fadil Zecevic,51 however, had taken the view that the
proportionality between the force exercised by the accused and the harm threatening
him is but one of many factors left to be considered by the jury in deciding whether
the accused's conduct was reasonably necessary in self-defence. The court asserted
that the test is, "whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was
necessary in self-defence to do what he did."52 At this point, the majority judgement
in Zecevic seems to have departed from the third and fourth directive in the Viro
formulations. It could well be said that by virtue of Zecevic, the third and fourth
"requirement of proportionality" in Viro is now replaced by the half subjective and
half objective test as propounded in Zecevic.
Another point to note is that, in Zecevic the High Court had unhesitatingly
expressed its confirmation on the law of self-defence set forth in Palmer v. R.53 At
51 Supra, fn. 5.
52 Ibid., at p. 174.
53 Mason C.J. in his separate judgement in the case stated:
"The law on this topic (self-defence) in Australia will then be conform to the law in the
United Kingdom as expounded in Palmer and Mclnnes." Fadil Zecevic, ibid., at p. 168.
Wilson, Dowson and Toohey J.I in their joint judgement said:
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least in respect to the accused's belief on the degree of required force in self defence,
the Australian courts were in line with the application of the law as it is in Palmer v.
R. This would mean, the accused defensive act is now considered to be based on a
mixture of subjective as well as objective reasonableness.
This approach was adopted and confirmed in the New South Wales Supreme
Court's case of Glen William Conlon.54 The facts of the case were that the accused
shot dead two men in his farmhouse. Both of the deceased were found to have stolen
the accused's marijuana plant. Evidence was also led at the trial that the accused was
attacked and seriously assaulted in his own house. The primary question left for the
jury to decide, then, was whether the accused's had been reasonable in his
employment of force in the defence which lead to the death of the two intruders.
The Supreme Court in this case was confronted with the argument that the
decision as to whether there were reasonable grounds for any belief on the part of the
accused that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did, was a completely
objective one. This argument was categorically rejected. The court's rejection was
based on Zecevic where, as the Supreme Court puts it: "... . that it is the belief of the
accused, and not that of the hypothetical reasonable person in the position of the
accused, which has to be reasonable."55 Hunt C.J. then added: "It seems to me that
it would require a very clear statement by the High Court that it had intended to
substitute a completely objective assessment for that of a mixed objective and
subjective nature as had been posed in Viro."56
"Finally, it (the law relating to self-defence) has the effect of expressing the common law
in terms which are in accord with the views expressed in Palmer (adopted in England in
Mclnnes) and which are generally consonant with the law in the Code States." Ibid., at p.
176.
54 (1993 ) 69 A. Crim. R. 92.
55 Ibid., at p. 98.
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The effect of this decision is twofold:
1. It rejects the attempt to have the accused's belief be judged according to a purely
objective standard of reasonable belief as opposed to the mixed subjective and
objective reasonableness,
2. As evidenced in the judgement, the notion of considering seriously the accused's
honest belief and of leaving it for the jury to judge its reasonableness was in fact a
practice originated in Viro. It is also of considerable significance in demonstrating
that even though the case of Viro was rejected in Zecevic, some of its formulations,
especially in relation to the question of the accused's belief, have survived.
56 Ibid., at p. 99.
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4.4 BELIEF IN SELF-DEFENCE: CONCLUSION
In England, the case of Palmer v. R..51 had clearly played an important role in
the modern law of self-defence, particularly in introducing the new conception of
reasonableness. In Australia, the case of Fadil Zecevic58 has changed completely the
law of self-defence in Australian states with Common Law jurisdictions, where it
was previously entangled with the controversial doctrine of excessive defence; now
the doctrine has been abolished in favour of a "straightforward interpretation" of
Palmer v. R.. The case had now been considered as the main source of guidance in
dealing with a self-defence claim. This is evidenced by the Supreme Court of New
South Wales judgement in Conlon's59 case, where heavy reliance was made on
Zecevic.
The English court's approach to the case of self-defence could be explained in
these terms: with regard to the accused's belief relating to the occasion allowing him
to exercise some force in retaliation to an attack or what he believed as an attack
threatening seriously his life and bodily integrity, the law regards his honest and
genuine belief to be the deciding factor. Even in the event where it is objectively
unreasonable, if it is honestly thought to be necessary, this will entitle him of the
defence of self-dcfcncc.
In relation to the accused's defensive conduct (the amount of force he
employed in his defence) the judgement of Lord Morris in Palmer suggests a mixture





affirmatively applied in the cases of R. v. Shannon,60 R. v. O'Grady,61 and R. v.
Whyte.62 The test is, what would a person in the accused's position be doing in the
circumstances. This is not a purely objective reasonableness.
In similar circumstances, the Australian courts would most probably rely on
the accused's reasonable belief, as described in Viro v. The Queen,63 to determine the
reasonableness of the accused's belief as to the existence of an attack. This principle,
despite the demise of Viro formulations on the doctrine of excessive defence, still
survives.
As the judgement in Zecevic makes clear, the same approach as that adopted
in English courts would be applied in justifying the accused's defensive force. This
means that regard must be had to the accused's instinctive and spontaneous reaction
on the occasion; the court could not expect the accused to weigh precisely the exact
measure of self-defensive action which is required. This postulates a mixed
subjective and objective reasonableness.
In judging the accused's belief concerning the reaction to the threatening
occasion, the Australian High Court has ruled that this is to be assessed according to
the accused honest and reasonable belief that the force applied by him was necessary.
The orthodox purely objective hypothetical reasonable man test has therefore been






Finally, it should be pointed out that the distinction between the objective and
subjective test, when applied to the question of reasonable force in self-defence,
although semantically clear, is rather blurred in practice. The fact of the matter is
that the issue of one's belief is intrinsically too subjective and that it is highly
unlikely that one would be able to determine that belief with absolute certainty. It
has to be said that in any case where the question of the accused's belief is at issue,
whatever formulations and theories are applied, the conclusion derived still framed in
terms of probabilities. Nevertheless, the approach presently finding favour in the
courts has certainly proved more sensible. The tendency of accepting the accused's
belief on what he actually perceived in the agonising circumstances - especially in
considering the accused's belief as to his defensive action - is arguably the best
available way of achieving a satisfactory conclusion in cases of self-defence.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEFENCE OF SELF-DEFENCE AND THE THEORY OF
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFENCE AND
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The theory of battered woman syndrome has pre-occupied the criminal law
system of many common law jurisdictions for the past decade. Many suggest that
battered woman - those who constantly been physically and mentally abused, and
those who live under constant threat to their life from their partners - could plead
self-defence when they kill their violent partners.
In most cases, the battered woman kills her spouse in two situations. Firstly,
it happens at the time when the two parties are involved in a direct physical
confrontation, or what could be termed "traditional confrontation cases", or more
accurately - at the time when the accused is defending herself from a violent act on
the part of her partner. In this instance, the argument with regard to self-defence is
quite straightforward in favour of the accused - straightforward in the sense that a
successful self-defence claim could depend upon the fulfillment of the traditional
self-defence requirements; the test of imminence, proportionality and also the
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consideration of duty to retreat. In other words, the battered woman case here is in
fact just another case of an ordinary self-defence.1
Secondly, there are cases where the battered woman kills her partner at the
time when there is no actual physical confrontation, which also known as "non-
traditional confrontation cases." The killing took place when the partner is asleep,
laying down intoxicated, or has turned his back from the accused; in short, at a time
when the husband is not behaving abusively. The reason for the killing is arguably
mainly psychological. The pressure of living under a constant threat to her life from
the partner and the traumatic experience of being continuously beaten leads the
battered woman to believe that she would in the end be killed. Often this belief is not
merely the accused's2 illusion but is supported by the fact that she has been
repeatedly threatened with killing and that the assault has always been too serious
and threatening. In this instance, the preliminary question is: can the accused woman
really plead self-defence under the existing self-defence law? Does the doctrine of
self-defence really suit the battered woman's case, or should the law be modified to
account for the battered woman's situation? What are the difficulties in pleading self-
defence?
Before continuing with this discussion of battered woman and self-defence, it
is to be noted at the very outset that self-defence is not the only option for a battered
woman in court. In quite a number of instances, the accused has claimed diminished
responsibility. In some cases provocation was the main defence. In others, the
It is to be noted however that in some exceptional cases a battered woman has had also to
prove battered woman syndrome in courts in confrontational self-defence cases. The
reason for introducing the syndrome is to prove the reasonableness of the "accused's" (the
battered woman's) perception of the danger. Smith v. State 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678
(1981), Strong v. State 251 Ga. 540, 307 S.E.2d 912 (1983), State v. Borders 433 So. 2d
1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). P.L. Crocker, "The Meaning ofEquality for Battered
Woman Who kill", (1985) 8 Harvard Women's Law Journal 121.
2
The term "accused" hereinafter used to denote a battered woman pleading self-defence.
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duress defence has been established. Those defences would, at the most, if
successfully pleaded, hold the accused guilty only of manslaughter instead of murder.
In contrast to those defences, if the battered woman accused's self-defence claim is
accepted, she will be entitled to a complete acquittal. For this reason, there are
strong reasons on the part of the battered woman to plead self-defence.
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5.2 THE BATTERED WOMAN AND THE TRADITIONAL
"IMMINENCE" SELF-DEFENCE'S REQUIREMENT
As a settled and uncompromising condition, any self-defence claim must, first
of all, establish that the accused was in fact confronted by an attack which was not
only serious in nature but also so imminent that it would be impossible for him to
resort to other means to avoid the danger. In the case of Devlin v. Armstrong' for
example, Lord MacDermot held that the plea of self-defence may afford a defence
where the parties raising it uses force, not merely to counter an actual attack, but to
ward off or prevent an attack which he has honestly and reasonably anticipated. In
that case the anticipated attack must be imminent. In the case of Colin v. Chisam4
the Court of Appeal quoted with approval the judgement of Lord Justice Norman in
the case of Owens v. HMAdvocate:5
"In our opinion self-defence is made out when it is established to the satisfaction of
the jury that the panel believed that he was in imminent danger and that he held that
belief on reasonable grounds. Grounds for such belief may exist though they are
founded on a genuine mistake of fact."
These two cases evidently suggest the existence of actual threat and danger
and that that threat must also be imminent before one can exercise his or her right of
self-defence. In the absence of such a pressing situation, it is highly unlikely that the
defendant will be successful in pleading self-defence. Thus the nature of the
circumstances in which the battered woman kills her partner makes the defence of
self-defence prima facie improbable.
3
[1972] "NI 13, CA.
4
[1963] 47 Cr. App. R. 130.
5
(1946) S.C. (J) 1 19.
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5.2.1 The meaning of "threatened attack" in the requirement of
imminence
A case relevant to this issue is the case of Gaynor Oatridge.6 The accused in
this case had a battering relationship with the deceased (her co-habitee). It was
accepted in the trial that their relationship seems always to have been stormy. There
was ample evidence from other witnesses besides the appellant that there had been
several instances when the deceased had struck her. At the time of the killing, the
appellant was being throttled by the deceased. Her throat was seized and squeezed to
the extent that she had difficulty in breathing. The appellant stabbed him in the
belief that at that point her life was in immediate peril. The trial court rejected the
plea of self-defence on the ground that the defensive act was not proportionate to the
attack. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the trial court's decision was quashed. The
trial judge was held to have misdirected the jury on the point of the appellant's belief
in her need to defend herself.
The importance of this case lies in the judgement ofMustill L.J. in the Court
of Appeal. In his attempt to summarise the law of self-defence drawn from the case
of Gladstone Williams1 as well as the case of R. v. Beckforcfi, he laid down the
following propositions:
"In many cases of self-defence the following questions must be asked: (1) Was the
defendant under actual or threatened attack by the victim? (2) If yes, did the
defendant act to defend himself against this attack? (3) If yes, was his response
commensurate with the degree of danger created by the attack?"
6
(1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 367.
7 (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276.
8 (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 378.
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It is constructive to examine question number (1) in this proposition,
particularly in relation to the use of the words "actual" or "threatened" attack. The
literal meaning of the term "threatened attack" seems to suggest that the accused self-
defence claim could be entertained even in a case where the attack was not in the
form of an "actual attack". At this point it is interesting to know what the court
means by the word "threatened attack" itself? Does it mean: 1) as a result of the
battering relationship, the accused believed that her life has always been in
immediate peril and therefore, her act of killing is justified, whatever the prevailing
circumstances? Or, does it mean: 2) that a "threatened attack" is confined to a
situation where the deceased has already acted violently, but it is not clear whether
the violent act really imminently threatens the appellant's life at the time when she
delivers the fatal blow.
If "threatened attack" is understood as having this second meaning, then this
authority could not support the battered woman's case. However, if it (the word
"threatened attack") is understood in the first sense, there is a possibility that a
battered woman killing in self-defence could rely on this authority to justify her self
defensive act. This point is now discussed in detail.
An actual attack could be understood as an attack which is actually
happening, physically present and on the way to cause the accused severe injury.
Threatened attack, on the other hand, could be construed in two ways: firstly, it could
be understood as an attack which is likely to occur at any time during the battering
relationship as a result of the threat made by the batterer. For example, as a result of
one battering incident, the accused is threatened that at some future time she will be
beaten more seriously or she will be killed. No violent act on the part of the accused
has yet happened.
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Secondly, a situation may arise in which, in one incident, the batterer has
already been acting violently but the life of the accused itself is not really in serious
danger. For example, as a result of some misunderstanding with the accused, the
male partner starts to behave aggressively, damaging and destroying things in the
house. Flowever, even though he has already acted aggressively, there is no clear
indication that he will end up threatening the life of the accused or causing her
serious injury. It could be possible that he might stop by not hurting her, it could
also be possible that he will seriously injure her. The question is whether would it be
justifiable for someone to use force in self-defence in that particular situation? The
Australian case of R. v. Lane9 may clarify the point. The facts in this case showed
that the deceased had been acting violently in the accused's house. Before the
incident, he had been drinking heavily and that he had consumed a quantity of
Mogadon tablets. It was accepted in court that the combination of these two led to
the deceased being unreasonable and irrational. Much of the accused's furniture was
destroyed by the deceased's violent acts. The court had accepted that before the
killing, the deceased had already acted violently. However, in spite of this, the
evidence did not conclusively suggest that the accused's life was at that time in
imminent danger.
The trial court in R. v. Lane refused to leave self-defence to the jury, taking
the view that, at the actual time of the killing, the accused could not have reasonably
believed that an unlawful attack was being made or was about to be made on her. In
other words, the trial judge saw no imminent danger to the life of the accused at the
time the killing was committed. The Supreme Court of Victoria on the other hand,
took the view that self-defence should have been open to the accused.
[1983] 2 V.R. 449.
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The importance of this case in the context of the present discussion lies in the
fact that it supported the presumption that in a case where the violent act of the
deceased has not yet directly threatened the accused's life, he or she nevertheless could
rightly consider himself or herself to be in imminent danger and would be justified in
using force in self-defence.
The Court of Appeal in Gaynor Oatridge10 did not, however, elaborate on this
issue, namely the meaning of "threatened attack" as mentioned in its proposition.
The reason is probably that the court's primary concern was the proportionality of the
accused's act in her defence. For that matter the court's main consideration was
whether the appellant's defensive act was proportionate to the attack she confronted
and not whether her life was in immediate danger at the time of the killing. The case
thus was decided upon the requirement of proportionality defence rather than on the
test of imminence.11
The judgement in Gaynor Oatridge further said:
"(la) Even if the defendant was not in fact under actual or threatened attack, did he
nevertheless honestly believed that he was? If this question is answered in the
affirmative (or, more correctly, the prosecution does not establish that it should be
answered in the negative) then the third question must be modified, so as to read:
Supra, fn. 6.
Coincidentally, the judgement of the Supreme Court of Victoria also relied on the same
approach as that taken in Gaynor Oatridge. Murphy J. in delivering the majority judgement
stated: "In the present case I do not think that the applicant had to wait until the deceased
was in the act of committing mayhem before he took physical steps to prevent the deceased
doing so. The real question in the case, as I see it, may have been whether the jury were
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the steps which the applicant took to protect himself
were not reasonably proportionate to the danger which the applicant believed he faced: see
Mason J. in Viro. v. R. (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88, at p. 147." R. v. Lane, supra, fn. 9 at p. 456.
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(3a) Was the response commensurate with the degree of risk which the defendant
believed to be created by the attack under which he believed himself to be?"
This proposition may be read as meaning: even if there was no actual
threatening attack, if the accused - in the context of this discussion the battered
woman accused - honestly believed that the threat had always existed, she would be
allowed to make necessary step for self-defence even to the extend of killing her
partner. The only qualification would thus relate to the test of proportionality in self-
defence. In a case where the jury is satisfied that the accused's purported defensive
act is proportionate to the attack which she believed to have seriously threatened her
life, she would be protected under the defence of self-defence.
This is an ambitious interpretation of the Court of Appeal's propositions in
Gaynor Oalridge. It has to be said that the case discussed did not in any instance
refer to the problem of the battered woman syndrome. Neither are the propositions
intended as a guideline for battered woman pleading self-defence. Should it be
applied in this context, though, the decision could be an interesting authority in
favour of the battered woman.
In Australia, the first proposition in Viro v. The Queenn required the accused
to have reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death
or serious bodily harm "was being or about to be made".13 This appears to mean that
the accused will only be allowed to rely on the defence if the attack is imminent and
immediate. The defence against an anticipated attack will not be allowed. Therefore,
12
(1978) 141 C.L.R. 88.
13 Mason C.J. stipulated in his proposition:
1 (a) "It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the
accused reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or
serious bodily harm was being or was about to be made upon him."
Viro v The Queen, ibid., at p. 146-147.
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a person cannot rely on the defence if he has acted out of fear of some future (i.e. not
presently existing) violence. In this respect, it is correct to say that the accused must
have believed the threatened danger to be present and pressing before the defence
will operate.
This strict rule laid down by the High Court was nevertheless interpreted
quite loosely in the case of Morgan v. ColmanM The South Australian Court of
Criminal Appeal in an attempt to restate the Viro propositions included the following
comment:
"A person who, according to the circumstances as he understands them, genuinely
believes that he is threatened with an attack, is not obliged to wait until the attack
begins. A person so threatened may use reasonable measures to make the situation
safe, and he does not act unlawfully merely because he forestalls or tries to forestall
the attack before it has begun."b
The subsequent case of R. v. Laneu1 is important in that it tested the dicta of
the judge in Morgan v. Colman,17 The facts of the case were that the accused hit the
deceased with a bottle, thus fracturing his skull and killing him. The act of killing
was committed at the time when the deceased was destroying the accused's property
in his own house. It was not clear if the deceased had in fact made a threat to the
accused's life. Murphy J. expressed the following opinion in his judgement:
[1981] 27 S.A.S.R. 334.
Ibid., at p. 337.
Supra, fn. 9 at p. 449.
Supra, fn. 14.
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"If a person is, in his own home, placed in constant danger of serious bodily harm by
another, I do not understand the law to be that he is only entitled to rely upon the plea
of self-defence (should he kill the assailant and be charged with murder) if the killing
was performed whilst an actual physical onslaught on the accused was ensuing or
immediately threatened."18
This judgement seems to allow self-defence even when an actual threat did
not exist. The approach taken in this judgement is perhaps due to the fact that the
deceased was behaving menacingly in the accused's own house. It is doubtful
whether the court would have decided the same way if the killing had taken place
elsewhere.
The authorities discussed above, especially the cases of Morgan v. Colman
and R. v. Lane, purported to allow self-defence even in a case where the life and
bodily integrity of the accused is not in immediate peril. Nevertheless, returning to
the battered woman's case, could these authorities strengthen a plea of self-defence in
such circumstances? It seems unlikely. The primary reason is the fact that even
though in both cases (the battered woman and the two cases discussed above) the life
of the accused was not in immediate peril, there is a substantial difference between
the two sorts of case. In Morgan v. Colman, despite the fact that the deceased's act
has not yet caused the accused an immediate threat to his life, he had already been
violent in the house and destroyed the accused's property. In contrast to the case of a
battered woman, the killing takes place during a lull in the violence.
It has to be said that the traditional elements of self-defence give no room to a
battered woman in her plea of self-defence. The decision of Morgan v. Colman in
Australia arguably extends the imminence requirement to a situation where an actual
18
Ibid., at p. 456.
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threat did not exist at the time of the killing. However, unless there is a more
specific judgement to that effect, this decision is inadequate as a comprehensive
authority to justify the battered woman's killing.
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5.3 THE "BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME"
It is apparent that the essence of a battered woman case is that the threat or
danger apprehended, though arguably existing at some time, was not actually present
at the time of the killing. It appears that the circumstances of a battered woman case
do not exactly fit the traditional model of self-defence. But this does not mean that
the defence of self-defence can never be pleaded in court. Recent developments in
the law of self-defence seem to allow a battered woman accused to plead self-
defence. This may be done by introducing evidence of "battered woman syndrome"
to convince the jury that her case does in fact contain all the requisite elements of
self-defence.
5.3.1 What is "battered woman syndrome"?
The theory of battered woman syndrome was developed substantially by the
work of an American psychologist, Lenore Walker.19 Her aim appears to have been
to dispel myths and misconceptions about domestic violence and thereby to help to
establish the reasonableness of homicide by battered woman. But who is the battered
woman? A battered woman has been defined by Walker as any woman "18 years of
age or over, who is or has been in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly
subjects or subjected her to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse."20 The
battered woman syndrome consists of two elements: the "cycle theory" and the
theory of "learned helplessness."
19
The theory of the battered woman syndrome was first developed in her work, "The Battered
Woman", (Harper and Row ,1979). The theory was then reorganised in her book, "The
Battered Woman Syndrome", (Springer, 1984). These two books are now widely referred
to in many discussions on the battered woman syndrome.
10
L. Walker, "The Battered Woman Syndrome", ibid., at p. 203.
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5.3.2 The "cycle theory" in the definition of the battered woman
syndrome
This theory postulates that male violence against women partners typically
follows a three-phase pattern.
a. Tension-building phase
This is a period of tension heightening caused by the man's
argumentativeness, during which the woman attempts various unsuccessful pacifying
strategies. The tension-building phase of the battering cycle is the longest, with the
initial stages lasting up to ten years. The batterer may initiate minor skirmishes,
either physical or verbal, while the woman works to keep the peace and avoid the
inevitable and ongoing escalation of the violence. The woman at first attempts to
calm the batterer and reduce his anger but her efforts meet with limited success. She
will then avoid any argument with the batterer in the hope that the batterer could be
brought back to normal and also with the hope that she will not unnecessarily anger
him and set off an explosion. The batterer on the other hand, despite the efforts by
the woman to avoid arguments, behaves oppressively towards her. The situation
between the two partners will be tense and unbearable. However, even though their
relationship is so tense, there is no physical assault or attack by the male partner at
this stage.
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b. The acute battering incident
The tension building phase ends when the man erupts into a rage at some
small trigger and acutely batters the woman. This phase is the shortest phase of the
cycle, typically lasting between a couple of hours and a day. This is the period where
the batterer, the male partner, unleashes all of the anger and tension accumulated
during the tension building phase. The batterer starts to abuse the woman practically
in any way he likes. This include beating, sexual abuse, harassment and any other
sorts of abuse that satisfy him. Apart from releasing his anger, the reason for the
battering could also be in the batterer's mind, a "lesson" to his female partner. It
could also be that the batterer intends to show off his dominance in the relationship.
It will only stop when he feels that his anger has been unleashed by the battering.
c. The loving contrition phase
Once the battering incident stops the batterer, perhaps after he managed to
calm himself down and return to normal, may become apologetic and remorseful.
The guilt-ridden batterer pleads forgiveness for what he had done and confesses his
mistake. He may promise the woman not to lose his self control again and he may
also promise to seek professional help to become a better husband or a better partner.
The woman, amazingly, accepts the pledge and helps to build a new relationship,
forgetting the bitterness of her battering experience.
Eventually, however, the cycle returns to phase one and the tension building
begins again. As the relationship progresses over time, this phase becomes shorter
and less conciliatory and the tension building phase becomes more dominant. When
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the same process recurs, the female partner is said to be suffering from the battered
woman syndrome.21
The acceptance of this "cycle theory" in a case where the battered woman
pleads self-defence is of vital importance. As the facts of the incident show, the
killing occurs during a period of relative calm and there is no actual physical threat
that could suggest that she should exercise force in self-defence. Nevertheless,
because of this cycle theory, she believes that at any time the man could be violent
and at any time her life could be in great danger. The behaviour of the man always
presents her with a threat of imminent harm. So what the accused is trying to
establish is that, even though her act if judged strictly according to the traditional
self-defence criteria, would not fit the defence, she has nevertheless acted honestly
and reasonably in her use of force. If this is accepted, the requirements of imminence
and reasonable belief no longer pose as obstacle to the plea.
5.3.3 The theory of "learned helplessness"
The theory of "learned helplessness" is derived from experiments in which
dogs were tortured with electric shocks.22 After repeated unsuccessful attempts at
escape, they become increasingly passive and "learned" helplessness so that they
L. Walker, explains: "A woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behaviour by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without any concern for her rights. Battered woman include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs for the
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
L. Walker, "The Battered Woman Syndrome", supra, fn. 19.
This experiment was conducted by Martin Seligman and his colleagues. Seligman
generalised this phenomenon to depression in humans. The finding of this experiment
was adopted by Lenore Walker in her theory of learned helplessness. See L. Walker, "The
Battered Woman Syndrome", ibid., at p. 86.
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later spurned proffered chances to escape.23 It is suggested that the same thing
happens to the battered woman - after repeatedly being battered, she may learn not to
retaliate and to obey and accept.
The battered woman develops low self-esteem and becoming self-blaming.
She becomes unable to anticipate the reaction of her partner in their daily relations.
She cannot anticipate how the batterer will respond to any word or action on her part,
and so she feels little control over his anger. Because the battered woman is unable
to predict the effect her actions might have on her battering spouse, she eventually
learns that she has no control over the situation and no escape from the pain;
reacting with passivity becomes her best defence.
This psychological theory of learned helplessness helps to explain the
incapacity of the battered woman to leave the abusive relationship. This is also of
great importance as the traditional law on self-defence judges the reasonableness of
the accused's act according to the way in which the accused has behaved. It is well
accepted that the traditional self-defence concept requires the accused, if possible, to
avoid the killing. The accused's effort to disengage and to flee in avoiding the worst
is necessary in the determination of the reasonableness of her act.24
Now, to escape from the battering relationship in this case is arguably the
more sensible alternative to the killing. The accused could be asked to explain why
23
D.Nicolson and R. Sanghvi, "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications ofR. v.
Ahluwalia", (1993) Crim. L. R. 728 at p.733.
24
The attitude ot the law towards the duty to retreat reflects the tension underlying self-
defence doctrine generally. It has been desired that an individual should be encouraged to
retreat in order to avoid injury to himself or herself, or the attacker. At the same time, one
should not be required to adopt a cowardly or humiliating posture. The result of Palmer v.
R. [1971] 1 All ER 1077, concluded that, duty to retreat should not be the deciding
factor in accepting the accused's plea of self-defence. It, however, goes to show the
reasonableness of the accused defensive act.
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she did not try to leave the relationship when she was under "constant state of fear"
or, why she did not try to seek help from outside. At this point. Walker's
psychological theory of learned helplessness becomes an appropriate explanation.
The "cycle theory" and the theory of "learned helplessness" constitute the
main ingredients in Walker's theory of the "battered woman syndrome". In a case
where they are satisfied - they would help to explain the reasonableness of the
accused's self defensive claim.
5.3.4 Criticisms of the theory of the battered woman syndrome
Despite the fact that Walker's theory of the battered woman syndrome is the
most comprehensive and widely accepted theory in this area,25 it is still far from
perfect. As well as criticism of the theory itself, there has also been criticism of its
proponent, Lenore Walker. Walker's involvement in the case of State v. Martin26 in
favour of the accused was heavily criticised. In this case, the accused separated from
her husband in September 1980, after a violent five year marriage. The accused
heard that her husband intended to blow up her house for the insurance money, and
she feared this would be done while she was in the house. The accused, in her
attempt to stop this plan, hired another person, Bratcher, to kill the husband. On
December 5, 1980, after the deceased came to the house to sign some papers,
Bratcher emerged from his basement hiding place and shot the husband in the neck.
The accused asked him to fire a second shot, as she thought that this was necessary to
kill the deceased.
25
One commentator described L. Walker as the pioneer of the research on battered woman.
L. Stuesser, " The "Defence " of "Battered Woman Syndrome " in Canada." (1990) 19
Manitoba L.J. 195 at 197.
26
666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo.Ct.App. 1984).
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The accused was convicted of murder. She appealed her conviction on the
ground, among others, that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence on the
topic of the battered woman syndrome. In the Appellate Court the accused
contended that as a result of repeated beatings, she had reasonably believed that she
was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. This argument was rejected
by the Appellate Court, which stated that "the evidence here falls woefully short of
establishing an issue of justifiable self defence."27
The main point of criticism was directed on the willingness of a psychologist,
expert witness, in this case Walker, to give her evidence in support of the accused's
claim. On the basis of her research, she had concluded that the primary reason to
resort to killing is because that there is no other practical alternative for her to get out
of her agony. She said: "Although our data indicate the woman kill their abusers for
different reasons, they all resorted to using such violence as their last attempt at
protecting themselves from further physical and mental harm They don't want
the batterer to die, but rather, they just want him to stop hurting them."28 In Martin's
case however, it is difficult to see how a woman hiring another person for the
specific purpose of killing her husband could be described as, "not wanting to see the
husband die"- as claimed by Walker's theory. On the contrary, one could argue that
the killing involved the highest degree of culpability if, as stated in court, the wife
herself ordered the killer to finish off her husband's life at the time when the first shot
did not quite did so. The fact that she gave her testimony in favour of the accused in
this case contradicts her own theory.
D. L. Faigman, "The Battered Woman Syndrome andSelfDefense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent", (1986) 72 Virginia Law Rev. 619 at p. 632.
L. Walker, "The Battered Woman Syndrome", supra, fn. 19 at p. 41.
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As in other cases, the accused could be completely acquitted in the event of
being able to plead self-defence successfully. In this case, she sought to rely on the
defence on the ground that she was constantly abused and that that abusive and
violent behaviour of her husband led her reasonably to believe that her life was in
imminent danger. It was for this reason that expert testimony in respect of the
battered woman syndrome was called for.
From the facts of the case, one wonders whether any court could really accept
the claim of self-defence. The claim of self-defence would deserve to be taken into
account if the killing took place while the accused was being attacked or abused by
her husband. It could also be raised if the facts showed that the accused had stabbed
or shot the husband herself even at the time when there was no actual physical threat
from the deceased; in such circumstances the introduction of the battered woman
syndrome in the trial would be appropriate. However neither of these two factors
was present. The accused's claim of self-defence was made after she had hired
another person to kill her husband on her behalf. On this point alone, her wicked
intention was evident, and any argument that she was reasonable in her act seems
utterly unacceptable.
The flaw of the claim would be more apparent if the issue is discussed in the
context of the theory of justification and excuse in self-defence. Legal theorists have
mostly concluded that the defence of self-defence falls under the theory of
justification - which means that the accused herself or himself is tolerated or
condoned for what he had done even though the act, if committed under ordinary
circumstances, is wrongful and punishable. It is commented that when a person is
justified in doing certain act in defence of his or her life, it means that she had the
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legal right to do what he or she had done.29 Now, returning to the case under
discussion, should the accused's claim of self-defence be accepted on the ground of
the doctrine of battered woman syndrome, theoretically, her act is one that she had
the right to do in the defence of her own life against her husband. The question is,
would it really be acceptable for her to hire another person specifically to kill her
husband, and then claimed that the pressure of living in a battering relationship
forced her to do so? The Court of Appeal in the case of Martin had therefore very
rightly rejected the plea of self-defence and ignored the evidence on battered woman
syndrome.
It is, however, regrettable that the accused's claim was supported by
psychological evidence. The expert's involvement in favour of the accused in this
case rendered her credibility questionable. It is precisely this willingness of experts
to take the stand in extreme cases that reinforces the perception among lawyers that
psychologists and psychiatrists are simply "hired guns."30
Lenore Walker's theory of battered woman syndrome also attracted criticism
among lawyers in respect of the design of the research that lay behind it. These
methodological and interpretive flaws call into question the validity of cycle theory.
One of the most comprehensive criticism comes from David L. Faigman in his
evaluation of the research:jl
It was explained: "The basis of a claim ofjustification is that it speaks to the act, a claim of
excuse to whether the actor is properly regarded as responsible for it. A claim of
justification involves saying. "I am responsible for what was done although as invasion of
an interest of another which is generally protected by the criminal law, was done in
circumstances which gave me legal right to do it." P. Abridge, "The Coherence of
Defences", 1983 Crim. L. R. 665 at p. 665.
D. L. Faigman, supra, fn. 27 at p. 633.
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1. The first point of his criticism focuses on the fact that the research used leading
questions in interviews with subjects; this renders the subjects' response suspect. In
many of the studies involved, the hypothesis of the experimenters is not difficult to
discern, and the subject may simply supply the researchers with what they want to
hear. A good and reliable research project should not permit the hypotheses to
become as obvious to her subjects as Walker did.
2. The second criticism dwells on the manner in which the researcher derives her
evidence of tension building and/or loving contrition. This evidence was gathered
not from the subjects' responses directly, but derived instead from the interviewers'
evaluations of those responses. This, as the criticism explains, made the research
susceptible to the problem of the expectation of the experimenter.
3. The third defect was said to be the most legally significant flaw in Walker's
development of the cycle theory. This is concerned with her failure to place the three
phases of the cycle within any sort of time frame. The determination of each and
every phase of the cycle is vitally important so as not to allow an overlap between
each phase. For example, it was commented that, a tension building phase of 15
minutes could not be considered long enough for an accused to claim a "constant
state of fear." By contrast, tension building that lasts several days and always
culminates in a severe beating assumes tremendous legal significance in a self-
defence case.
The theory also did not indicate whether the period of normality did occur in
between the loving contrition phase and the tension building phase. If it exists, then
there should be four phases to constitute the battering cycle rather than the three
suggested. The theory made no mention of this possibility.
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4. Supporters of battered woman syndrome testimony have understood Walker's
research to show that "during the first two stages, particularly in the second one, the
woman is consumed by fear and feels powerless to do anything to end the violence."
The criticism, however, says that this conclusion in actual fact receives little support
from the research itself. A considerable number of the women subjects were not sure
when asked whether they really thought that their husband or partner could or would
kill them. Though there were some who did have that feeling, many still did not
think it would happen. This fact loosely supported her claim that the battered woman
really suffered from a constant fear of death as a result of the battering relationship.
5. Walker concluded that there must exist three distinct behavioural cycles in the
progress of the battered woman syndrome. Each and every phase occurs separately
and in the sequence, she deduced: tension building, leading to the acute battering
incident, followed by loving contrition - in a single relationship. However, her own
data was said not to support her conclusion. The main difficulty of her theory is to
find any subject to fulfill all the three phases in one relationship. In the data which
she referred to in her conclusion it is shown that there were many instances where a
woman had not completely fulfilled all the three cycles in one relationship but was
still said to be suffering from the syndrome. This suggests that a person may not
have to undergo all the three phases to claim battered woman syndrome. Her final
conclusion, however, stressed importance of fulfilling the three phases. At this point
her research data contradicts her own theory. A good and reliable theory should not
have these defects.
In addition to this difficulty of fulfilling the three phases, what is not clear in
the research is whether the recurrence of the battering relationship needs to fulfill all
the three stages of the theory. What would be the effect if, after the loving contrition
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period the parties suddenly became involved again in a tension building phase? After
a period of time, however, the tension cools down and the couple manages to settle
the dispute. The wife starts to put her trust in the husband and even more than that,
forgets the past experience. The tension building then recurs over a period and in a
serious manner. Now, if the wife at the end kills the husband, can she be said to be
suffering from the battered woman syndrome as it is defined in Walker's theory?
Despite the fact that she had been battered once, could she be said as having
reasonably feared of her life if the only threat that is likely to follow is no more than
a "tension building phase", no matter how serious and how frequent it happens?
Walker does not clarify this and indeed it is not also reasonable to expect
clarification in detail. However, this does tend to show the frailty of the theory.
In addition to these five methodological flaws, difficulty is also encountered
the cycle theory to cases in which a woman has killed her partner. The law of self-
defence stands on the principle that only a reasonable amount of force is allowed in
repelling the threatened attack or danger. A corollary of this principle is that the
defender may employ deadly force only in response to the aggressor's threat of
deadly force. In the context of the present discussion on the cycle theory in battered
woman syndrome, it does not provide the jury with any insights into the precise
nature of the harm a woman perceives at the time she strikes out at the batterer,
whereas, as an underlying precondition in the law of self-defence, a deadly force
could only be used to repel a similarly deadly attack.
The cycle theory presupposes that the woman believes that her life and
bodily integrity have always been in imminent danger, nevertheless the true fact is
that the nature of the danger she believes herself to be exposed to may not be as
serious as she might have thought. For example, after undergoing the three stages as
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suggested in the theory, the woman entered into a period of calm with her husband.
Not long after a period of calm, however, they again became involved in a quarrel.
By now, the cycle theory is recurring and that the woman could be within the
definition of battered woman syndrome. However, even though she may be
reasonable in expecting another battering incident from her husband, the nature of the
"assault" could never be precisely determined. There is a possibility that she may be
severely beaten to the extend of causing her serious bodily injury, but it is equally
possible that she may not suffer any serious attack. For the theory to be strongly
substantiated, though, it must be a matter of certainty that the attack perceived by the
accused be murderous or capable of inflicting upon her grievous bodily harm.
The other major defect of the theory is that it seems to deny completely the
fact that human beings are by our very nature susceptible to changes. A caring and
lovely husband could one day be violent for very specific reasons and, similarly, a
violent husband, one who one does not show many signs of being a good partner,
may on occasion also be very responsible and protective. Therefore, one could
legitimately argue that when a husband happens to batter his wife once, it does not
necessarily mean that in future she is again going to be the subject of the same
brutality.
The theory also does not consider the reason why the husband should behave
with such cruelty. It is possible, for example, the woman's behaviour contributes to
the worsening of the family relationship. The theory seems not to give any
consideration at all to this point. It could be said that Walker presumes that in any
quarrel between the partners - which in her theory leading to the battering
relationship - the blame will inevitably be laid at the door of the male partner. This is
obviously bias and prejudice against the male partner.
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Some consideration has also got to be given, if the theory is to be made
reliable, to the character or personality of husband and of the partner who was killed.
There are cases where the husband was indeed prone to violence and an irresponsible
partner. There are also cases where the husband was a responsible partner without
any history of violence, and there was nothing else to suggest that he might be a
threat to anybody let alone to his own wife. In a case where this kind of husband
suddenly becomes violent in the family, it would be possible that his behaviour has
been affected by other outside factors. It might be possible that the wife herself has
contributed to the situation. Therefore, not only that the circumstances affecting the
wife's act is to be considered, the reasons leading to the husband's violent behaviour
should also be assessed. Without such a full investigation the complete picture of the
killing and the causes behind it may not emerge.
5.3.5 The theory of "learned helplessness": some observations
The adaptation of the theory of learned helplessness which was originally
based on the finding of Martin Seligman's research experiment on dogs,32 was also
considered to suffer from both theoretical inconsistency and inadequate research
methodology. The theory explains that when dogs were subjected to repeated
electrical shocks, they would in the end "learn" that they were helpless. When
subsequently placed in an escapable situation, the dogs failed to escape. The
researcher then concluded that as a result of the torture, it would be extremely




A battered woman who have been the subject of repeated abuse and torture
would in the end be passive and unable to act. This would mean, from a theoretical
perspective, one would predict that when a battered woman was suffering from
learned helplessness she would not be able to control over her environment:
certainly, one would not envisage such decisive steps as the killing of the batterer.
The act of killing the batterer showed that, on the contrary, she had full control of the
environment and that certainly she had not been completely helpless and passive as
the theory itself suggested. It was suggested then that for a woman to realise that she
alone has to protect herself is "antithetical" to the notion that she is unable to assert
control over her environment and this contradicts the basic insight of the theory of
learned helplessness.33
D. L. Faigman, supra, fn. 27 at p. 641.
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B. THE THEORY OF THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME IN THE COURTS
5.4 BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN THE CANADIAN
COURTS: R. v. LAVALLEE
The decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of R. v. Lavallee34 is
significant in so far as the application of the battered woman syndrome in the courts
is concerned. The case is now discussed in full.
The appellant had been living with the deceased for some three to four years.
On the night in question, they invited some guests for a party in their own home. It
was explained in court that when the party was over, they had an argument which
later turned out to be fairly serious. The appellant in her statement to the police,
which was made during the night of the killing, explained that they started to quarrel
after most of the guests had left the house. The deceased seized her by the left hand
and also hit her, causing a bruise on her face.35 He then went to the other room,
loaded his gun and gave it to the deceased. In her police statement, the appellant
claimed that the deceased said "wait till everybody leaves, you'll get it then" and then
threatened the appellant to the effect that "either you kill me or I'll get you". She
then shot him in the back of the head, apparently as he was leaving the room, and
killed him almost immediately.
[1990] 1 S.C.R 852
The coroner who performed an autopsy on the deceased was shown pictures of the appellant,
and he testified that it was "entirely possible" that bruises on the deceased's left hand were
occasioned by an assault on the appellant. R. v. Lavallee, ibid., at p. 858.
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It was apparent from the appellant's statement that throughout the
relationship, she had been continuously harassed, threatened and sometimes beaten
seriously. One of the attending physicians testified that he had treated the appellant
several time between 1983 and 1986 when the appellant went to hospital for
treatment for injuries including severe bruises, a fractured nose, multiple contusions
and a black eye. This accordingly affected her profoundly and when a situation
similar to that which arose on the night of the killing, the appellant really believed
that she was to be seriously wounded if not killed.
It is to be noted that all the witnesses testifying in the case had spoken in
support of the appellant's claim that she had been living in a volatile relationship with
the deceased. A friend of the deceased testified that he had witnessed several fights
between the appellant and the deceased and that he had seen the appellant pointed a
gun at the deceased twice and threatened to kill him if he ever touched her again. He
also testified that on one occasion he had seen the appellant with a black eye and
doubted that it was the result of an accident as she and the deceased had suggested at
that time.
Another witness said that on the night of the killing the appellant was chased
by the deceased and that she pleaded with the deceased to leave her alone. It was
testified that the appellant sought his protection by trying to hide behind him.
Further testimony was provided by the arresting officer who said that en route
to the police station the appellant made various comments in the police car, including
"he said if I didn't kill him first he would kill me. I hope he lives. I really love him."
This testimony of the arresting officer was significant in that it supported the
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appellant's claim in the police report that her intention was not malicious but merely
to save her own life from possible murderous assault from the deceased.
On top of this evidence given in the appellant's favour, her claim of self-
defence was supported strongly by an expert witness - a psychiatrist with extensive
professional experience in the treatment of battered wives. The substance of this
opinion was that the appellant had been terrorised by the deceased to the point of
feeling trapped, vulnerable, worthless and unable to escape the relationship despite
the violence. This testimony strongly suggested that the psychological affect of the
battering relationship, added with the incident prior to the killing on the night in
question, led to an honest belief by the appellant that she would be killed.
In the trial court, Crown counsel challenged the testimony of the psychiatrist
expert witness on two main grounds:
1. The jury was perfectly capable of deciding the issue on the admissible evidence
and that expert evidence was therefore "unnecessary and superfluous".
2. The psychiatrist's comment that he had found the accused credible was "wholly
improper" in light of her failure to testify as to the facts upon which Dr. Shane (the
expert witness) based his opinion.
The trial court rejected these contentions. The psychiatrist's examination of
the appellant was accepted and she was held to have suffered psychologically from a
long period of battering, and that the killing had not been premeditated. Her plea of
self- defence was thus accepted.
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The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The main ground of
appeal was the admissibility of the expert witness. The Crown prosecution insisted
that a claim of self-defence should not be granted due to the fact that the
requirements of self-defence had not, or could not be fulfilled and that the battered
woman syndrome could not in any way support the appellant's claim of self-defence.
The majority opinion in the Manitoba Court of Appeal shared this concern
over the admissibility of the expert witness's testimony. The main point of
dissatisfaction was the fact that the appellant did not herself testify in the court. In
addition, the expert witness based his opinion, in the main, on the unsworn police
statement made by the appellant on the night of the killing and his lengthy interview
with her sometime after the killing, and not on the evidence presented in court.36 In
the end result, the majority of the judges allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.
The matter was subsequently taken to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
main issues before the court were still that of the admissibility of an expert witness in
a case where a woman killed her partner when she is not in immediate danger and
also the significance of the theory of the battered woman syndrome.
The Supreme Court, through Wilson J., accepted that in a case where the
accused had been continuously harassed by her husband, the psychological effect of
the relationship has to be explained by an expert professional. References were made
36
Philip J. in the Manitoba Court of Appeal said:
".... In these circumstances, absent the evidence of Dr. Shane, it is unlikely that the jury,
properly instructed, would have accepted the accused's plea of self-defence. The accused did
not testify, and the foundation for her plea of self-defence was, in the main, her unsworn
exculpatory evidence and the hearsay evidence related by Dr. Shane. Because Dr. Shane
relied upon facts not in evidence, including those related to him in his lengthy interviews
with the accused, the factual basis for his opinion should have been detailed in his
evidence."
The judgement clearly proved the unreadiness of the Court of Appeal to accept the
evidence not based on facts actually presented in the trial. R. v. Lavallee, ibid., at p. 866.
186
to the case of Alain Beland67 and R. v. Abbey38 where in both cases the courts
explained the circumstances where expert opinion may be necessary and also
elaborated the function and the implications of an expert opinion.
In addition to the two cases referred to above, the court also cited with
approval the decision of Slate v. Kelly?9 where in its explanation on the value of
expert testimony, the New Jersey Supreme Court said: "It is aimed at an area where
the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area
where juror's logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect
conclusion, an area where an expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard
their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge."40
The court decided that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners must be both relevant and necessary in the context
of the case in hand.
As it appeared, the claim of self-defence could hardly be successful as the
traditional requirements of self-defence had not been met - the deceased had not been
physically violent during the time preceding the shooting and that there is no
evidence that he did anything so as to put the life of the appellant in danger. The
Supreme Court in dealing with the case, therefore, acknowledged the fact that the
theory of battered woman syndrome, if accepted, would enable the appellant to
succeed in her self-defence defence despite the absence of the fundamental
requirement of "actual danger".
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 389.
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 24.
478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).






5.4.1 The battered woman syndrome and the self-defence
requirement of reasonableness in R. v. Lavallee
Section 34 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides:
"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily
harm in repelling the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily
harm from the violence with which the assault was originally made or with
which the assailant pursues his purposes, and
(b) he believes on reasonable and probable grounds, that he cannot otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm."
This provision essentially requires an accused to be reasonable in respect of
both believing an attack to be being made as well as in the manner of repelling this
attack in defence of his or her life. We now turn to an analysis of this prerequisite as
applied in the decision in R. v. Lavallee.
In the context of this provision, the question which needed to be decided is
whether the shot fired in the night in question was realistically necessary at that
particular moment in order to forestall the perceived threat? In other words, was the
appellant under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from the
deceased as he was walking out of the room? The second question is whether the
appellant's use of force, i.e. the shooting, was reasonably necessary in that situation
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which, had it not been so, it would not be possible for her to otherwise preserve
herself from death or grievous bodily harm.
In both contexts the appellant needed to be reasonable; firstly, in her belief
that her life is seriously in danger, and secondly, in her belief that the only way to
safe herself is by way of killing the deceased. The issue which immediately came to
the attention of the judges was that of the assessment of the appellant's reasonable
belief. Should reasonableness here be interpreted according to an ordinary
reasonable man test as it is widely understood or should there be a special
consideration given to suit the circumstances of woman's case; which suggests a
departure from the orthodoxy of the reasonableness test.
The objective reasonableness required in the Code, and also in provisions of
self-defence in other system emphasises the male perception of danger. It could
therefore be said that the requirement of reasonableness, as required in the law of
self-defence, is postulated on the reaction of a hypothetical reasonable man presumed
to be in the appellant's position. On this point the Supreme Court had a clear view.
Wilson J. in delivering the Supreme Court's judgement stated that in a case
where a woman is subjected to continuous abuse, the law does not need to consider
her act according to the ordinary reasonable man test. The question of'"practicality"
and "justice" seems to be the main reasons for this approach: practicality in the sense
that, to compare a woman's perception in a situation which could not be appreciated
by a man is simply unacceptable and not sensible; justice in the sense that if it is
done, there is a danger that a woman accused could be convicted as a result of the
misapplication of the law. He suggested that in a situation where an accused has
been the subject of continuous abuse, it would only be sensible if her reaction were to
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be judged according to a criterion of the reasonable female person presumed to be in
her position. Wilson J. stated:
"If it strains credulity to imagine what the "ordinary man" would do in the position of
a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find themselves in that
situation. Some women do, however. The definition of what is reasonable must be
adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by
the hypothetical "reasonable man"."41
Having decided on the correct use of the reasonableness test, the court moved
on to decide the requirement of imminence in the law of self-defence. Again section
34 2 (a) and (b) of the criminal code was referred to. The court observed that section
34 2 (a) and (b) does not in actual fact envisage the attack as imminent.
Nevertheless, a series of previously decided cases treated the imminence requirement
as an important ingredient in the law of self-defence. Specific references were made
to the case ofReilly v. The Queen,42 R. v. Bogue43 and R. v. Baxter.44 In these cases,
the Supreme Court approved an interpretation of imminence conjuring up an image
of "an uplifted knife" or a pointed gun.
The court then considered whether a person threatened only by words or
gesture, could view herself or himself as being already in imminent danger and
therefore be allowed to proceed with whatever steps thought necessary in defence of
the perceived threat? Or, should such a person seek assistance from others? On this
Ibid., at p. 874.
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 396.
(1976) 30 C.C.C. (2d) 403.






matter, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's case of R. v. Whynot45 was highlighted.
The decision in that case asserted that it is inherently unreasonable to apprehend
death or grievous bodily harm unless and until the physical assault is in progress.
The decision in R. v. Whynot was too rigid and inflexible, and if followed strictly
would leave the accused in this case with no chance of success in her plea of self-
defence.
It has to be said that by mere looking at the facts of the case as explained in
the court, based on the unsworn statement of the appellant made to the police, it
would be reasonable to ask why she opted to shoot when she has other alternatives.
Perhaps it would have been more sensible for her to flee to safety. Perhaps she could
even seek police protection if she really thought that the threat made was to be
carried out. In an ordinary case of self-defence, it seems highly unlikely that the
accused could answer those questions satisfactorily to justify her self-defence claim,
particularly if the judgement in the case of R. v. Whynot is applied.
The Supreme Court, however, had openly expressed its unwillingness to
follow R. v. Whynot.46 In its judgement, the theory of battered woman syndrome as
explained by an expert evidence was regarded as highly necessary in deciding the
reasonableness of the accused's act. At this point, therefore, the theory of battered
woman syndrome from which the appellant allegedly been suffering became the
deciding factor. It is upon this consideration that the case then proceeded.
(1983) 9 C.C.C. 449. This case will be discussed in full later in this chapter.
Wilson J. in her judgement stated:
"The requirement imposed in Whynot that a battered woman wait until the physical assault
is "underway" before her apprehensions can be validated in law would, in the words of an
American court, be tantamount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment': State v.
Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986), at p. 1271."
R. v. Lava/lee, supra, fn. 34 at p. 883.
191
5.4.2 Walker's theory of the "battered woman syndrome" in R. v.
Lavallee
Wilson J. in delivering the majority judgement expressed the court's
recognition of the theory of battered woman syndrome advocated by Lenore Walker.
The description of the accused's state of mind and the history of her relationship with
the deceased conformed to the features of the syndrome propounded in the theory.
With regard to the mental state of the appellant, Wilson J. observed:
"Given the relational context in which the violent occurs, the mental state of an
accused at the critical moment she pulls the trigger cannot be understood except in
terms of the cumulative effect ofmonths or years of brutality."47
The implication of this statement is that in saying that the appellant's act can
be understood only after considering her state of mind and taking into account the
history of the relationship, the court suggest its readiness to allow an expert opinion
explaining the appellant state of mind which, if acceptable, would help the jury to
understand her perception to the situation while committing the killing. The
"cumulative effect of months or years of brutality" in the relationship was in fact
explained by a psychiatrist in the trial court which was also held to be desirable by
the Supreme Court. The approach taken in the Supreme Court only confirms that the
case was to be treated differently from other ordinary self-defence cases and that the
jury could only understand the true situation after hearing an expert's clarification of
the appellant's state ofmind at the time of the killing.
Ibid., at p. 880.
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5.4.3 The battered woman syndrome's cycle theory in R. v. Lavallee:
some comments
The "cycle theory" derived from Walker's battered woman syndrome had
been successfully explained in the trial court and accepted in the Supreme Court.
The theory requires the battering incidents to occur at least twice in the relationship.
The court quoted with approval the work of Dr. Walker: "Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."48
Having said that, however, the judgement did not meticulously observe the
three periods which constitute the cycle theory. The theory suggests that the violence
frequently occurs within the context of a three phase cycle namely the "tension
building phase", the "acute battering phase" and the period of calm which is known
as "loving contrition" phase. During the third phase, as it was explained in the
theory, the batterer would realise that he was at fault and would seek forgiveness and
show remorse and kindness. Nevertheless, eventually the cycle begin once again and
as soon as it starts for the second time, if the wife happens to kill the batterer, her
claim of self-defence could be supported by the syndrome.
Now, the court was right to require the appellant to have experienced violence
twice before she could be said to be suffering from the syndrome. However, it seems
evident that whether or not she had undergone all the three phases as described and
required in the original theory had not been fully observed.49 All the three courts
seemed not to be too particular on this issue. It was explained in the trial court that
R. v. Lavallee, ibid., at p. 880.
49
The court seems to have observed the first requirement that the battering relationship
happened twice but the problem is that no serious observation seems to have been made as
to whether the whole phases comprising the cycle theory need also to happen twice.
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the appellant was frequently a victim of physical abuse between 1983-1986.
However, the incidents leading to the beating and what happened immediately after it
has not been observed. Should the cycle theory be fully applied and testified, it will
be necessary that all the happenings required need to occur exactly and in the
sequence laid down in the theory. Otherwise, the theory could not be applied and
that the appellant is not a battered woman as intended in Walker's theory despite the
fact that she had been the subject of continuous battering.
Another way to look at the issue involves taking Walker's cycle theory only
as a general guideline. The three phases mentioned in the theory are not really meant
to occur exactly in a sequence as described. It would suffice if the evidence show
that the accused woman had been beaten from time to time. Whether after the
beating, they fell into the "loving contrition phase", or before the beating there was a
period of "tension heightening" will not affect the claim. And also prior to the
second abusing incident, that is, in the period between the loving contrition and the
second battering, there was a period of tension heightening was not also being
emphasised. It seems that the main point in the eyes of the court is the repetition of
the beating itself. This seems to be the way the theory of battered woman syndrome
was viewed in the present case. If it is so, one could ask, what is the legal effect of
the cycle theory? Should it be carefully examined in each battered woman claim or,
should it not be. Certainly by virtue of the case under discussion, the issue had not
been made clear. One could say, at least at this point of the theory, it needs more
clarification. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, the theory itself is
defective and confusing.
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5.4.4 The theory of "learned helplessness" in R. v. Lavallee
The court also agreed with the theory in that where an accused had been
routinely abused, she had developed herself the skill that could accurately predict the
occurrence of the violence and also she would be able to anticipate correctly the
nature and the result of the attack. Thus, even though an ordinary reasonable person
would not believe life and bodily integrity to be in serious danger merely by the kind
of the threat received by the accused as in the present case, the accused, considering
the history of her relationship with the deceased, would believe this.
Lenore Walker responds to the argument that the wife could have indeed
avoided the killing by fleeing the relationship or seeking outside help by introducing
what is known as "learned helplessness" theory. This notion of learned helplessness
arises in the present case. Dr. Shane, who testified for the appellant argued that as a
result of the sufferings she had become hopeless and had very low self esteem. She
learned only to be obedient for that is the best way to avoid any serious argument that
could lead to another battering incident.50
The nature of the relationship between the parties had evidently, as testified
and accepted in the court by an expert, fitted the theory of battered woman syndrome.
This would also mean that despite the fact that the appellant's behaviour did not fit
squarely with the traditional requirement of self-defence, it could do so with the help
of an expert witness to testify in her favour.
Dr. Shane testified that one of the reasons that forced the accused to remain in the
relationship is the fact that she had been beaten very seriously on many occasions preceding
the killing. "One is that the spouse gets beaten so badly-so badly- that he or she loses the
motivation to react and becomes hopeless and becomes powerless . . It
becomes just helpless and lies there in an amotivational state, if you will, where it
feels there's no power and there's no energy to do anything."
R. v. Lavallee, supra, fn. 34 at p. 884.
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The judgement in the Supreme Court rigorously emphasised the importance
of expert testimony in a case where the battered wife kills her spouse. In the absence
of such testimony, the credibility and integrity of the court itself would be in
question. Wilson J. therefore laid down the primary function of expert evidence in
cases involving a battered woman accused in the following terms:
1. Expert testimony is admissible to assist the fact-finder in drawing inferences
in areas where the expert has relevant knowledge or experience beyond that
of the lay person.
2. It is difficult to comprehend the battered wife syndrome. It is commonly
thought that battered women are not really beaten as badly as they claim,
otherwise they would have left the relationship. Alternatively, some believe
that women enjoy being beaten, that they have a masochist strain in them.
Each of these stereotypes may adversely affect consideration of a battered
woman's claim to have acted in self defence in killing her mate.
3. Expert evidence can assist the jury in dispelling these myths.
4. Expert testimony relating to the ability of an accused to perceive danger from
her mate may go to the issue ofwhether she "reasonably apprehended" death
or grievous bodily harm on a particular occasion.
5. Expert testimony pertaining to why an accused remained in the battering
relationship may be relevant in assessing the nature and extent of the alleged
abuse.
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6. By providing an explanation as to why an accused did not flee when she
perceived her life to be in danger, expert testimony may also assist the jury in
assessing the reasonableness of her belief that killing her batterer was the
only way to save her own life.51
Having relied heavily on expert opinion, the Supreme Court finally overruled
the majority judgement in the Court of Appeal and reinstated the trial court's
decision. The appellant's plea of self-defence was granted with the assistance of an
expert opinion and accordingly the theory of battered woman syndrome justified an
act which would otherwise unjustified.
5.4.5 R. v. Lavallee: some comments
The importance of R. v. Lavallee rests on four factors:
1. The court admitted that in a case where a battered woman claims self-defence, her
mental state needs to be clarified by an expert witness. By this, the court meant to
say that, in some cases, the jury has to be assisted by an expert to appreciate the
nature of the case. Without such detailed examination, the credibility of a judgement
would be in question.
2. The battered woman's perception of the danger threatening her life and bodily
integrity and the manner she exercises her defensive conduct have to be reasonable.
However, the construction of reasonableness here is not a matter of stereotypical
assumptions based on male experiences. It would be of a great injustice if a woman's
behaviour were to be adjudged objectively by the standard of hypothetical man
51
R. v. Lavallee, ibid., at p. 889 - 890.
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presumed to be in her position. The reasonableness of the accused's act can only be
justifiably assessed by a reasonable hypothetical woman put in her position. This
accordingly introducing a new conception in the law of self-defence.52
3. For the first time, battered woman syndrome was successfully used to support an
accused person's claim of self-defence. The main function of the syndrome is its role
in explaining to the jury the physical and mental condition of the battered wife. As a
result of this traumatic experience, such a woman's perception of danger could be
different from that of others. And most importantly, what is reasonable to her could
accordingly be different from others who did not suffer from the same bitter marital
relation.
4. Fourthly, and most importantly, is the fact that the court is now prepared to allow
self-defence even in a case where the traditional necessary elements constituting the
defence are not present.
5.4.6 The application of section 34 of the Canadian Criminal Code in
R. v. Lavallee
One point of criticism concerns the application of section 34 of the Canadian
Criminal Code. The provision states:
It was argued that the majority ofmurder cases involve male offenders which makes the
defence of self-defence basically a paradigmatically male ideal model. The concept of
reasonableness and proportionality through which reasonableness will be judged, is
essentially for a male oriented concept. It is of this reason that homicides by women are
rarely perceived as instances of self-defence.
A. McColgan, "In Defence ofBattered Woman Who kill", (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 508.
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"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily
harm in repelling the assault is justified if. "
The wording in this part of the provision suggested that self-defence could be
claimed in a situation where he or she is unlawfully assaulted and that he caused the
death or grievous bodily harm against the attacker "in repelling" the unlawful attack
which was at that time underway. The word "in repelling the assault" here is crucial.
It naturally suggests that the accused was in the process of defending himself from
any kind of threat or attack which would cause her death or grievous bodily harm.
Subsection (a) of section 34 (2) further states that the killing is justifiable if at
the time of its commission the accused was under reasonable apprehension of death
or grievous bodily harm from the violence with which the assault was originally
made or with which the assailant pursues his purposes. The subsection requires the
accused to be reasonable in his apprehension of the danger. Thus in the light of
section 34 (2) (a), an accused could rely on self-defence as described in this provision
in a case where he is the subject of an unlawful assault and where in repelling that
actual assault he reasonably apprehended that his life was seriously threatened.
Now, apart from the case where the accused's life was clearly in the hands of
the assailant,53 this subsection also seems to allow self-defence in a case where "an
attack was already physically in progress, but, it has not yet directly threatened the
life of the accused". In a case of such a nature, the only condition prescribed is the
reasonableness of the accused's belief in the danger encountered. An example of this
would be the case where an accused is confronted with a violent person who has been
menacing people on the street. Let us assume that for some reason he is not able to
53
For example in a case where the accused had already been struck in her struggle to ward off
the attack - as in that situation it will not be difficult to establish the reasonableness of her
act.
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flee and he uses force in what he thinks to be a defensive act. In the trial, the main
issue would be whether his apprehension of the danger and also the manner in which
he carried out the defensive act is reasonable. In considering this, all the
circumstances surrounding the incident would have to be examined. In a case where
the jury is satisfied that his defensive conduct is reasonably necessary, it seems likely
that he could rely upon section 34 (2) (a) and be successful in his self-defence claim.
This could be so despite the fact that the violence he confronted had not yet directed
specifically at him.
Another example would be a case where there is a dispute between a couple.
The male partner loses his temper and that starts to act violently but does not yet
directly threaten the life of his partner. However, fearing that her life may be
seriously threatened, she strikes him, causing his death. Surely the primary issue is
how imminent is the danger, how reasonable is she in perceiving the threat to her life
(which means that how reasonable is she in believing that despite the fact that the
violence has not yet been directed to her, her life is already in danger) and whether
the killing is the most appropriate and effective way to save her life. Again, as in the
previous hypothetical case, the reasonableness of her perception of the danger would
in the end be the decisive factor.
Section 34 (2) (a) thus enables self-defence to be involved in two situations:
1. In a case where there is a direct interference with bodily integrity.
2. It is likely that a person who has not yet been attacked, but, believes that he will be
- because of the violent act of his supposed attacker - may also be protected by the
section.
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However, in the case of a battered woman, where an accused killed when
there is no actual physical threat, and the killing is merely a result of her belief that
she will at some point herself be killed or seriously injured, there can be no
connection with the provision. The question then is: was Lavallee's claim of self-
defence compatible with the requirements of section 34. The trial court as well as the
Supreme Court did view the case in this perspective.
In the course of the judgement in Lavallee, the Supreme Court singled out
two elements of the defence under section 34 (2) of the Code for particular scrutiny.
The first is whether the appellant reasonably felt that her life was in immediate
danger at the time when the deceased handed over to her the loaded gun and walked
out of the room. The second related to the section 34 (2) (b) requirement as to the
magnitude of the force used by the accused. No discussion was entered into
regarding the suitability of the provision itself in the case in question. Had this issue
been raised, there is a strong possibility that the case in question would not have
satisfied the requirements laid down in the Code. The main reason is because
Lavallee in her defence did not kill at the time when the threat was really imminent
and that she was not at the time of the killing repelling any actual assault from the
deceased. This apparently fails the "in repelling the assault" requirement of the
Code.
The theory of the battered woman syndrome thus provided justification for
the acceptance of self-defence. In accepting this, the court's focus was more on the
question of the admissibility of the expert evidence rather than on the major factor
which is supposed to form the substantial part of the decision, that is, whether or not
to allow a person to kill on fear of her death from her battering partner at the moment




would have faced. Certainly, this decision has been roundly applauded by feminists
and lawyers who believe that special consideration must be given to battered woman
cases. However, the issue certainly does not seem to have been satisfactorily settled.
The fear that it might be asserted that any battered woman could find her response to
be privileged under the new theory is certainly well grounded.^
5.4.7 R. v. Lavallee\ a conclusion
The decision in Lavallee is widely viewed as a new development in the law of
self- defence, at least as far as Canadian criminal law is concerned. Allowing a plea
of self-defence to a woman who kills without satisfying the imminence requirement
is, indeed, a departure from the classical law of self-defence. By assessing the
accused's belief on the basis of what she herself thinks reasonable, and also by taking
into consideration her perception of the deceased throughout their relationship, the
traditional conception of "reasonable man" itself has now been altered. The result of
Lavallee could also be stated thus: the requirements of the law which have long been
upheld appear now to have been changed in favour of an approach which will strike
"The issues had become clearly established by this stage as evidentiary rather than
substantive. That is, the appeal focused on the status of Dr. Shane's testimony, not on
whether it is justifiable to defend oneself by shooting an unarmed person in the back of the
head. This is mysterious. For some reason, both at the trial and appeals levels, the courts
viewed this as an "expert evidence" case, not an "imminent attack" one."
C. Boyle, "The Battered Woman Syndrome And Self-Defence: Lavallee v. R" [1990] 9
Canadian Journal of Family Law 171 at p. 172.
C. Boyle in concluding her discussion on the case of Lavallee commented that the
Supreme Court's judgement in favour of the battered woman may, at the best, be hailed as
a step towards recognising the need to have a woman's perception of a case be given serious
consideration. The corollary of this is to accept the need to differentiate between a male
accused and female accused in a murder case. It must not, however, be assumed that a
woman facing criminal charges will have no difficulty in having her perspective
perceived as reasonable in Canadian courts.
C. Boyle, ibid., at p. 179.
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many as more acceptable. If the previous law were to be applied strictly in battered
woman cases, the result would be too harsh and this has certainly now changed.
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5.5 BATTERING AND THE DECISION IN R. v. WHYNOT6
In this case the accused shot her sleeping common law husband as he lay
passed out in his truck. At trial she was granted a defence of "prevention of assault"
under section 37 of the Canadian Criminal Code; the trial court decided that the
accused's act was justified in that it was necessary to protect the life of his neighbour
and her son. (whom the deceased had repeatedly threatened to kill), and that the
manner in which the defence was conducted was not in any way in excess of what
would be necessary.
The accused lived with the deceased together with their son, and her son by
another. Near their house there was a trailer occupied by their neighbours. The
evidence at trial indicated that the deceased dominated the household and exerted his
authority by striking and slapping the various members and from time to time
administering beatings to the accused and the others. On the day of the killing the
accused was asked by the deceased to drive him to his friend's home, where he
became heavily intoxicated. On many occasions the deceased was said to have
mentioned that he would burn to death his neighbour, and also kill the accused's son.
On their way home, these threats were again repeated. It was due to this threat,
coupled with the fact that she had previously been threatened with death should she
try to leave, that the accused on returning home shot the deceased.
The Crown asserted that the killing was premeditated and well arranged. The
shooting took place when the accused was aware of her act and the consequences
thereof. The theory of the defence, on the other hand, was that the accused shot the
deceased in the reasonable belief that he was going to assault her son and that such




The trial judge in his direction to the jury asserted that the case was one of
self-defence and involved section 37 of the Canadian Criminal Code. Section 37
states:
"(1) Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any one under his
protection from assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary to prevent the
assault or the repetition of it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to justify the willful infliction of any
hurt or mischief that is excessive, having regard to the nature of the assault that the
force used was intended to prevent."
There were two main questions for the jury to decide: firstly, whether in
causing the death of the deceased, the accused did really act to defend herself or
persons under her protection in line with the requirement stated in the Code, and
secondly, if she did act to protect herself or persons under her protection, whether the
amount of force used was necessary.
In relation to the first issue, the trial court asked the jury to consider the state
of mind of the accused and all factors affecting her state of mind. In relation to the
second, whether or not the amount of force used was necessary, this was to be
assessed objectively and not from the perspective of the accused alone.57 By virtue
The trial judge's instruction reads:
"Now when you address the question of the amount of force that was used it is not the
accused, it is not from the perspective of the accused that you should look at the question-
you should look at the question as an objective question, and it really is whether an
ordinary reasonable person who knew the kind ofman William Stafford was would in the
circumstances have believed that it was necessary to kill him."
R. v. Whynot, ibid., at p. 462.
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of this direction, the jury concluded that the accused did act to protect her son from
being assaulted by the deceased and therefore, the killing was justifiable.
The Court of Appeal presumed that there are two possible ways that the jury
could have reached the verdict of not guilty. First, they may have had reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused really did the killing or it was in fact done by the
accused's son as it was also claimed in the trial. Second, if they understood from the
trial judge's instruction that section 37 of the Criminal Code permitted the accused to
anticipate a possible assault against her son from threats made earlier in the evening
and that she used reasonable force to prevent such an assault.
The Court of Appeal, in any event, disagreed with the way the case was
conducted in the trial court on the grounds that it was not appropriate to apply section
37 of the CodeF8 The wording of the provision is intended only to justify killing by
a person who suffers an actual assault, or where there is an actual assault on the
person he or she intended to defend. In the absence of this requirement, there seems
to be no other way in which a killing could be justified under this provision. To
justify the accused's conduct in such a case would be tantamount to allowing anyone
to kill merely out of fear of a threat that may or may not be carried out. Hart J.A. in
Hart J.A. in his judgement stated:
"I do not believe that the trial judge was justified in placing s. 37 of the Code before the jury
any more than he would have been justified in giving them s. 34."
He later asserted:
"In my opinion, the trial judge in this case should have ruled that in law there was no legal
foundation in the evidence to merit a justification of the act of killing the deceased as a
means of defending Jane Stafford's son from any assault by Billy Stafford. As he did with
s.34 of the Code he should have refused before the jury any justification of her actions under
s. 37 The jury should not have been permitted to consider a possible assault as a
justification of her deed, and s. 37 of the Code should not have been left with them."
R. v. Whynot, ibid., at p. 464-465.
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delivering the judgement stated that the provision had been too broadly interpreted
and that this was not intended by Parliament.59
5.5.1 R. v. Whynot and the theory of the battered woman syndrome
It must be pointed out that the case under discussion did not deal specifically
with the theory of the battered woman syndrome; neither in the trial court nor in the
appeal level was any reference was made to this theory. In the course of the trial it
was indicated that the deceased has been a continuous threat to the accused. The life
of the members of the whole family would be threatened if the accused left the
relationship. It was also claimed, the killing was done in the accused's belief that the
deceased would, on the night in question, make good his threat to kill her son. It was
evidence such as this which pointed to the fact that the accused at the time of
committing the killing was overwhelmed.60 The trial court had indicated the
relevance of the circumstances surrounding the accused when, in its direction, the
jury was asked to take into consideration "the state of mind of the accused and all
factors affecting her state of mind."61 However the matter seems to stop at that
juncture without any attempt to observe the accused's mental and physical condition.
If it was intended to look at the accused's state of mind as directed, perhaps, the
59
Hart J.A. said: "The instructions given to the jury regarding s. 37 were broad enough to say
that a person is justified in killing anyone who has threatened them and is likely to carry out
such threat. I do not believe that Parliament intended such an interpretation of the section."
R. v. Whynot., ibid., at p. 463.
There were some psychiatric evidence adduced on behalf of the defence which tended to
show that Jane Stafford was at her wit's end when she committed the killing. The accused
also testified that she could not leave the deceased because he had threatened to kill all of
the members of her family, at one time, should she do so. This testimony seems to comply
with the theory of learned helplessness adopted by Dr. Lenore Walker in her battered woman
syndrome. However, this testimony carried very little weight as the question of battered
woman syndrome itselfwas not invoked.
61
Regina v. Whynot, supra, fn. 45 at p. 462.
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testimony of an expert witness explaining the situation would meritably be required,
had that been adduced, it would have substantially changed the nature of the case.
The primary issue in R. v. Whynot was therefore whether section 37 was the
proper defence for the accused. In other words, the question was whether she had
acted in defence of persons under her protection and whether her conduct in their
defence was necessary and within the limitations prescribed by the law. The trial
court as well as the Court of Appeal had essentially decided on the substantial aspect
of the law of self-defence - whether a person would be justified in adducing self-
defence merely on the strength that the life of someone under her protection was
threatened. This would be so even without satisfying the imminent attack
requirement, as the shot was made in the absence of an actual threat. For this matter
the jury, guided by the trial judge's instruction, found that the defence should be
allowed. The Court of Appeal for the reasons already explained, overruled this
decision.
5.5.2 R. v. Lavallee62 and R. v. Whynot:63 some discussions
The two cases were similar in that both accused were woman living under
constant threat from their husbands. In Lavallee, the woman killed her husband
because of the continuous threat and assaults she had suffered, and she believed that
without taking such steps, she would herself be killed. In Whynot, the accused killed
the husband in defence of her son and not really for her own self-defence. It was
committed in the belief that unless she acted as she did, the life of her son would be
seriously in danger.
62 Supra, fn. 34.
63 Supra, fn. 45.
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The fundamental difference between the two is this: whereas in Lavallee the
trial court admitted the importance of an expert witness (which was approved in the
Supreme Court), in Whynot, the court did not find it necessary to do so. Now, it
seems that the reason why the court took a different approach in the two cases may
be that the court in each case was dealing with a different provision in the Code. In
R. v. Whynot, reference was made to section 37 of the Code and, therefore, the case
was treated as a claim of a "prevention of an assault". The section states:
(1)
"Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any one under his
protection from assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary to prevent the
assault or the repetition of it."
(2)
"Nothing in this section shall be deemed to justify the willful infliction of any hurt or
mischief that is excessive, having regard to the nature of the assault that the force
used was intended to prevent."
The wording of this provision necessarily required the accused, in the use of
force, to act only in defence of her life or the life or those under her protection. The
force used must, furthermore, be commensurate with the nature of the assault
intended to be prevented. In the event where the force used is greater than that which
was necessary, this provision cannot justify her act. The section obviously suggest a
very rigorous proportionality test before any force can be justified in the name of
self-defence.
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The sort of case for which the provision was designed presupposes an assault
which is underway and posing an imminent threat to the life of the accused.
Therefore, by virtue of this provision, the central discussion in the case focused on
whether or not the accused's use of force was really necessary in defending the life of
a person under her protection and whether the force itself was not excessive
compared to the assault she was attempting to prevent.
Not a great deal of attention was paid to the issue of the reasonableness of the
accused's belief as to the necessity of killing in self-defence. The reason for this is,
as explained, the reasonableness of the act was not made the main issue in section 37.
Had the reasonableness of her belief became the central issue, it is highly likely that
it would have been necessary to call for an expert opinion as to her state ofmind.
In Lavallee, on the other hand, section 34 of the Canadian Criminal Code was
referred to. To restate this provision:
Section 34 (2)
"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily
harm in repelling the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under 'reasonable apprehension' of death or grievous bodily
harm from the violence with which the assault was originally made or with
which the assailant pursues his purposes, and
(b) he 'believes on reasonable and probable grounds', that he cannot otherwise
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm."
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As is apparent, the requirement of reasonableness is stressed. An accused can
only be justified in killing or causing grievous injury if he believes and believes
reasonably that, i) his life is in immediate danger, ii) that the manner of his defensive
action is really necessary, and that without exercising such force his life will in turn
be in peril. If the court is satisfied that the accused has been reasonable in
apprehending the danger and also reasonable in his defensive conduct, whether or not
the amount of force used is more than what would be necessary will not be the point
of discussion. At this point the different between section 34 and section 37 becomes
clear. In short, whereas section 37 points out the importance of the proportionality
requirement, section 34 stresses that as long as it is satisfied that the accused has
been reasonable in the apprehension of the danger, and that he believes that the
repelling force used was the only way to safe his life, whether or not the amount of
force used is more than required will not be a bar to his claim of self-defence under
the provision.
5.5.3 Distinguishing "evidentiary" and "substantive" issues in Lavallee
and the case of Whynot
The facts of Lavallee's case did not show that her act was reasonable at all at
the time of the killing. This is due to the fact that the fatal shot was fired at the time
when no actual assault had been initiated. This necessarily failed the test of
imminence as stipulated in section 34 of the Code. Nevertheless, the court found it
necessary to look at the state of mind of the accused at the time of the killing, as this
would explain the reasonableness of her act. To achieve this, the opinion of an
expert was held to be necessary.
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Having had to consider the accused's reasonable belief and her claim of
battered woman syndrome, the court then dealt with evidentiary matters rather than
the matter of substance, that is, whether the killing could be justified when the threat
or assault was not imminent. Had the case been seen as one of "imminent attack", it
would have focused on the doctrine that limits self-defence to situations where a
person is actually being attacked or is about to be attacked, exactly the approach
taken in Whynol's case. However as the law, or more specifically section 34 of the
Code, requires the accused to have reasonable apprehension that her life is in serious
danger, her reasonable belief had thus became the primary issue. This issue could
only be resolved by reference to expert opinion. Thus, the case turned out to be one
of an "expert opinion" rather than "imminent attack".
The two cases discussed above show two distinct attitudes in Canadian courts
in the treatment of female accused in murder cases. The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal did not make any meaningful observation on the battered woman syndrome,
as the issue itself had not been seriously discussed in the trial court.64 The
application of section 37 provides the reason for the Court of Appeal's attitude. As
explained, the provision did not make a requirement of reasonableness as the primary
condition to a plea of self- defence under the law.
On the other hand, in Lavallee the Canadian Supreme Court agreed with the
need to have the accused's case testified to by an expert. This is important in that the
court has now indicated its willingness to recognise the theory, the function of which,
is the justifying of an act which under ordinary circumstances would not have been
64
Hart J. admitted a great deal of evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defence
about the character of the deceased in order to explain the accused's perception towards him
and also to explain the state of mind of the accused at the time of the killing. However he
stressed that much of this evidence was not admissible for it served only to create
sympathy for the respondent.
Regina v. Whynot, ibid., at p. 461.
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justified. As section 37 affected the judges approach towards Whynot's case, the
application of section 34 had evidently affected the whole discussion of the case in
Lavallee. The requirement that the accused should have reasonably apprehended an
attack made the discussion focus mainly on her reasonable believe of the danger she
might be confronting. And, as explained, this makes the opinion of an expert
indispensable.
The application of the battered woman syndrome in the Canadian Supreme
Court was positively received by many commentators as well as by feminists.
Stuesser characterised the Supreme Court's decision as "fair, just, and correct in
law." Martinson stated: "The willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to
address gender bias in an area of substantive criminal law, an area that can affect the
lives of a significant number of Canadians, is commendable. Wilson J., in the
February memorial lecture, saw no reason why the judiciary cannot exercise "some
modest degree of creativity in areas where modern insights and life's experience have
indicated that the law has gone awry". The court did just that in the Lavallee
decision."66 She also suggested that the Lavallee approach to the construction of
reasonableness and the imminent danger requirement to be extended to other criminal
law doctrines.67
Isabel Grant, nevertheless expressed her scepticism on the reliance of expert
evidence on battered woman syndrome. She was of the view that by heavily relying
on expert evidence, the court implicitly sent the message that without this evidence
L. Stuesser, "The "Defence" of "Battered Woman Syndrome" in Canada", supra, fn. 25 at
p. 210.
D. Martinson, "Lavallee v. R. - The Supreme Court ofCanada Addresses Gender Bias In The
Court." (1990) 24 U.B.C.L.Rev. 381 at p. 396.
D. Martinson, M. MacCrimmon, I. Grant and C. Boyle, "A Forum On Lavallee v. R: Women
And Self-Defence" (1991) 25 U.B.C.L.Rev. 23 at p. 36.
213
the woman's perception of reality would not be accepted. The writer suggested: "we
must not develop rules such that only woman who fall into stereotypical description
of "battered woman" are allowed to raise a claim of self-defence. The focus must be
on what the woman did and on the context in which she did it: the presence or
absence of "battered wife syndrome" should never be determinative."68
The application of the battered woman syndrome theory in court is seen as a
step towards recognising the need to differentiate between female and male
offenders, particularly in murder cases. This would also mean that women facing
criminal charges would now have their perspective sympathetically considered,
therefore raising their chances of acquittal. However, looking at it from another
perspective, it could also be said that this theory would only be considered if the law
referred to in the defence is section 34 of the Canadian Criminal Code, as the law in
this section specifically required the accused's belief to be reasonable. That it should
be applicable to other self-defence laws, especially section 37, seems unlikely as the
accused's reasonable belief is not the main ingredient for the accused's success in her
claim of self-defence.
5.5.4 Conclusion
In R. v. Whynot, The Nova Scotia Court of Criminal Appeal stated that to
justify an accused's act of killing in the absence of the important ingredient
constituting the law of self-defence, that is, the imminence test, would mean to allow
a person to kill when there is no more than a fear that her life is in danger. This is
not what the court should allow and certainly not the way section 37 should to be
interpreted. Hart J.A. stressed:
68
D. Martinson, M. MacCrimmon, I. Grant and C. Boyle, ibid., at p. 59.
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" In my opinion, no person has the right in anticipation of an assault that may or may
not happen, to apply force to prevent the imaginary assault"69
On the contrary, Wilson J. in The Canadian Supreme Court in Lavallee
stated:
"The requirement imposed in Whynot that a battered woman wait until the physical
assault is "underway" before her apprehensions can be validated in law would, in the
words of an American court, be tantamount to sentencing her to murder 'by
installment': State v. Gallegos, 719P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986), at p. 1271."70
The difficulty of the battered woman who kills in self-defence is the fact that
she has, in fact, killed someone. The dictum in Whynot proved the fact that once a
crime of murder is committed, it has to be taken seriously. The idea behind this is
that the law should not lightly justify a criminal act, all the more so if the crime
involves the life of another human being.
The judgement in Lavallee will certainly have a major implication as it
emanates from the highest court in Canada. However it is doubtful whether this
judgement is likely to provide an accused with a complete acquittal after she has
satisfied the court that she is a battered woman. The judgement of R v Whynot may
have been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision, yet its tenor certainly still finds
support in some quarters.
R. v. Whynot, supra, fn. 45 at p. 464.
R. v. Lavallee, supra, fn. 34 at p. 883.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE THEORY OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN
ENGLISH AND AUSTRALIAN LAW
A. THE THEORY OF THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME IN ENGLISH COURTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 Self-defence in English courts
The English criminal law on self-defence is governed by the rules laid down
at common law as well as section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. The
traditional doctrine of self-defence at common law requires that the defence should
have been necessary in self-defence. From this limitation derives the test of
"imminence", "the duty to retreat" and also the requirement that the amount of force
should not be more than is necessary in the defence - a test of "proportionality". The
statutory requirement laid down under section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 on
the other hand states:
"A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention
of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or of persons
unlawfully at large."
This provision refers to cases of prevention of crime or arresting offenders
rather than specifically explaining the law on self-defence. However, it has been
argued that a person who defends himself against an unlawful attack has also acted
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in prevention of crime and thus his claim of self-defence falls within the scope stated
in the Act.1 Hence, it is likely that the requirement of "reasonable in the
circumstances" stated in the Act will have a significant bearing in self-defence cases.
One question arises here is whether the provision in the Criminal Law Act
1967 overrules the common law requirements of self-defence. Section 3 (2) of the
same Act states:
"Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question
when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that
purpose."
One commentator2 has proposed three possible interpretations:
1. Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 totally replaced the defence of self-
defence.
2. Section 3 deals only with public defence; the common law rules remain in being
in respect of private defence.3
Smith and Hogan argue:
"Private defence and the prevention of crime are sometimes indistinguishable. If D goes to
the defence of E whom P is trying to murder, he is exercising the right of private defence
but he is also seeking to prevent the commission of crime. It would be absurd to ask D
whether he was acting in defence of E or to prevent murder being committed and
preposterous that the law should differ according to his answer. He was doing both." In
the later part of the discussion on the same issue, the writers explained:
"Where D is acting in defence of his own person it may be less obvious that he is also acting
in the prevention of crime but this will usually be in fact the case, D's purpose is not the
enforcement of the law but his own self-preservation; yet the degree of force which is
permissible is the same. An inquiry to D's motive is not practicable." The writers seems to
conclude that the act of self-defence and prevention of crime in a situation explained is
indeed invariably synonymous.
Smith and Hogan, "Criminal Law" (8th Ed. 1996), at p. 263.
C. Harlow, "Self-Defence: Public Right or Private Privilege" (1974) Crim.L.R. 528.
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3. Self-defence and section 3 co-exist as defences, but any common law rules
inconsistent with the overall test of reasonableness are replaced. The writer suggests
that, though not explicitly underlined, it could not be denied that in practice the
effect of the section has been precisely in concert with the third interpretation. The
third interpretation is consonant with another commentary, where it has been said
that the common law of private defence still exist "but if, and in so far as, it differed
in effect from s.3 of the 1967 Act, it has probably modified by that section." By this,
the writers meant to say that s. 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 may be taken as
having the effect of clarifying the common law rules.4
The fact is that the doctrine of self-defence in common law is deeply
entrenched in English courts and that any attempt to change it dramatically would be
virtually impossible. In any case, the requirement of "reasonable in the
circumstances" itself is a very vague standard and undefined. It would be possible
that, in ascertaining the reasonableness of the accused's act, the test of
proportionality and duty to retreat (the common law requirements) would be
observed. In other words, the accused's use of force could not be reasonable unless it
was both necessary and proportionate. Thus it would be possible that the common
law requirements of proportionality, the duty to retreat, and the requirement of
reasonableness asserted by the Act could be merged together in deciding cases
involving a claim of self-defence.5
C. Harlow explained the distinction between private-defence and public-defence. He
agreed with Hale's classification in that private defence is referred to the defence of one's
own property against robbers and burglars, and public defence is concerned with defence
against felony involving violence. C. Harlow, ibid., at p. 529-530.
4 Smith and Hogan, supra.,fn. 1 at p. 263.
It was explained that there are two principal requirements governing English law in self-
defence, that is, the requirement that the force used should have been necessary and the
requirement that the defence must be reasonable in the circumstances. The former supports
two separate limitations. The first is what is known as the test of necessity. The second is
the test that the repelling force used must be proportionate to the danger one is defending
against. It was further elaborated that in many instances courts have required that the
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6.1.2 The test of "reasonableness": bias against a woman accused?
The test of "reasonableness" in self-defence has been developed largely, if
not altogether, through cases concerning male defendants. The reason for this is
probably that the majority of murder cases have involved male accused and rarely
involved female offenders. For this reason, many cases in which women killed in
order to protect their own lives or those of their children were simply not perceived
as instances of self-defence. As observed by one commentator,6 the relative scarcity
of female killers has resulted in a paradigmatically male ideal model of self-defence
and this, together with the apparently gender-neutral concept of reasonableness, is
actually weighted against the female defendant. This commentator referred to the
case of Janet Gardner, a case in which a woman lived in an abusive relationship with
her husband for some five years. She had been the subject of continuous beating
throughout the relationship. At the time of the killing she was seriously attacked by
the deceased. She grabbed a knife on the wall and fatally stabbed the deceased in her
attempt to protect her own life. Evidence was led that she had many times tried to
leave the relationship but was persistently tracked down by the deceased.
In reducing her five years sentence for manslaughter on the ground of
provocation, the Court of Appeal warned that there were "exceptional
circumstances" in the case and asserted that the year she had already spent in jail was
sufficient to "expiate in some measure the guilt she must feel for the rest of her life".
This case was then compared with another case which was decided a day before the
judgement. In that case the accused had shot dead a person with whom he had an
defensive act be proportionate in order to be reasonable. This line of argument proves that
in many ways the requirement of reasonableness merged with the common law requirement
in self-defence.
A. Ashworth, "Self-Defence and The Right to Life", 34 C.L.J. (1975) 282 at p. 284-285.
A. McColgan, "In Defence ofBattered Woman Who Kill", 13 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 508 at p. 515.
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argument. The judge directed the jury to acquit the accused on the ground that the
prosecution had failed to prove that he was not acting in self-defence. The accused
was fined for possessing a fire-arm without a certificate. The point which was
stressed by the writer was that in the latter case, the court did not feel that there was a
need to expiate his guilt over the death of the deceased whereas in the former, where
the accused person was a female offender, the court clearly took the view that the
period of imprisonment she had undergone was necessary for her to realise the
gravity of the crime she had committed. From the two cases cited the writer
concluded that, in actuality, the defence of self-defence was not readily advanced on
behalf of battered women who kill. In a case where a battered woman accused was
clearly confronting a serious danger, her defensive conduct was not acknowledged as
a necessary act to save her life. However, when a man acted aggressively against his
attacker, this was readily regarded as an instance of self-defence.7 Thus, it would not
be surprising that in English courts battered women were more inclined towards
pleading defences other than self-defence even when self-defence seems to be the
proper ground of defence.
The case of Janet Gardner and Barry Crane was quoted from the commentaries by A.
McColgan in her article. Ibid., at p. 515.
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6.2 THE CASE OF R. v. AHLUWALIA8
6.2.1 The facts of the case
The appellant came from a middle class Indian family and entered into an
arranged marriage with the deceased. From the very outset of the marriage she had
been ill-treated and abused by the deceased. A series of battering incidences was
reported in the trial court. In 1981 there was a report of her being hit three or four
times on the head with a telephone and thrown to the ground. In 1983 the court was
told, she was pushed by her husband whilst pregnant and sustained a bruised hand.
In the same year, not very long after this incident, she sustained a broken finger in
another argument. The severity of the relationship was proved by the fact that in her
desperate act to escape the abuse she had twice attempted suicide in 1983 and 1986.
The court was also told that an injunction had already been made to restrain
the deceased from hitting her. This order was not successful in stopping the
deceased's violent behaviour; in 1986 he tried to run her down at a family wedding.
A second injunction was granted after she was seriously beaten and threatened with a
knife, but in spite of this, the violence continued and even intensified.
In support of her claim that she was subject to brutality on the husband's part,
medical evidence was produced. The appellant's doctor confirmed that he found
bruising to her face and wrist in 1983. Her work supervisor testified that she had lost
weight and showed signs of nervousness and distress. The appellant's sign of distress
was also spoken by her workmate and by various relatives. In addition to this
physical torture, the appellant was further mentally humiliated when she found out
8 [1992] 4 All ER 889.
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that her husband was in fact having an affair with another woman. Despite this
humiliation, however, she opted to remain in the matrimonial home; the reason for
her tolerance was her sense of duty as a wife and her concern for the welfare of the
children.
On the day of the killing, the appellant had tried to discuss their marriage.
The deceased did not show any interest in discussing the matter and, instead,
threatened to beat her the next day if she did not give him money to pay the phone
bill. The deceased then went to iron some clothes and threatened to burn the
appellant's face with the hot iron if she did not leave him alone.
The appellant claimed that she was deeply frustrated by the deceased's refusal
to talk to her. She also claimed to be overwhelmingly worried by the deceased's
threat to beat her if she failed to give him money the next day. After brooding for
some time, the she went outside, fetched some petrol, lit a candle, poured the petrol
in the deceased's room and ignited it. The deceased, on fire, ran to immerse himself
in the bath and was later helped by alerted neighbours. He suffered severe burns,
and died some six days after the incident.
The appellant was charged with murder. She contended that she had no
intention to kill or cause her husband serious bodily injury but only to inflict pain on
him. Apart from being psychologically affected by the violence she had suffered, the
main reasons for burning her husband on the night in question were that she was
overwhelmingly frustrated by the deceased's refusal to talk about their future and the
physical threat to her if she failed to provide the deceased with the money asked for.
These arguments were rejected in the trial court, where she was convicted ofmurder
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
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6.2.2 The grounds of appeal: sudden and temporary loss of self-control
One of the grounds of appeal turned on the applicability of a classical
requirement in the defence of provocation. In the case of R. v. Duffy,9 Devlin J. laid
down a classical definition of provocation in common law. He said:
"Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done [or words spoken], . . which would
cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and
temporary loss of self control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make
him or her for the moment not master of his mind."
This judgement was brought to the attention of the jury. The jury was further
instructed that those who purported to rely on the defence of provocation must
satisfy the court that they have, at the time of the killing, lost control of themselves.
If this test is not satisfied, the defence of provocation would be rejected. The
appellant's counsel argued that there had been a misdirection in the trial court and
argued that the requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" was in
actual fact wrongly referred to. He argued that the direction in the case of R. v. Duffy
was based on a failure to comprehend the true meaning of s. 3 of the Homicide Act
1957 as explained in D.P.P v. Camplin.l0 This section states:
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the
person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation is enough to
make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in
determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and
9 [1949] 1 All ER 932.
10 [1978] 2 All ER 168.
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said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable
man."11
Lord Diplock in D.P.P. v. CampJin referred to that section as abolishing "all
previous rules of law as to what can or what cannot amount to provocation". The
appellant's counsel hence argued that this pronouncement had effectively overruled
the requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" as defined in R. v.
Duffy.12 The Court of Appeal however, rejected this contention. Lord Taylor was of
the view that, by virtue of a number of authorities, the requirement of "sudden and
temporary loss of self control" laid down in Duffy was good and applicable.13
Therefore, as far as the argument on the validity of the traditional law of
provocation is concerned, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Ahluwalia saw no reason why
it need be ignored. The requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control"
is still to be observed and satisfied.
6.2.3 The second ground of appeal: on the issue of the "characteristics"
of the appellant
The second ground of appeal concerned with the trial judge's direction to the
jury regarding the "characteristics" of the appellant which would have been relevant
R. v. Ahluwalia, supra, fn. 8 at p. 894.
Supra, fn. 9.
In reaching this conclusion Lord Taylor referred to a number of authorities which
approved and followed the definition of provocation as defined in R v. Duffy. These cases
are, R. v. Ibrams (1981) 74 Cr App R 154, R. v. Whitfield (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 39 and R. v.
Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306.
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in determining the appellant's claim of provocation. The trial judge's direction to the
jury contained this passage:
"The only characteristics of the defendant about which you know specifically that
might be relevant are that she is an Asian woman, married, incidentally to an Asian
man, the deceased living in this country. You may think she is an educated woman,
she has a university degree. If you find these characteristics relevant to your
considerations, of course you will bear that in mind."14
This direction was criticised as being too specific. It did not allow the jury to
take into account any other characteristics that might affect the gravity of the
provocation. The defence went on to argue that the trial judge had failed to realise
the importance of the fact that the appellant was, as a result of the traumatic
experience, suffering from battered woman syndrome. It was suggested that as a
result of the battering relation, the appellant was in the state of "learnt helplessness".
Lord Taylor rejected this argument by asserting that the mental condition of
the appellant would only be relevant if expert witnesses on this matter were brought
to testify in the trial court. In the words of Lord Taylor:
"In the present case, there was no medical or other evidence before the judge and
jury, and non even from the appellant, to suggest that she suffered from a post
traumatic stress disorder, or 'battered woman syndrome' or any other specific
condition which could amount 'characteristic' as defined in R. v. McGregor.15 It was
true that there was considerable evidence that the appellant had suffered grievous ill-
treatment, but there was nothing to suggest that the effect of it was to make her 'a
14 R. v. Ahluwalia, supra, fn. 8. at p. 897.
15 [1962] NZLR 1069.
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different person from the ordinary run of [woman]', or to show that she was 'marked
off or distinguished from the ordinary [woman] of the community."16
The judgement explained that the reason for the rejection of the appellant's
argument was based on the fact that no expert testimony was offered describing her
mental condition. By this Lord Taylor seems to suggest that should evidence on
battered woman syndrome be adduced, the whole scenario of the case could be
deeply affected (most likely in favour of the appellant). The judge asserted:
"Had the evidence which had now been put before this court been adduced before the
trial judge, different considerations may have applied. As it is, we consider that
there was no basis for the judge to refer to a characteristic consisting of an altered
personality or mental state in this appellant. Nor do we consider that, on the
evidence before them, the jury would have been justified in finding such a
characteristic."17
The quotation above made it clear that had the evidence on battered woman
syndrome been adduced in the trial, it would be possible that this ground of appeal
might be considered. Since it was not put forward, the appeal was dismissed.
In short, two main grounds of appeal were argued by the appellant's counsel:
1) that the trial judge was wrong in stressing on the requirement of sudden and
temporary loss of self control. The reason being that this requirement derived from
the classical definition of provocation in R. v. Duffyn and that it was replaced by
16 R. v. Ahluwalia, supra, fn. 8 at p. 898.
17 Ibid., at p. 898.
18 Supra, fn. 9.
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section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, as asserted by Lord Diplock in D.P.P. v.
Complin.19
2) that the trial judge was also wrong not to consider the issue of "battered woman
syndrome" as the accused, according to the appellant's counsel, had clearly been
psychologically affected by the battering relationship she had undergone throughout
her stay with the deceased.
Lord Taylor rejected the first ground of appeal and as explained above, refused to
entertain the second ground of appeal.
6.2.4 The partial defence of diminished responsibility
Having dismissed the two previous grounds of appeal, the court went on to
consider the third issue, that is, the question of diminished responsibility (which was
not even raised at the trial). The Court of Appeal clearly considered this ground of
appeal as the strongest of the three. Lord Taylor concluded that it would be
expedient in the interests of justice to admit the fresh evidence under s 23 (1) of the
Criminal Appeal Act 1968. An order of retrial was made and the conviction
quashed.
The re-trial of the case was heard on 25th September 1992. Hobhouse J.
convicted Ahluwalia of manslaughter and imposed a sentence of three years and four
months imprisonment, exactly the length of time she had already served. This case
has essentially signified the admissibility of the theory of the battered woman
syndrome in English courts.
'9 Supra, fn. 10.
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6.2.5 Commentaries on R. v. Ahluwalia
Perhaps the most interesting point raised in the Court of Appeal in R. v.
Ahluwalia was Lord Taylor's observation on the issue of the battered woman
syndrome. He suggested that had the issue been raised and supported by expert
opinion at the trial level, "different considerations may have applied". The matter is
now open as to the meaning of "different considerations" mentioned. It could be
presumed that the theory of the battered woman syndrome would in the end be used
to explain the reasonableness of the appellant's act and that the main defence would
necessarily be changed from provocation to a justified defence of self-defence. The
consequence of this would then be that if the jury were satisfied that the appellant
was at the time of the killing suffering from the condition, this would render her act
reasonable and she would be entitled to a complete acquittal. Nevertheless, in a case
where the jury is not convinced of the story, it is equally possible that she will be
held entirely responsible for the killing and be convicted ofmurder.
In spite of this, it seems highly unlikely that the case would be considered on
the basis of self-defence. Perhaps Lord Taylor himself, having made such a
statement in his judgement, did not envisage the raising of this defence. In addition,
at the time when the case was decided, there was no English authorities where a
battered woman had succeeded in raising self-defence on the basis of the battered
woman syndrome.
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6.3 THE CASE OF R. v. THORNTON™
6.3.1 The facts of the case
The appellant in this case was a married woman with a daughter who had
been born before she met the deceased. The first marriage ended disastrously. It
was reported that she had attempted suicide several times and was also admitted to a
psychiatric hospital for a short time. In due course she met the deceased, whom she
realised was a heavy drinker and was also jealous and possessive. Despite this, she
moved into the deceased's house with her daughter. The deceased's drinking
worsened and he started to behave violently at home.
In one of the many rows between the parties, the deceased's son, who lived
with them in the same house, testified that the deceased picked up a guitar and
threatened the appellant with it. The appellant for her part took a knife, held it in
front of her pointing towards the deceased and in turn, threatened the deceased with
it if he should cause distress to her daughter. Later that day, the appellant purposely,
as she admitted, gave the deceased an overdose of Magodan tablets. She then
telephoned the doctor saying that the deceased was feeling suicidal. Her reason for
doing this, as she later explained, was to have the deceased committed to hospital.
This did not happen as the deceased recovered shortly and was incensed by what the
appellant had done to him. They then became involved in another quarrel.
On the night of the killing, they had had another argument. The appellant
went to the kitchen to calm down. At the same time she looked for a truncheon in
the kitchen's drawer allegedly to protect herself in case if she was attacked. Not
20 [1992] 1 All ER 306.
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finding it, she found a knife, which she sharpened. She returned to the deceased,
who was laying down half asleep on the sofa. The appellant asked him to come up
to bed but was again greeting by wounding remarks. The deceased then threatened
to kill her when she was asleep. The appellant then stood up in front of the deceased,
holding the knife in her clenched hand over the deceased's stomach. She then
brought it down towards the deceased thinking that he would ward it off. This did
not happen and the knife entered the deceased's stomach and killed him. In her
statement to the police she said that she did not intend to kill her husband but only to
frighten him.
At her trial, the appellant relied mainly on the defence of diminished
responsibility but since the provocative remarks the deceased had made leading up to
the killing were adduced in evidence the trial judge was required to leave the defence
of provocation to the jury as an alternative verdict.
The appellant's defence of diminished responsibility was supported by two
psychiatrists. Both of the experts agreed that the appellant suffered from a
personality disorder, which amounted to abnormality of mind, and that this was due
either to retarded development of her personality or to inherent causes. They
concluded that, at the time she killed the deceased the abnormality of mind was so
pronounced that it substantially impaired her responsibility for her acts.
By contrast, a psychiatrist called by the Crown, while agreeing that she had
suffered a mental abnormality, did not believe that at the time of the killing the
abnormality of the appellant's mind was such as substantially to impair her mental
responsibility for her action in killing the deceased.
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In respect to the defence of provocation, the appellant contended that the trial
judge had misdirected the jury particularly on the direction of the traditional
requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control". In this respect, the
arguments were similar to that of in R. v. Ahluwalia.2i The appellant's counsel
argued that the requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control", which
was originated in R. v. Duffy,22 was replaced by Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957.
The Court of Appeal rejected this ground of appeal. The requirement of "sudden
loss of self-control" has long been an acceptable test to the claim of provocation and
as such, nothing seems to be substantially wrong in making directions to that effect.
The Court of Appeal decided that to succeed in the plea of provocation, the
manner in which the appellant was provoked must be of such a nature that she
suddenly and temporarily lost her power of self control. The series of violence and
provocative acts throughout the relationship did not cause the appellant a sudden and
temporary loss of self control: the trial judge, therefore, had not been wrong in his
direction. With regards to the second argument regarding the trial judge's direction
on the question of diminished responsibility, the Court of Appeal did not think the
trial judge had substantially erred in his recommendation to look at the two
confronting views made by the experts from both parties in court. The appeal
against the conviction was therefore dismissed.
Refer to the discussion at p. 223 - 224, supra, of this chapter.
Supra, fn. 9.
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6.3.2 The case of R. v. Thornton:23 the second appeal
Some four years after Beldam L.J. in the Court of Appeal dismissed Sarah
Thornton's appeal against her conviction, the case was again brought to court for
reconsideration. The second appeal referred to fresh medical evidence which
touched upon the defence of provocation. The appeal suggested that two
characteristics possessed by the appellant at the time of the killing should be relevant
to her claim of provocation, namely her personality disorder, and the effect of the
deceased's abuse over a period of time on her mental state. It was argued that should
evidence as to these have been led at the trial, the judge would have had to direct the
jury to consider whether a reasonable woman with those two characteristics might
have lost her self-control and have acted as the appellant did.
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed its previous judgement. A successful plea of
provocation could only be made upon satisfying the test of sudden and temporary
loss of self control. Even if the appellant was accepted as having been suffering
from the battered woman syndrome, her provocation defence would not be
successful if the jury were not convinced that the appellant had suddenly and
temporarily lose her self-control at the time of the killing.24
Having explained the importance of the traditional requirement in the law of
provocation, the court examined the fresh argument raised in the appeal, namely the
issue of the battered woman syndrome. In the first appeal medical evidence
explaining the appellant's mental condition was held to be irrelevant as to the
23 R. v. Thornton (No.2), [1996] 2 All ER 1023, [1996] Crim.L.R. 597.
24 In the second appeal the Court of Appeal stated: "A defendant even if suffering from that
syndrome, cannot succeed in relying on provocation unless the jury consider she
suffered or may have suffered a sudden and temporary loss of self-control at the time of the
killing." R. v. Thornton (No2), ibid., at p. 1030.
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appellant's "characteristic" in the claim of provocation; in the present appeal,
however, the court decided that the appellant's personality disorder, supported by
evidence on battered woman syndrome, was a characteristic relevant to provocation.
On these grounds, the Court of Appeal finally decided that it could not be sure that
the jury's verdict in the trial was safe and satisfactory. Sarah Thornton had her
conviction quashed and a retrial ordered.
The main difference between the second trial and the first was that this time
the accused's mental condition was considered as a relevant characteristic to be
considered in relation to the claim of provocation. The outcome was a conviction for
manslaughter. It is interesting to note that the judgement focuses on diminished
responsibility, with the judge saying: "I sentence you on the basis that your
responsibility for the killing of your husband was diminished by an abnormality of
mind, were 1 sentencing you for provocation, the sentence would have been the
same."25
6.3.3 The case ofSarah Thornton: a summary
Sarah Thornton was found guilty of murder in her first trial, the defence of
diminished responsibility and provocation having been rejected. Her first appeal in
1991, which mainly questioned the trial court's application of the long established
principle of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" in the law of provocation,
and a misdirection on the issue of diminished responsibility, was unsuccessful. At
that time, the theory of the battered woman syndrome had very little bearing on the
fate of battered woman in English courts.
This judgment was quoted by S. Edwards and C. Walsh in "The Justice ofRetrial?"
1996 N.L.J. 146 (6747) 857.
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The second appeal was heard in December 1995, came at a time when the
landmark decision of R. v. Ahluwalia26 had opened the door to the application of the
theory of battered woman syndrome in English courts. This had necessarily affected
the attitude of the judges in the second appeal. As a consequence, the Court of
Appeal was of the view that to convict the appellant of murder without considering
the evidence on the battered woman syndrome would be "unsafe" and
"unsatisfactory".27 The murder conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
Supra, fn. 8.
R. v. Thornton, supra, fn. 23 at p. 598.
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6.4 R. v. AHLUWALIA AND SARAH THORNTON: AN
ANALYSIS
In R. v. Ahluwalia^ the Court of Appeal rejected the plea of provocation.
The argument that the requirement of "sudden and temporary loss of self-control"
had been substituted by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, which was referred to
by the House of Lords in DPP v. Camplin29 as "abolishing all previous rules of law
as to what can or cannot amount to provocation", was emphatically rejected. In the
second appeal in Sarah Thornton's case, the requirement of sudden and temporary
loss of self-control was upheld as the principal ingredient of the law of provocation.
The appeal against conviction in R. v. Ahluwalia was successful on the basis
that the question of diminished responsibility had not been properly discussed in the
trial and that, it would not be just to ignore altogether the presence of fresh evidence
regarding the appellant's mental condition. The fact that no medical evidence was
adduced on behalf of the appellant at the first trial explaining her mental condition
seems to have been a major factor in the Court of Appeal's decision to order the re¬
trial. The defence of diminished responsibility therefore played a major part in the
manslaughter verdict in the retrial ofMrs. Ahluwalia.
In the first trial in R. v. Ahluwalia, the theory of "learnt helplessness", which
was one of the two ingredients constituting the theory of battered woman syndrome,
was introduced by the defence. It was adduced mainly to argue that as a result of the
battering relationship the appellant had undergone throughout her life with the
deceased, she had suffered from the syndrome and that, it was necessary to be
considered in determining her liability at the time of killing the deceased. Battered
28 Supra, fn. 8.
29 Supra, fn. 10.
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woman syndrome, it was argued, thus served as one of the appellant's
"characteristics" at the time of the killing.
This argument was rejected by the court. However the reason for the
rejection is of particular interest. It was not accepted, not because the theory itself
was considered defective; it was rejected on the basis that no medical evidence was
adduced in support of the claim. And it is more interesting when the court itself
stated that had evidence on the syndrome been supported by experts, "different
considerations may have applied". At this point, one might ask what would be the
consequence if evidence supporting the theory were in fact to be adduced in terms of
expert opinion as the Court of Appeal required? Should it assist the appellant's plea
of provocation? In the presence of medical evidence, it could be presumed that the
court would then be directing the jury to accept the theory of "battered woman
syndrome" as an explanation of the appellant's state of mind, and that this "state of
mind" amounted to a characteristic possessed by the appellant during the time of the
killing. And upon considering this "characteristic", it would be likely to help to
convince the jury of the lack ofmens rea on the part of the appellant.
In the second of Sarah Thornton's appeals, the Court of Appeal decided that
the issue of battered woman syndrome was relevant to the defence of provocation.
Lord Taylor explained that the theory may be applicable in two ways: firstly, a jury
might more readily find a sudden and temporary loss of self control triggered by
even a minor incident on the "last straw" basis where a defendant had endured abuse
over a period, and secondly, depending on the medical evidence, the syndrome might
have affected the defendant's personality so as to constitute a significant
characteristic relevant to the second question a jury had to consider with regard to
provocation.30 As a result, a retrial was ordered.
30 R. v. Thornton (No2), supra, fn. 23 at p. 1030.
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The judgement in R.. v. Ahlnwalia has been hailed as a landmark decision in
that, for the first time, the English Court of Appeal has openly accepted the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence explaining the state of mind of an appellant as a
result of a battering relationship with her husband. The "battered woman syndrome"
was held to be relevant as evidence of the appellant's mental disability and in support
of a claim of diminished responsibility. The significance of this is that, at least in the
eyes of the court, at the time of committing the fatal act, a battered woman who kills
her husband may be psychiatrically abnormal.
In the case of Sarah Thornton, the Court of Appeal admitted that the battered
woman syndrome showed the appellant to be suffering from a personality disorder
which amounted to a characteristic relevant to provocation. But, as in R. v.
Ahluwalia, in this case, whether she was treated as being of diminished
responsibility or as having been provoked is not a matter of particular importance.
For Mrs. Thornton (and others who are in the same plight as her) the primary
concern is not to be convicted of murder, even if she would still be convicted of
manslaughter and subjected to punishment. To the "offender"- the "battered
woman"- whether the ground for the reduction of the offence from murder to
manslaughter is diminished responsibility or provocation would be of no importance.
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6.5 THE JUDGEMENT OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL IN LUC
THIET THUAN v. RC
In this case the appellant and two other men were charged with the murder of,
and robbery from, the appellant's former girlfriend. In his account to the police, the
appellant stated that he and his co-accused had intended to rob the deceased and that
one of his co-accused had killed her to prevent her informing the police that she had
recognised the appellant. At his trial, however, the appellant gave an entirely
different account of the crime, repudiating his earlier statement as having been
procured by inducements from the police. His new account was to the effect that he
and his co-accused went to the deceased's flat to collect money which she owed him,
that she had taunted him about her new boyfriend and his own sexual inadequacy,
causing him to lose control of himself and stab her repeatedly, thus causing her
death.
Two defences were relied upon by the appellant at the trial, namely the
defence of provocation and diminished responsibility. Two medical experts called
by the defence testified that the appellant suffered from brain damage which could
make it difficult for him to control his impulses. That evidence was corroborated to
some extent by the Crown's medical expert. The trial judge however, when directing
the jury on provocation, did not refer to the testimony of the medical experts. The
appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
The appellant brought the case to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal on the
grounds that section 4 of the Hong Kong Homicide Ordinance, which was identical
to section 3 of the English Homicide Act 1957, required the judge, when directing
the jury on the effect of the alleged provocation on a reasonable person having the
31 [1996] 2 All ER 1033.
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characteristics of the accused, to direct them to have regard to the appellant's brain
damage when considering whether a reasonable man having the characteristics of the
accused would have reacted to the provocation as he did. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal and the matter was then brought to the attention of the Privy
Council.
Lord Goff, in delivering the majority judgement (Lord Steyn dissenting)
upheld the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal. The judgement essentially
says that mental abnormality is not a relevant characteristic for the purpose of the
objective test in provocation. By virtue of this judgement it would appear that the
dictum regarding provocation in R. v. Ahluwalia - in which it was suggested that post
traumatic stress disorder or the battered woman syndrome might be a relevant
characteristic for the purpose of the objective test in provocation, and the judgement
in R. v. Thornton, which upheld the relevance of the battered woman syndrome in
considering the appellant's claim of provocation - were both wrongly decided. The
objective test in the law of provocation, thus, seems to have given no regard to the
characteristics of the accused at the time of committing the offence. An objective
reasonable test means a purely objective test. The accused's act would now be
assessed by a hypothetical reasonable ordinary person not taking into account
whatever mental or physical illness that he or she might have suffered at the time of
committing the act.
The question now is what will be the effect of this judgement in future cases,
especially when they involve the question of the reasonableness test in provocation
defence? The answer to this is perhaps best provided by one of the commentaries on
this case:
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"The effect of Luc as a precedent. Decisions of the Privy Council are not binding on
English courts; but when the board consist of five Lords of Appeal and may be
thought to represent the opinion of the house of Lords, it can hardly be ignored."32
The commentary on the case of R. v. Humphreys, [1996] Crim.L.R. 131 at p. 134.
B. THE THEORY OF THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME IN AUSTRALIA
CASES PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE THEORY IN
THE COURTS
6.6 THE CASE OF VIRO v. THE QUEEN55
A new conception of the criminal law of self-defence in Australia34 arguably
developed in 1978 in the case of Viro v. The Queen?5 Mason C.J. in the Australian
High Court stated in his judgement in this case that "for the offence to be reduced
from murder to manslaughter it must appear that the accused reasonably believed in
all circumstances in which he found himself that an unlawful attack which threatened
him with death or serious bodily injury was being or was about to be made."36 This
dictum was then incorporated into the six famous formulations intended to provide a
guideline for the courts in dealing with future cases involving a claim of self-defence
where there was a charge of murder or grievous bodily harm. The first of these
provides:
(1978-1979) C.L.R. 88.
The discussion on Australian criminal law here is focused mainly on the Australian States
with common law jurisdictions.
This case was decided in the High Court of Australia. Two fundamental issues were
discussed: (1) whether in the case involving the plea of self-defence the Australian court is
bound to follow the decision of the Privy Council in Palmer v. The Queen [1971] A.C. 814.
or whether the principle in the decision ofRegina v. Howe is applicable.
(2) what should be the proper direction to the jury in self-defence cases.
Viro v. The Queen, supra, fn. 33 at p. 143.
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1. (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the
deceased the accused reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which
threatened him with death or serious bodily harm was being or was about to
be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable
man would have believed, but what the accused himselfmight reasonably
believe in all the circumstances in which he found himself.37
The primary requirement derived from the above proposition is that any
accused person claiming self-defence must in the first place have a reasonable belief
that an unlawful attack was made or was about to be made upon him. This
necessarily means that in a case where no actual attack was in the offing, the claim of
self-defence will automatically be irrelevant.
However, looking at the provision from another, perhaps more pragmatic
perspective, it could be argued that when a person kills another in the absence of an
actual attack, he might still find some comfort in the wording of the proposition,
where it is stated - when an accused killed someone, he reasonably believed that an
attack which threatened him with death or grievous bodily harm "was about to be
made upon him". It could be claimed that the words "was about to be made" would
allow a person to take necessary steps in defence of his life even to the extent of
killing the purported attacker at the time when the actual threat was not presently
existing.
The argument of this kind finds support from S.M.H.Yeo38 who states:
Viro v. The Queen, ibid., at p. 146.
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"The description of an attack in the first proposition in Viro as one which "was about
to be made" suggests that the law permits what may be termed a pre-emptive strike."
However, it has to be borne in mind that there are two situations where a pre-emptive
strike could happen. Firstly, a person could strike his purported attacker at the time
when the person whom he is confronting has already behaved violently but, only that
at that time there was no direct threat to his life. Secondly, a situation may arise
where an accused acts in what he believes to be a self-defensive way at a time when
the purported attacker was not in the course of assaulting him, nor otherwise
behaving violently. In other words, the act of self-defence occurred when there was
no immediate danger to the life of the accused.
The commentary by Yeo most probably relates to the first type of pre¬
emptive strike. This is due to the fact that in his elaboration of the issue reference
was made to the case of R. v. Lane.39 The facts in R. v. Lane suggested that the
accused killed the deceased when he was acting aggressively, but the aggressive
behaviour has not been directed against the life of the accused. The Supreme Court
of Victoria decided that the issue of self-defence should be left to the jury.
Therefore, as Yeo argues, the words "was about to be made" in Mason C.J.'s
direction foresee a pre-emptive strike by an accused and, based on the arguments
above, it has to be said that that pre-emptive strike is confined to a situation where
the deceased has already been behaving dangerously but there is no evidence
suggesting that the accused's life will become his ultimate target.
S.M.H.Yeo, "Self-Defence: from Viro to Zecevic", (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 251 at p.
255.
[1983] 2 V.C.R. 449. This case will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
6.6.1 The issue of a pre-emptive strike against a passive deceased
The question now is whether in reference to the words "was about to be
made" in the Viro formulation a direction on self-defence should be left to the jury in
a case where the accused's pre-emptive strike was against a deceased who has not, at
the time he was killed, been behaving aggressively. An example of this would be a
case of a battered woman killing her partner at the time when he was asleep.
To say that the formulation presupposes this kind of pre-emptive action
would rather be a liberal interpretation of Mason. C.J.'s formulations. Such an
argument has not been so far been put forward in any case of battered woman in
Australia. The fact is, the six formulations in Viro v. The Queen intend only to
entertain cases where the claimant of self-defence is confronted with direct
aggression from the attacker. The case where someone kills in anticipation of a
serious attack was not a point of discussion in the case of Viro v. The Queen. In
essence, the directives set out in Viro v. The Queen have not been favourable to a
battered woman's claim of self-defence.
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6.7 THE PROPOSITIONS IN VIRO v. THE QUEEN IN THE
CASE OF MORGAN v. COLMAm
One of the difficulties in Mason C.J.'s formulations in Viro v. The Queen is
that the language in which they are framed has not been easy for juries to understand.
In the South Australian Supreme Court's decision in Morgan v. Colman4] Mitchell
A.C.J, expressed his concern on this matter when he said:
"We are, of course, bound by the High Court and, more particularly, by the
judgement of Mason J. in Viro's case, but, with unfeigned respect to that learned
Judge and to the Alberta Court of Appeal, I venture to suggest that the language in
which the rules are formulated by them is more appropriate for communication with
other judges than for direct incorporation, unchanged, into a workaday summing-up
for the instruction and guidance of a jury, or into a set of rules by which courts of
summary jurisdiction direct themselves."42
The judge went on to paraphrase Mason C.J.'s proposition, incorporated into
it also the principle of self-defence derived from the Privy Council's decision in
Palmer v. R.43 Eight propositions were made for that purpose but it is the sixth
pronouncement which is of particular importance in the present discussion.
Proposition six (d) says:
[1981] 27 S.A.S.R. 334.
Ibid.
Ibid., at p. 335.
[1971] A.C. 814.
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"But it is the nature of things that certain sorts of situations in which violence erupts
will tend to recur, and accordingly, the application of the general principle to those
situations has given rise to some practical rules which are worth restating-
(d) A person who, according to the circumstances as he understands them, genuinely
believes that he is threatened with an attack, is not obliged to wait until the attack
begins. A person so threatened may use reasonable measures to make the situation
safe, and he does not act unlawfully merely because he forestalls or tries to forestall
the attack before it has begun."44
This pronouncement has been more dramatic in permitting a pre-emptive
strike against a threatened attack. If proposition (1) in Viro v. The Queen suggested
that the defence of self-defence is for a person whose life and bodily integrity was
violated or about to be violated, the proposition in Morgan v. Colman goes further
and suggests that even in a situation where no real attack was threatened, a person
can still take reasonable measures to make himself or herself safe on the condition
that he genuinely believed that his life was in danger. If a person genuinely believed
that he was "threatened by an attack", that in itself is sufficient justification for the
taking of self-defensive action. The dictum, also made it clear that an accused is
under no obligation to wait for the attack to really get under way.
This suggests that a person will be allowed to take action in anticipation of an
attack. It would also mean that where a person genuinely believes that he or she will
be attacked in future, a plea of self-defence will not be rejected even if the repelling
force was employed in the absence of any real threat to his or her life. The situation
seems to fit well with the case of a battered woman.
Morgan v. Colman, supra, fn. 40 at p. 336-337.
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The pronouncement in Morgan v. Colman provides comfort for an accused
person whose defensive action was made only in anticipation of an attack from
someone. It has to be confirmed, however, whether this pronouncement would allow
a consideration of self-defence defence in cases involving murder. Could a battered
woman, killing at a time when there was no actual threat to her life, benefit from the
judgement of Mitchell A.C.J, in her claim of self-defence? What is clear is that the
pronouncement under discussion was not intended for cases involving murder. This
is due to the fact that the case of Morgan v. Colman itself was not one involving a
charge of murder. Mitchell A.C.J, acknowledged this fact when he said:
"I accordingly take the liberty of restating what I conceive to be the substance of the
relevant Viro rules, adapted for the consideration of juries and courts of summary
jurisdiction in cases other than murder, and of marshaling with them similar rules
applicable to escape from unlawful imprisonment."45
Morgan v. Colman, ibid., at p. 335-336. (Emphasis added)
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6.8 THE CASE OF R. v. LANE46
In this case, the Supreme Court of Victoria dealt with an issue where a person
killed his homosexual partner after the latter had gone on the rampage, destroying
furniture in the accused's house. The accused hit the deceased with a champagne
bottle, without any cogent proof that his life was at that time immediately in danger.
The issue in this case was whether the accused was entitled to the defence of self-
defence.
At the trial, counsel for the accused relied on the defences of self-defence and
provocation. The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury, taking the view
that the accused could not be said to have reasonably believed that at the time of the
killing he was confronted with an unlawful attack or that an unlawful attack was
about to be made upon him. The trial judge said: "the jury could not entertain any
reasonable doubt on whether, at the actual time of the killing the accused reasonably
believed, in the Viro sense, that an unlawful attack was being made or was about to
be made on him, and that that attack threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm".47
Murphy J., in delivering his judgement in the Supreme Court of Victoria,
concluded that the behaviour of the deceased was such that it could be accepted that
the accused believed that his life or bodily integrity was about to be seriously
injured. The judgement included the following passage:
Supra, fn. 39. This case was decided nearly two years after the case ofMorgan v.
Colman.
Ibid., at p. 449.
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"In the present case, I do not think that the applicant had to wait until the deceased
was in the act of committing mayhem before he took physical steps to prevent the
deceased doing so. The real question in the case, as I see it, may have been whether
the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the steps which the applicant
took to protect himself were not reasonably proportionate to the danger which the
applicant believed he faced: see Mason, J. in Viro v R. (1978), 141 C.L.R. 88, at p.
J 47 "48
6.8.1 The effect of R. v. Lane on battered women's cases
A glance at the judgement in R. v. Lane seems to give the impression that the
law is favouring the battered woman's claim of self-defence. It necessarily extends
the words "was about to be made" in the Viro formulation to cases where no actual
attack was threatened. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the decision suggests a
different conclusion. The decision may not be as helpful as it was first thought when
it is looked at in this way. First of all, it has to be remembered that there are two
situations in which a person may exercise what he thinks as defensive force against
what he interprets as an unlawful attack about to be inflicted upon him. Firstly, an
accused might use defensive force against a person who has already acted violently.
The deceased may have destroyed property belonging to the accused or, perhaps
assaulted someone. The point, though, is that even though the deceased has behaved
violently, it may not be absolutely clear whether the life or bodily security of the
accused will ultimately be endangered. Hence if the accused believes that his or her
life at that stage had already been immediately threatened, his defensive act will be
tantamount to a pre-emptive strike against a purported attacker who had already been
physically acting violently in front of the accused even though no direct assault has
48 Ibid., at p. 456-457.
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yet been made against him. The facts in the case of R. v. Lane provide a good
example of this sort of situation.
Secondly, an accused might exercise what he believes to be his or her right of
self-defence against a person who is not behaving violently at the time, but who has,
on many occasions in the past, assaulted the accused and caused severe bodily injury.
The deceased might also on many occasions have threatened the accused with death.
The typical case of a battered woman is an example of this second situation. In the
instant case, if the accused took into consideration the history of her relationship
with her partner, and also took into account his character, she might reasonably have
believed that her life was in immediate danger. Hence if she reacted by killing him,
the killing could be said to amount to a pre-emptive strike against a person who at
the time of the killing had not been acting violently but who had a history of violent
behaviour directed against her.
Returning now to the judgement in R. v. Lane, what is certain is that the
expansion of the words "was about to be made" is confined only to a case of the sort
suggested in the first example above. This means that the law allows an accused to
take some action for the protection of his life against someone who has already been
acting violently though not yet directly affecting his own life. It is clear, though, that
in the case of a person who kills someone who has not been physically violent, there
will be little comfort in the judgement in R. v. Lane. R. v. Lane, therefore, provides
little assistance for the battered woman who seeks to plead self-defence.
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6.9 THE CASE OF R. v. WALDEm
A similar judgment was also handed down in the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in the case of R. v. Walden, which was decided some three years after R. v.
Lane. The facts of the case indicate that the appellant exercised her right of self-
defence at the time when the deceased was about to attack her. It was shown in court
that the appellant killed the deceased when the latter was moving towards her with
his arms swinging in what was looked as an attempt to attack her. The appellant,
believing that her life was at that moment threatened by the deceased's behaviour,
fired a shot which proved to be fatal, even though in her unsworn statement she
claimed that it was not intended to kill the deceased but only to frighten him.
The main issue in the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge was right
in construing the Viro formulation to allow self-defence only when the attack
purported to be made threatened death or serious bodily harm to the appellant. Street
C.J. did not think that the formulation should be limited to cases in which the
accused was confronted with a murderous attack. A person could also be entitled to
a self-defence plea even if the attack which she believed to be made against her was
of a less serious nature.
The relevance of this decision to the issue of "imminent attack" is that, as in
the case of R. v. Lane, this case also deals with an incident where the appellant was
confronted with a potentially violent act from a person (in this case the deceased)
who had already been acting violently or at least who had already attempted to act
violently against her. The judgement does not deal with the issue of a defensive act
directed against a person who had not behaved aggressively, and thus it leaves open
[ 1986] 19 A.Crim.R. 444.
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the question of whether Viro formulation would allow a battered woman to plead
self-defence.
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6.10 THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT'S CASE OF FADIL
ZECEVIO°
The propositions laid down by Mason C.J. in Viro v. The Oueen51 were to be
extensively discussed, seven years after their formulation, in the High Court of
Australia's decision in Fadil Zecevic. The majority in this case concluded that the
law had not developed as had originally been intended and that it therefore required
to be reformulated.
One of the most important results of this reformulation in Zecevic is that the
stringent test of imminence has been replaced by the requirement that the accused's
purported defensive action be necessary in the circumstances. The corollary of this
seems to be that even if the attack - which the accused believed would be made
against him - was not immediately threatening, the accused's defensive conduct
would be accepted if he believed, and believed reasonably, that it was necessary for
the protection of his life. Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ., in the majority
judgement asserted:
"It is apparent, we think, from the difficulties which appear to have been experienced
in the application of Viro, that there is wisdom in the observation of the Privy
Council in Palmer that an explanation of the law of self-defence requires no set of
words or formula. The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether
the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, and
(1986-1987)25 A.Crim.R. 163, (1987) 162 C.L.R. 654.
Supra, fn. 33.
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the jury is left reasonable doubt about that matter, then he is entitled for an
acquittal."52
The occasion in which a defence of self-defence would be rejected was
further explained in these terms:
" If the response of the accused goes beyond what he believed to be necessary to
defend himself or there were no reasonable grounds for a belief on his part that the
response was necessary in defence of himself, then the occasion will not have been
one which would support the plea of self-defence."53
The judgement recommended that the only obstacle to a successful claim of
self-defence should be the absence of reasonable belief in the necessity to defend or
the fact that the defensive force employed went beyond what the accused believed to
be necessary. It appears, then, that whether or not the danger threatening the
accused's life is imminent is not the principal issue. This new conception of self-
defence, viewed in the context of the battered woman issue, is a positive
development. At least, the difficulty of complying with the "immediate threat"
requirement (which in most cases is impossible for the battered woman, because the
killing occurs at a time when there is no aggression on the part of the deceased) is
eased by the requirement of necessity in the killing.54
52 FadiI Zecevic, supra, fn. 50 at p. 173-174.
53 Fadil Zecevic, ibid., at p. 174.
54 Brennan J. in his separate judgement in this case said:
"I agree with Wilson, Dowson and Toohey JJ. that the ultimate question for the jury in a
case where the evidence discloses a possible occasion of self-defence is "whether the accused
believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did."
Fadi! Zecevic, ibid., at p. 177.
In one commentary it has been said:
"The reformulation of self-defence by the majority of the High Court in Zecevic may avoid
the difficulties faced by such offenders in satisfying the imminence requirement. The
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6.11 THE CASE OF ZANKER v. VARTZOKAS55
Not very long after Zecevic was decided, the South Australian Supreme Court
extended the concept of "imminence" in the case of Zanker v. Vartzokas. In this
case, a young woman accepted a lift from the defendant, who, once she was in the
vehicle, offered her money for sexual favours. She rejected this offer. The
defendant then said, "I am going to take you to my mate's house. He will really fix
you up." The threat in the circumstances put her in such fear that she opened the
door and leapt out on to the roadside. She suffered bodily injury as a result.
The main issue in this case was whether the statement by the defendant to
have the woman "fixed up" was serious enough to constitute a threat and whether the
threat was imminent enough so as to have him be charged with assault occasioning
bodily injury. This argument was rejected in the magistrates court on the basis that
there was no fear of immediate violence on the part of the woman. The South
Australian Supreme Court, by contrast, decided that the threat did cause the woman
to fear for immediate harm, despite the fact that she did not know for certain when
and how would the harm be inflicted against her. A threat of such a nature was thus
considered to be serious enough to enable the woman to take necessary action to
defend her life.
This decision in the South Australian Supreme Court was another example of
a liberal interpretation of the word "imminence". Even though the case did not
involve a claim of self-defence, what is important is the court's decision that a mere
proposed test does not specifically require a threat of immediate harm but instead focuses on
the necessity of the accused's response in the circumstances."
A.E. Sheehy, J. Stubbs and J. Tolmie, "Defending Battered Women on Trial: The Battered
Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" (1992) 16 Crim.L.J. 369 at p. 373.
55 (1988) 34 A.Crim.R 11.
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pronouncement of a threat will be sufficient to make a person to believe that his or
her life and bodily integrity is in serious danger.
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6.12 THE TEST OF "IMMINENCE": A RECAPITULATION
The decision in Viro v. The Queen56 substantially advanced the modern law
of self-defence in Australian criminal law against a background of a traditional
requirement of imminence as one of the conditions of a successful claim of self-
defence. The case was also known for its controversial formulations intended to be
made as a guidance to the trial judges in a case involving a claim of self-defence.
The formulations were indeed referred to in most cases subsequent to Viro, but only
for the later courts to find their shortcomings.
Before the law was reformulated by the High Court case of Zecevic,57 the
propositions in Viro had been discussed in a line of subsequent cases.58 Reference
has already been made to the cases ofMorgan v. Colman59 and R. v. Lane.60 In the
former case, Wells J. in the Supreme Court of South Australia had paraphrased the
law and in doing so concluded that the accused's claim of self-defence should be
considered despite the fact that he or she acted to forestall the attack before it has
begun. In the later case, Murphy J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria - in having to
decide a case where the accused killed the deceased when he believed that his life
was in danger from the deceased's strange behaviour - decided that one does not have
to wait until one's life is immediately threatened before attempting to forestall the
threat; a judgement which accorded with the approach taken in Morgan v. Colman.
56 Supra, fn. 33.
57 Supra, fn. 50.
58 For example in the case ofMcManus (1985) 2 NSWLR 448 and Lawson and Forsyth (1985)
18 A Crim R 360.
59 Supra, fn. 40.
60 Supra, fn. 39.
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The propositions laid down in Viro v. The Queen were ultimately refined in
the Australian High Court's case of Fadil Zecevic. The main argument for
abandoning the propositions was that they caused severe difficulties to the trial
judges and juries even though the essence of the concept was still claimed to be
acceptable.61 The result of this refinement essentially changed the nature of a
successful claim of self-defence. If in Viro v. The Queen, it was required that the
attack should actually have been launched, the new conception was that it all
depended on whether or not the accused reasonably believed62 that it was necessary,
for his self protection, for him to respond. This new approach clearly offers the
battered woman a better chance of having her case considered as one of self-defence.
Mason C.J. in his judgement in the case of FadiI Zecevic stated: "I still believe that the
doctrine enunciated in the case of Howe and Viro expresses a concept of self-defence which
best accords with acceptable standards of culpability, so that an accused whose only error is
that he lacks reasonable grounds for his believe that the degree of force was necessary for
his self-defence is guilty of manslaughter, not murder."
Fadil Zecevic, supra, fn. 50 at p. 167-168.
It has to be noted that the word "reasonable" here means reasonable in the circumstances in
which the accused found himself.
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CASES OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN
AUSTRALIAN COURTS
The discussion above has focused mainly on cases prior to the introduction of
the theory of battered woman syndrome in the Australian courts. It could be
concluded at this stage of the discussion that the development of the law on self-
defence in the Australian courts - particularly with regards to the requirement of
"imminence of the attack" - has been positively in favour of a person whose claim of
self-defence could otherwise be disregarded for having exercised the defence when
no immediate harm was threatening his life and bodily integrity. By virtue of the
cases of Morgan v. Colman, R. v. Lane and, most importantly, Fadil Zecevic, an
accused would be successful in his plea of self-defence even if he acted at a time
when there was no immediate threat to his life. In the first two of these cases, the
words "the attack is made or about to be made" in the Viro formulation was leniently
interpreted and in Zecevic, the formulation itself has been replaced with the
requirement of the necessity for the defensive act.
In the following sections we shall examine how these changes affected cases
in which the battered woman syndrome was at issue. The first case of this kind is
that ofRujanjic and Kontinnen.63
(1991) 53 A.Crim.R 362.
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6.13 THE CASE OF OLGA RUJANJICAND ERIIKA
KONTINNEm
This case involved two appellants, Rujanjic and Kontinnen, who were
convicted by the South Australian Supreme Court of false imprisonment and causing
grievous bodily harm. Both of the appellants shared a particularly violent domestic
relationship with one Hill, who designated them No.l and No. 2. Both were forced
into prostitution and were treated as slaves at home. Most importantly, for the
purpose of the present discussion of battered woman syndrome, that both the
appellants lived under constant fear of Hill - fear which, as one psychiatrist
explained in the trial court, rendered them helpless and unable to make their own
decisions. The relationship between the appellants and Hill was therefore one of
dominance and obedience.
The incident began when all three protagonists lured the victim, to their
house so that Hill might violently interrogate her regarding some allegedly stolen
property. The victim claimed that she was detained against her will and that she was
also the subject of ill treatment and violence by the appellants and Hill. Although
the appellants admitted being parties to deceiving her into going to the house, the
jury was told that there was no common plan involving the imprisonment or violence
and that Hill's assault on the victim was not anticipated by the others. This was the
primary defence forwarded by the appellants in the trial court. In the alternative, it
was contended on their behalf that their wills were overborne by fear of Hill's
violence and that they acted under duress. These arguments however were both
rejected in the trial court and both of the appellants were convicted of unlawful
imprisonment and unlawful assault.
Ibid.
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The specific grounds of appeal were firstly, that the verdicts were unsafe and
unsatisfactory, secondly, and more importantly was that the judge had wrongly
refused to admit certain specific expert evidence. The court rejected the first ground
of appeal, stating that it was of the view that the claim of duress was greatly
weakened by the fact that the appellants did not claim to have participated out of fear
in a plan involving imprisonment and violence, but had denied participation
altogether. In this regard the court said: "Their credibility must have been severely
weakened in the eyes of the jury by what were seen to be false denials and that must
have greatly influences the jury's assessment of the story that, to the extent that they
co-operated with Hill, they did so only out of fear."65
Having rejected the first ground of appeal, King C.J. in the Court of Appeal
went on to discuss the second issue related to the admissibility of expert evidence on
the battered woman syndrome. In his observations he referred to various authorities
on the syndrome, particularly to the works of American and Canadian
commentators.66 On this he stated:
"It emerges from the literature that methodological studies by trained psychologist of
situations of domestic violence have revealed typical patterns of behaviour on the
part of the male batterer and the female victim, and typical responses on the part of
the female victim. It has been revealed, so it appears, that woman who have suffered
habitual domestic violence are typically affected psychologically to the extent that
Rujanjic and Kontinnen, ibid., at p. 365.
The judge referred to the work of D. J. Brodsky, "Educating Juries: The Battered Woman
Defence in Canada." 25 No3 Alberta Law Review 461. A. E. Thar, "The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis" 77 No 3
Northwestern University Law Review 348.
The woks by Dr. L. Walker, "The Battered Woman" (1979) and "The Battered Woman
Syndrome" (1984).
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their reactions and responses differ from those which might be expected by persons
who lack the advantage of an acquaintance with the result of those study.
Repeated acts of violence, alternating very often with phases of kindness and
loving behaviour, commonly leave the battered woman in a psychological condition
described as "learned helplessness". She cannot predict or control the occurrence of
acute outbreaks of violence and often clings to the hope that the kind and loving
phases will become the norm. This is often reinforced by financial dependance,
children and feelings of guilt. The battered woman rarely seeks outside helps
because of fear of further violence. It is not uncommon for such women to
experience feelings for their mate which they describe as love. There is often an all
pervasive feeling that it is impossible to escape the dominance and violence of the
mate. There is a sense of constant fear with a perceived inability to escape the
situation."67
After explaining the basic insights of the theory, it was decided that the
exclusion of the evidence on the battered woman syndrome essentially vitiated the
whole trial. The judge asserted:
"It seems to me that a just judgement of the actions of women in those situations
requires that the court or jury have the benefit of the insights which have been
gained."68
The Court of Appeal finally concluded that evidence on the battered woman
syndrome had wrongly been overlooked. A new trial was ordered, the judge
Rujanjic and Kontinnen, supra, fn. 63 at p. 366.
Ibid., at p. 369.
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stressing the importance of the theory and the role it could have played in
determining the appellant's criminal liability.
This decision was acclaimed as the turning point in the history of battered
woman in Australian courts, in that for the first time the theory of the battered
woman syndrome was accepted. It has to be noted however, at this stage, that the
theory supported the appellants claim of the defence of duress, which means, as a
result of the battering relationship, the appellants became helpless, experienced low
self-esteem, feel psychologically unwell and had their wills were overborne by fear
of Hill's violence. Thus even though the case under discussion admitted the
tenability of the theory of the battered woman syndrome, a question still remains -
might it be accepted in a more serious charge, one of murder, as it was the case in
Canada? On this question it is revealing to refer to the judgement of King C.J. when
he said:
"I can see no distinction in principle between the admission of expert evidence of the
battered woman syndrome on issues of self-defence and provocation and on the issue
of duress."69
Clearly King C.J. envisaged no difficulty in admitting the theory to support a
battered woman case where it involved the claim of self-defence or provocation.
Nevertheless, the question is to what extent would the judgement as a whole, impress
judges in future cases involving battered woman claiming self-defence and
provocation. Few decisions subsequent to Rujanjic and Kontinnen, elucidate the
issue.
Ibid., at p. 370.
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6.14 THE CASE OF KONTINNEN70
The defendant, Erica Kontinnen, was one of the appellants in the earlier case
discussed above. She was charged with murdering Ian Hill, her de facto spouse.
The defendant did not remember firing the shot but she remembered seeing Hill
lying face down and bleeding on the ground, which made her conclude that she must
have shot him.
The defence of self-defence and provocation were both put to the jury. The
basis of these defences was Hill's long term abuse of the defendant, of his other de
facto spouse, Rujanjic, and of her child. The defences were also supported by the
fact that during the night in question the deceased had threatened to kill both women
and the child. In support of the self-defence argument, evidence on the battered
woman syndrome was given by a clinical psychiatrist and by a clinical forensic
psychologist. By virtue of the judgement of the Full Court of the South Australian
Court of Criminal Appeal in Rujanjic and Kontinnen, the trial court found no
difficulty in admitting the theory, which purported to explain the subjective view of
Kontinnen as to the necessity of killing Hill on the night in question and also to
explain the reasonableness of her claimed apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm. The defendant was acquitted of murdering Hill.
If the theory of battered woman syndrome helped the two appellants in
Rujanjic and Kontinnen on the issue of duress, the present case goes further by
admitting the theory in relation to the defence of self-defence in a case of murder.
The decision of Legoe J. in the Supreme Court of South Australia thus translated into
reality the judgement of the Full Court in Rujanjic and Kontinnen, where the judges
(1992) 16 Crim. L J. 360.
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were unanimous in their view that the evidence proffered would also be acceptable to
the defence of self-defence and provocation.
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6.15 THE CASE OF HICKEY^
The accused in this case was charged with the murder of her de facto
husband. It was asserted in the trial that she had suffered considerably during her
relationship with the deceased: severe beatings were not an uncommon experience -
indeed these happened almost daily. Evidence was also led that she was treated for a
suspected miscarriage after being kicked by the deceased. The deceased's violent
acts were not only directed at the accused but also involved the couple's children.
Because of her miserable life with the deceased, the accused decided to
separate from him. She obtained a Domestic Violence Order against the deceased,
restraining him from harassing her, but this order was ignored and the violence
continued as before. On the day of the offence, the accused had agreed to meet the
deceased so that he could see their children. They had a drink together and then
returned to his house. The deceased wanted the children to stay for a night in his
house but this was not agreed by the accused. They then became involved in an
argument during which the accused was assaulted and seized by the throat. When he
stopped acting violently and was seated on the bed with his back towards her, the
accused grabbed a knife and struck the deceased in the chest. He died shortly
afterwards from the stab wound.
The defence of self-defence was raised in the trial. The accused claimed that
she was in a state of rage and fear over what the deceased had just done to her when
the stabbing occurred. She also claimed to be overwhelmingly worried over the
safety of her children, fearing that they might be seriously threatened in future by the
deceased's violence. In addition to this, psychiatric evidence was also produced as to
the battered woman syndrome; the accused was said to have been living in the state
71 (1992) l6Crim.L.J. 271.
266
of "learned helplessness", as described in the theory. The court admitted this
evidence, and, as a result, the accused was acquitted ofmurder.
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6.16 SUMMARY
The unanimous decision by the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in
Rujanjic and Kontinnen72 was said to be the first case where the theory of the
battered woman syndrome was accepted in an Australian court. It must be borne in
mind that the theory was used in relation to the defence of duress in a case not
involving murder and not, as in the Canadian Supreme Court's case of R. v.
Lava/lee,73 in the context of the defence of self-defence. The judgement of King
C.J., however, permits the admissibility of the theory in support of the claim of self-
defence in a murder case. Hence the way was cleared for its use in subsequent
cases..
Ten months after the decision in Rujanjic and Kontinnen, the theory was
successfully introduced in support of an accused's claim of self-defence in a charge
ofmurder. The theory seems to have been accepted without much argument simply
because the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court had given the green
light in its previous decision. And not very long after Kontinnen's case was decided,
the theory of "learned helplessness", which was one of the two ingredients
constituting the theory of the battered woman syndrome, was held to be a reason for
the accused to have killed and therefore supported the claim of self-defence. As in
Kontinnen, in Hickey, the theory was accepted without any serious opposition.
Supra, fn. 63.
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
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6.17 THE CASE OF R. v. HELENPA TRICIA SECRETAR F74
6.17.1 The facts of the case
The accused in this case. Helen Patricia Secretary, was charged with
murdering her husband. They had been married for eleven years and the last eight
years of the relationship had been tortured ones for her. She had been constantly
verbally, mentally and physically abused by the deceased. Approximately one
month before the killing, the deceased had been more violent and had beaten the
accused to the extent that neighbours had reported the matter to the police.
The assaults then intensified, leading her to leave the household and obtained
a Restraining Order against the deceased. She spent a week at a women's shelter and
then returned to her home. The deceased neglected the order and moved back to the
house, staying with the accused. In one incident, the deceased assaulted her sister
and her child. This was reported to the police, but apparently no action was taken.
The day before the shooting, the deceased assaulted her by threatening her
with a knife. The phone cord in the house was also cut off by the deceased in what
seemed to be his attempt to prevent the accused to call the police. There were also
various threats made, the accused being told by the deceased that he would kill her
on waking up the next morning.
The accused took this last threat seriously. Two reasons probably contributed
to this apprehension; firstly, the deceased's aggressive conduct that day and
secondly, his violent behaviour over the previous weeks. The accused, in fearing for
74 (1996) 107 N.T.R. (n.p. Lexis transcript)
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her life, loaded a gun which was in the back of her car and then shot at the deceased,
who at that time was asleep in the home.
In the trial court the defence of self-defence was not left to the jury. Counsel
for the accused applied under section 408 (1) of the Criminal Code that the question
of law which was the subject of the ruling be reserved for the consideration of the
Court of Criminal Appeal. The case was then brought to the Court of Criminal
Appeal and the issue to be decided was whether the trial judge was correct in not
leaving the defence of self-defence to the jury in the circumstances in this case.75
The case was tried in the Northern Territory of Australia, a Code state. The
relevant section of the Criminal Code, s. 28 states:
"In the circumstances following, the application of force that will or is likely
to kill or cause grievous harm is justified provided it is not unnecessary force:
(f) in the case of any person when acting in self-defence or in the defence of
another, where the nature of the assault being defended is such as to
cause the person using the force reasonable apprehension that death or
grievous harm will result.
In the Court of Appeal Mildren J. stated that by virtue of this provision three
elements of self-defence should be satisfied by an accused:
It was reported in this case that the accused was re-arraigned at the request of the defence
and pleaded not guilty to the murder of the deceased but guilty to manslaughter by reason of
provocation. No conviction was formally recorded in the trial court and judgement was
postponed under section 408 (2) of the Criminal Code until the question reserved had been
considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal.
R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary, ibid.
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1. the accused must be acting in defence of herself from an assault by the
deceased;
2. the assault must have caused the accused reasonable apprehension that
death or grievous harm would result to her;
3. the force used to defend herselfmust not be unnecessary force.
Another issue that calls for clarification at this point is the meaning of the
word "assault" as intended by section 28 (f) of the Code. This was in fact discussed
in the court, which referred to section 187 of the Code. The relevant sub-sections
define assault as follows:
(a) the direct or indirect application of force to a person without his consent or
with his consent if the consent is obtained by force or by means of menaces
of any kind or by fear of bodily harm or by means of false and fraudulent
representation as to the nature of the act or by personation; or
(b) the attempted or threatened application of such force where the person
attempting or threatening it has an actual or apparent present ability to
effect his purpose and the purpose is evidenced by bodily harm movement or
threatening words, other than the application of force -
Counsel for the prosecution submitted that to establish an assault in this case,
the following elements must be present:
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1. a threatened application of force by the deceased to the accused without
her consent;
2. the deceased, at the relevant time, had an actual or apparent present
ability to effect his purpose;
3. the purpose was evidenced at the relevant time by bodily movement or
threatening words.
The prosecution's main contention was thus that as the deceased was asleep at
the time he was killed, the accused could not have been acting in self-defence from
an assault by the deceased. Furthermore, although there was evidence suggesting
that the deceased had behaved violently towards the accused, at the time of the
killing the deceased was not doing anything that fell within the definition of
"assault" as defined in the Code. The deceased simply did not have the "actual or
apparent present ability to effect his purpose" as stated in the Code. In other words,
the prosecution intended to establish that the killing was committed at a time when
the deceased has not been assaulting the accused, and therefore the question of self-
defence was irrelevant.
At this point it has to be noted that the prosecution was merely asserting that
the traditional conception of self-defence requires that an assault to be actually in
existence before one can reasonably exercise force in defence of life. The
implication of this is that when the accused kills in anticipation of an assault from
the deceased, this simply does not fall within the conception of self-defence but
remains murder.
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6.17.2 The accused's case
The essence of the accused's argument was that section 28 (f) does not put a
time limit on an act done in self-defence. Her submission was that the evidence
established one long assault lasting for a considerable part of the final day and which
had not ceased at the time of the deceased's death. In this context the court referred
to section 310 (1) of the Code:
"In an indictment against a person for an assault the accused person may be charged
and proceeded against notwithstanding that such assault is alleged to be constituted
by a number of assaults provided they were committed on the same person in the
prosecution of a single purpose or at about the same time."
This provision provides that one may be charged with an assault
notwithstanding the fact that it has been committed in a series of violent acts, on the
condition that such assault was made against the same person, in the prosecution of a
single purpose and at about the same time. Applying it in the present case, the
deceased could be said to have committed an assault against Mrs. Secretary for the
reason that he had consistently assaulting and abusing her for the purpose of causing
her serious bodily injury and in a number of occasions had threatened her life. The
deceased was therefore assaulting her by virtue of this provision, and her act of
shooting him was an acceptable act of self-defence.
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6.17.3 The decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern
Territory: The issue of "actual or present ability to effect
his purpose"
The primary issue which was addressed by Mildren J. in his judgement in the
Supreme Court was the question as to whether the deceased could be said to have
been assaulting the accused despite the fact that he was asleep when the fatal shot
was fired. Considerable attention was paid to section 187 (b) of the Code, in
particular, to the meaning of the word "assault" when it was stipulated that the
person intended to assault, in this case the deceased, must have "actual or apparent
ability to effect his purpose". In this context, the primary issue was whether the
deceased really did have the actual and apparent ability to make good his threat to
kill the accused?
Two issues were elaborated in this part of the judgement. Firstly, it was
decided that the words "apparent present ability" had to be construed by reference to
the threat to which the threatening words relate. Therefore, if the case was one of the
threatened application of force, it must be evident from the facts known at the time
the threat was made, that when the threat was to be carried out the person making the
threat would have the ability to carry out the threat. Secondly, the judgement
emphasised the issue of the "purpose" of the deceased. For a person to be said to
have the actual or apparent ability to carry out his death threat, his purpose to kill
must be unambiguous. It must be made clear, from the evidence available in court,
that the purpose of the deceased must be clear that he intended to kill or to cause
severe injury to the accused.
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In this case, if a question is asked, what was the ultimate purpose aimed at by
the deceased? It seems clear from the appalling history of violence suffered by the
accused that the deceased intended to kill or at least to inflict serious bodily injury
upon his partner. Moreover, it is clear, on the basis of his past conduct, that he was
quite capable of doing this. Thus, the deceased may be said to have had an actual or
present ability to effect his purpose to kill the accused thus satisfying the
requirements of section 187 (b) of the Code.
6.17.4 The issue of the completion of the assault: section 28 (f)
Section 28 (f) of the Code provides that the outcome in relation to self-
defence depends on whether or not at the time of the employment of the defensive
force, the accused was defending the assault from the purported attacker.76 After
concluding that the deceased might have had the ability to effect his purpose, that is,
to kill the accused, the issue was whether or not the deceased's assault was
completed at the time when the accused fired the fatal shot. The Supreme Court was
of the view that if the assault was completed by the time the deceased fell asleep, the
accused could not have been defending an already-existing assault but a different one
- an anticipated assault which she feared may occur in the future. On the other hand,
if the assault was still persisting, the defensive force used by the accused would be a
justifiable act of self-defence as intended by the Code, despite the fact that the
deceased was asleep.
It is to be pointed out again that the Code says " in the case of any person when acting in
self-defence or in the defence of another, where the nature of the assault being defended is
such . . . ." The words "the assault being defended" suggest that a valid claim of self-defence
could only be made in cases where the claimant of the defence is defending himself against
an assault which is physically in progress.
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In delivering his judgement Mildren J. said that it was open to the jury to
conclude that the assault was still not completed. This would amount to saying that
the court at this point considered that the threat made by the deceased not very long
before he slept was still continuing, and still a murderous one, and that the accused
had the right to take necessary steps for self-defence, in order to ward off the threat.
It would be open to her to do this in whatever way she thought fit to save her life -
even if she acted at a time when the deceased was in bed, passive, and not behaving
violently. The Supreme Court regarded the deceased in his sleep as "temporarily
physically unable to carry out his threat". When he awoke, however, he would still
be a dangerous person capable of effectively implementing the threat he has made.
In this respect, it could be maintained that the Supreme Court of The Northern
Territory effectively went beyond the traditional interpretation of the requirement of
"imminence".
It is apparent that the Court of Appeal concluded that section 28 (f) of the
Code did not envisage the imminence of the threat as one of the requirements of a
successful plea of self-defence. The law thus seems to be that a plea of self-defence
could be made available in cases where the purported attacker, has the apparent
ability to carry out his ultimate purpose and where that ultimate purpose itself is a
clear one, that is, to cause severe injury or to kill. (This could be established by
looking at the history of the relationship between the parties). In addition to this
requirement, the assault must not have been completed at the time of the
employment of the defensive force. If these two requirements are met, by virtue of
the decision in Helen Patricia Secretary, a claim of self-defence would be left to the
jury even if repelling force is resorted to in the absence of an actual attack.
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6.17.5 Some observations
Two sections in the Criminal Code of the Northern Territory of Australia will
be directly relevant in cases of self-defence. Section 28 (f) deals with the law on
self-defence itself and section 187 (b) of the Code necessarily clarifies the meaning
of the word assault which is stated in section 28 (f). Section 28 (f) requires that the
assault intended to be defended against be presently existing and that the accused,
based on the assault he or she faces, reasonably apprehends that death or grievous
bodily harm will result from the assault.
The court's task then, was to determine the meaning of the word assault as
well as to decide the beginning and the completion of the assault. In this case, an
assault was said to have occurred by virtue of the threat made, and by virtue of the
fact that the deceased had the present and actual ability to carry out the threat. To
decide whether the accused has the ability to carry out the threat the court needs to
look at the history of the relationship between the two parties involved, in the present
case, the deceased and the accused. The continuation of serious battering incidents in
the relationship will be strong evidence supporting the view that the person who
made the threat has the present and actual ability to carry out his purpose.
Perhaps the most interesting outcome of the judgement is that the court
seems to differentiate between an anticipated assault which may occur in the future
and the assault which has already begun but has yet to be completed. Both have
specific effects on the plea of self-defence. If force is used in repelling an
anticipated assault which may occur in the future, the court would probably take the
view that it would not be an act of self-defence as intended by the provisions in the
Code. This is probably due to the fact that the accused was only defending herself
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against an anticipated assault which may or may not occur. To allow self-defence in
cases of such a kind would in the end be disastrous to the law of self-defence itself.
The court nevertheless took the view that the plea of self-defence could be left open
for consideration by the jury if the repelling force was used against an assault which
had already begun but which was temporarily halted, as, for example, in a situation
where the purported attacker is asleep. The Supreme Court in this case described the
person in such a situation as "temporarily physically unable to carry out his threat".77
It is also important that the assault is not yet been completed at the time when the
defensive act is done. Therefore even if the accused attacked the deceased and killed
him when he was asleep, the act of killing will be within the intended meaning of the
defence of self-defence in the Code, despite the fact that she was not physically and
presently confronted with any violent act from the deceased.
In summary, a death threat or a threat to cause severe bodily harm will be
regarded as an assault if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the person who
made the threat has the ability to carry it out. The assault is therefore, by virtue of
the Code, one which may be defended against by the use of force provided that it is
still persisting and there is no evidence to suggest that it has already been completed.
At this point the traditional imminence requirement has been disregarded.
R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary, supra, fn. 74.
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6.18 THE CASE OF R. v. HELENPATRICIA SECRETARY:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME
Mildren J. in his judgement in Secretary referred to a number of cases which
involved the issue of the battered woman syndrome. The Canadian cases of R. v.
Lavallee78 and R. v. Whynot79 were compared and highlighted. After elaborating the
facts of the case in Lavallee, the judge expressed the view that his approach to the
case was in conformity with that of the judges in the Supreme Court of Canada; the
threat of future conduct could amount to an assault which could be defended against
in self-defence.
With regard to the case of R. v. Whynot, Mildren J. concluded that the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal did not characterise the threat made by the deceased as an
assault. The appellant in that case, therefore, was not acting in defence against an
assault which, having the act been considered so, would enable him to rely on the
defence of self-defence. The Australian court stressed the point that the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal did not differentiate between the two kind of assaults which they
(the Australian court) had identified. No distinction was attempted between an
assault which was the result of a threat made (taking into consideration the capacity
of the person who made it to realise the threat) and an anticipated assault which may
or may not occur in the future. In the former, the existence of such a threat is
evidence of an assault, and such assault is still continuing until it has been completed
by the person who makes it or there is evidence to suggest otherwise. In saying this,
the Court of Appeal implicitly disagreed with the decision in R. v. Whynot. Thus it is
Supra, fn. 73.
(! 983) 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449.
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understandable that the criticism of Whynot expressed in Lavallee was cited in length
in Mildren J.'s judgement.80
The decision in Zecevic v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions81 was referred to
in the case of Secretary to support the fact that in the Australian states with common
law jurisdictions the law has moved away from the requirement of immediacy and
tended to favour a more flexible approach. In Zecevic, the court decided that in
determining whether or not an act was a justifiable act of self-defence, regard had to
be paid to the honest and reasonable belief of the accused as to the existence of a
need to defend. If on the evidence the accused honestly and reasonably believed that
his life was seriously threatened, her repelling force would be acceptable for
consideration of the defence of self-defence. This would be so even in the absence
of any actual physical violent act from another party. Decisions of this nature were
taken by the judges in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory as justification
for deviation from the old conception of self-defence, with its emphasis on the rule
of imminence.
By virtue of the judgement in R. v. Lavallee,82 the criticism by the Canadian
Supreme Court of the judgement in R. v. Whynot,83 and the pragmatic approach in
the High Court of Australia in Zecevic, the Northern Territory Supreme Court
concluded that "there is no compelling reason why, in a case such as this, the "assault
80 Widren J. cited this part of the judgement of R. v. Lavallee: "The requirement imposed in
Whynot that a battered woman wait until the physical assault is "underway" before her
apprehensions can be validated in law would, in the words of an American court, be
tantamount to sentencing her to "murder by installment": New Mexico v. Gallegos,719 P.2d
1268, at 1271, 104 N.M. 247 (C.A., 1986)."
R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary, supra, fn. 74.
81 Supra, fn. 50.
82 Supra, fn. 73.
83 Supra, fn. 79.
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being defended" for the purposed of s.28 (f) of the Code, ought not to be
characterised as a continuing assault constituted by threatening words uttered by the
deceased immediately before he fell asleep so that, in truth, it is that assault which is
being defended, not a possible assault in the future which may or may not occur, as
the court in Whynot characterised it."84 In reaching this conclusion, therefore, the
court had invented a new conception where the defence of self-defence could be
claimed - a threat of violence could be interpreted as an act of assault even if the
person who makes the threat is not of violent character. The point is that, in the light
of the history of the relationship between the two parties, the person who makes
death threat must have, on the evidence produced in court, been continuously and
consistently assaulting the accused. This is important as it shows that the person
who makes the threat has the ability to effect his purpose and therefore falls within
the meaning of "actual and present ability to effect his purpose" as stated in the
Code. Thus, the defensive force employed by the accused is in actual fact an act of
self-defence against an assault which has already begun and still continuing. The
defender does not have to wait until the assault is in the final stage of its execution,
which means the actual physical attack on the defender. The temporary physical
inability to carry out the threat on the part of the purported perpertrator, does not
mean that the defensive conduct is unjustifiable.
6.18.1 Is the theory of battered woman syndrome an issue in the
case ofSecretary?
One interesting point to be highlighted in the judgement of the case of
Secretary is that despite the fact that this case involved a woman who was living
with a violent husband and who had been continuously abused - which suits her well
84 R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary, supra, fn. 74.
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with the newly invented theory of the battered woman syndrome - no reference to the
theory seems to have been made. The Canadian case of R. v. Lavallee, (which was
known to be the first case where the theory was accepted in the Canadian court and
was widely referred to thereafter) was discussed and evidently influenced the
judgement of the judges in the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory of
Australia. However, it was not particularly the theory of battered woman syndrome
that was referred to by the Australian judges. Mildren J. concluded, rather, that the
case of Lavallee was important in that its judgement accepted that a threat of future
conduct could be defined as amounting to an assault that could be defended against
in the act of self-defence.85 The question is, is this the ratio of the judgement in the
Canadian Supreme Court?
We must remember that the acquittal of the appellant in R. v. Lavallee was
due in great measure to the acceptance of the theory of battered woman syndrome; in
fact, the theory became the overwhelming issue from the very beginning of the trial.
On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal however, overturned the trial court's
decision and refused to accept the validity of the theory. The issue was finally
resolved when the Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the trial court's decision and
approved the application of the battered woman syndrome as a mean of proving the
appellant's reasonableness in her use of force in self-defence. The fundamental issue
was indeed one of the battered woman syndrome.
It has to be noted here that Mildren J., as has been pointed out above, bases
his judgement in the main on the interpretation of the provision in the Criminal Code
of the Northern Territory of Australia. The main provision is section 28 (f) of the
Code which talks about the circumstances which a person could be granted a defence
of self-defence and section 187 (b) which elucidates the meaning of the word
85 R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary, ibid.
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"assault" as mentioned in the said section. The law as stated in the Code requires
that before an accused's plea of self-defence could be considered, it must be
"established" that the defender is in a situation where she is defending herself against
an assault and the nature of the assault is such as to cause her reasonable
apprehension that her life and bodily integrity is in danger.
The issue then becomes one of whether a person (in this case the deceased)
who has threatened the life of the accused and after that has fallen asleep, has already
assaulted the accused for the purpose of the Code? The court decided this in the
affirmative, coming to this conclusion by arguing that by looking at the history of
violence between the parties the deceased had the actual and apparent present ability
to effect his purpose (that is to kill the accused as he mentioned in his threat). For
this reason, the court said, the death threat made by the deceased immediately before
he went to sleep was a threat that falls within the definition of the word "assault" as
used in section 28 (f) of the Code. Therefore the fatal shot that killed the deceased
was not an act ofmurder but an act of self-defence.
The question now arises is whether the exculpation of the appellant (the
battered woman) in R. v. Lavallee was based on a similar line of argument. A brief
recapitulation of the main issue in Lavallee will thus be necessary to answer the
question.
The appellant in this case was a battered woman who had been continuously
beaten and abused by her common law husband. On the night the killing occurred,
she shot her husband in the back of the head as he left her room. It was alleged in
court that the deceased, before being shot to death, had threatened the life of the
appellant. The issue then became that of whether the testimony of a psychiatrist,
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testifying on the point of battered woman syndrome, should be accepted. The
acceptance of this testimony allowed the court to consider the appellant's plea of
self-defence, and the whole argument of the case then focused on this point.
In the judgement the Supreme Court of Canada made reference to the
Canadian Criminal Code's provisions on law of self-defence. One of the most
important requirements of a successful claim of self-defence stated in the Code is
that the appellant, before using force in her defence, must have reasonably
apprehended that the assault which was made against her was of a serious nature that
could cause her death or severe bodily injury.86 The key phrase here is "reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm". At this point the Canadian
Supreme Court decided that the reasonableness of the appellant's conduct could only
be properly evaluated by considering expert evidence on battered wife syndrome.
Wilson J. in her judgement stated:
"Where evidence exists that an accused is in a battering relationship, expert
testimony can assist the jury in determining whether the accused had a "reasonable"
apprehension of death when she acted by explaining the heightened sensitivity of a
battered woman to her partner's act. Without such testimony I am skeptical that the
average fact-finder would be capable of appreciating why her subjective fear may
have been reasonable in the context of the relationship. After all, the hypothetical
"reasonable man" observing only the final incident may have been unlikely to
recognise the batterer's threat as potentially lethal."87
86 Section 34 (2) (a) of the Canadian Criminal Code states:
"Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily harm in
repelling the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension ofdeath or grievous bodily harm from the
violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the assailant pursues his
purposes."
87 R. v. Lavallee, supra, fn. 73 at p. 882.
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It must be noted that the main issue discussed in R. v. Lavallee was the
reasonableness of the accused's conduct, a matter which could only be appreciated
by allowing an expert to testify on the issue of battered woman syndrome. The
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, for some reason, did not
highlight this part of the judgement in its decision. It is possible that the Supreme
Court of the Northern Territory did not feel that there was a need to discuss the issue
of the reasonableness of the accused's defensive conduct even though, as in the
Canadian Code, the provision in the Criminal Code of the Northern Territory also
talks about the reasonable apprehension of the accused and her belief in the severity
of the assault made against her. This approach accordingly leads to the issue of
battered woman syndrome becoming unnecessary.
285
6.19 THE CASE OF R. v. HELENPA TRICIA SECRETARY:
CONCLUSION
The result of the judgement in R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary is twofold:
Firstly, the case under discussion reveals that even though the issue of
battered woman syndrome was not been brought up in argument, the accused's plea
of self-defence could still be heard and considered. Throughout the judgement, the
Supreme Court failed to make any reference to other Australian cases which
involved the issue of battered woman syndrome. The decision of the South Australia
Court of Criminal Appeal in Rujanjic and Kontinnen - which is the landmark
decision as far as the admissibility of the theory of battered woman syndrome is
concerned, was not discussed. The subsequent cases of Kontinnen in the Supreme
Court in South Australia and the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in
Hickey were similarly ignored.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in making its decision perhaps
explains the reason for this attitude. The judges' main focus in Secretary's case is not
the requirement of the reasonableness of the accused's belief at the time of
committing the act. Flad this been the case, there is a possibility that expert evidence
explaining the accused's state of mind would in the end have been necessary, and
that would also mean that the cases mentioned above discussing the theory of
battered woman syndrome would have been considered. The primary concern of the
judges instead was the issue of "the nature of the assault being defended" mentioned
in section 28 (f) in the Code and the definition of the word "assault" as stated in the
same provision. Upon the court's being satisfied that the assault had already been
made by the deceased and that the deceased had the ability to effect his purpose of
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killing the accused, the repelling force used would be accepted as within the
acceptable act of self-defence required in the Criminal Code of the Northern
Territory.
Secondly, the fact that such a decision has been reached poses the question: is
the theory of the battered woman syndrome really necessary? The Supreme Court
has proved that even without considering the syndrome a battered woman who kills
at the time where there is no actual attack from her partner, could still have a valid
argument for the consideration of a plea of self-defence. One final question would
then be asked: does this judgement signify the demise of the syndrome in court?
Whether or not this is so depends on the attitude of the judges at the time of the trial,
but what is certain here is that the decision in R. v. Helen Patricia Secretary only





7.1 THE DOCTRINE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN SELF-
DEFENCE
When a person is attacked and as a result, kills or causes grievous injury to
his attacker while labouring under a mistaken belief that the amount of force used in
his repelling force is necessary, he may be convicted of manslaughter. This is the
principle embodied in the doctrine of excessive self-defence.
Despite the fact that it has been widely supported, this doctrine has now been
abolished. The approach presently prevalent in the Australian, English as well as
Canadian Courts seems to require the accused's mistaken belief as to the quantum of
force employed to be reasonable on both the subjective and objective view. This
approach does not permit any concession in a case where one's defensive act is
reasonable subjectively but, objectively viewed, unreasonable. In particular, the law
now recognises no halfway house - a person who honestly but mistakenly believes
that his behaviour is reasonable may still be convicted of murder if this behaviour is
objectively unreasonable.
The High Court of Australia in the case of Fadil Zecevicx laid down the law
that the accused's mistaken belief is now to be judged by the test of reasonableness.
1
[1986-1987] 25 A.Crim.R 163.
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However the reasonableness of the accused's mistaken action is to be judged by what
is reasonably believed by the accused himself. This is a mixture of a subjective and
objective approach. In a case where the jury is satisfied that this mistaken belief is
subjectively and objectively reasonable, the accused's mistaken belief is then
justifiable and he bears no criminal liability at all. On the contrary, in a case where
the mistaken belief is found to be unreasonable, the accused is guilty of murder.
By virtue of the Privy Council's decision in Palmer v. R.,2 the English courts
appear to have adopted a completely objective reasonableness test in dealing with the
issue of the accused's act of resistance.3 If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence, the issue will be eliminated; on the
contrary, if it is within the scope of necessary self-defence, it is a justified act and a
judgement of acquittal is the only option. This approach was subsequently
confirmed and adopted in the English Court of Criminal Appeal case of R. v.
Mclnnes.4
In the controversial case of R. v. Clegg,5 the accused's mistaken belief as to
the amount of force required in his defence was not sufficiently dealt with. The six
shots fired by the accused in what he claimed to be his act of self-defence were
divided by the Law Lords into two categories namely; first, the first two shots which
were accepted as being made in the exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence;
2 [1971] 1 All ER 1077.
However it has been argued that with regard to the belief of the accused in the amount of
force used in self-defence, the judgement of Lord Morris in Palmer v. R. suggests that the
jury also consider the subjective belief of the accused. Thus this view holds that in
considering the reasonableness of the accused's belief as to the amount of force, a subjective
and objective reasonableness test is applied. A detailed explanation of this argument is
provided in chapter 4 p. 141 - 145.
4
[1971] 1 All ER295.
[1995] 1 All ER 334.
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second, the remaining four, which were held to be unnecessary and therefore
unjustified. Since it was the fourth shot which, according to an expert opinion, was
the main cause of the deceased's death, the claim of self-defence was rejected. The
case simply disregarded the honest but mistaken belief of the accused.
The Canadian Provincial Appeal Courts had, on many occasions, applied the
middle ground principle. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in Brisson v. The
Queen (which was subsequently followed in R. v. Gee , R. v. Faicf and Reilly v.
The Queen 9 ) has firmly rejected the arguments in favour of the doctrine. The main
reason for the Supreme Court's declining to follow the doctrine was the fact that the
law of homicide in the Canadian Criminal Code has not been so defective so as to
require a fundamental change of this nature. Moreover, any fundamental change to a
long established and well accepted principle was thought to need the clear approval
of the legislature.
Section 34 (1) of the Code which specifically deals with the defence of self-
defence requires the accused to act proportionately in his defence. It is apparent from
the language of the section that this proportionality requirement must be satisfied
objectively. The defence of self-defence was also elaborated in section 34 (2) (a) and
(b) of the Code. In this section, the law made no mention of the requirement of the
proportionality test. Subsection (a) of section 34 (2) requires that the accused's belief
as to the need to exercise force be satisfied under a purely objective test. Subsection
(b) of the same section obliges the accused to honestly believe that his defensive act
139 D.L.R. (3d) 685.
139 D.L.R. (3d) 587.
145 D.L.R. (3d) 67.
13 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
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is necessary and that belief must be satisfied upon objective standard of
reasonableness.
In considering the issue of the accused's belief under section 34 (2) (a) and
(b), it could be argued that here there is a similarity between the Australian
conception of reasonable belief and the reasonable belief of the accused under this
part of the Canadian Criminal Code; the latter Code requires an honest belief, but
judged objectively by a hypothetical person acting in the accused's position; the
Australian approach, by virtue of Viiro v. The Queen 0 (which was adopted in
Zecevic ) requires that the accused must be reasonable in his defensive behaviour,
but "reasonably believed" here means what the accused himself belief based on all
the circumstances in which he found himself. In the former, the law accepts the
importance of the accused's interpretation of the situation, and his defensive act is
allowed according to that interpretation, but, having accepted that, the law also
requires that whatever the accused might honestly have believed must be acceptable
to a hypothetical person presumed to be in his position. The latter, on the other hand,
suggests that the accused's act be reasonable in the eyes of a hypothetical person
presumed to be in his defensive position but, even so, regard is to be had to the
accused's belief as to the circumstances which he faced at the time of repelling the
attack. It is now abundantly clear that, the purely subjective belief of the accused
will not be sufficient to justify his act of defence. It is the belief of the hypothetical
reasonable person that in the end decides the legality of the accused's conduct.
[1978-1979] 141 C.L.R. 88.
Supra, fn. 1.
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7.1.1 The question of the origin of the qualified defence
12 13
The Australian cases of R. v. McKay and The Queen v. Howe have always
been referred to as the two main sources for the earliest development of the doctrine
is concerned. Lowe J., in delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court of Victoria
in R. v. McKay, laid down the law of self-defence as:
"if the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the
apprehension of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of
the occasion and kills the offender, the crime is manslaughter not murder."14
This bald statement in the law of self-defence was intended to be limited in its
scope by the Australian High Court in the case of R. v. Howe, in which it was stated:
". . . a person who is subjected to a violent and felonious attack and who, in
endeavouring, by way of self-defence, to prevent the consummation of that attack by
force exercises more force than a reasonable man would consider necessary in the
circumstances, but no more force than he honestly believes to be necessary in the
circumstances, is guilty of manslaughter and not ofmurder."15
In contrast to the application of excessive defence in McKay, where the law
only requires one to believe that a situation warrants him to use some force in self-
defence, and even if it was excessive, the accused would be held guilty of




[1958] 100 C.L.R. 448.
14
R. v. McKay, supra, fn. 12 at p. 563.
15
R. v. Howe, supra, fn. 13 at p. 456.
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defensive act against his attacker if the attack is so violent in its nature that the
accused believes his life will be seriously endangered.
One point to be stressed here is that the decisions elucidating the doctrine of
excessive defence in those two cases were based mostly on the old English cases.16 It
is interesting to observe that those cases however were not dealing specifically with
the case where an accused was convicted of manslaughter as a result of an excess of
force used in his defensive behaviour. Those authorities only provide an indication
that the middle ground principle had once been applied and accepted by the courts.
One point that has not been highlighted in most of the works concerning the
development of the doctrine is the fact that in Howe, the Australian High Court had
17
specifically referred to the case of R. v. Barilla, which was decided in 1944.
Unlike the old English cases discussed earlier, this Canadian case directly dealt with
the doctrine of excessive self-defence - an accused person was convicted of
manslaughter only on the basis that his act of defence was greater than what was
supposed to be required. This is exactly the principle adopted in Howe.
At this juncture the point to be stressed is that in discussing the earliest cases
on the doctrine of excessive self-defence, there seems to be no solid reason to
disregard the importance of R. v. Barilla. The Canadian case certainly had applied
the doctrine some thirteen years before it was observed in McKay and adopted in
Howe. The only possible reason not to refer to Canadian cases in any discussion on
excessive defence is the fact that the doctrine itself has not been developed in an
interesting way in Canada as it was in Australia.
Those cases were discussed earlier in chapter two at p.10-16 under the sub-heading of "The
origin of the defence and its development."
17
[1944] 4 D.L.R. 344.
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Finally, in Australia, Mason C.J. in his judgement in the Australian Court of
18
Appeal case of Zecevic concluded that the formulations intended to be directed to
the jury whenever dealing with an issue involving the defence of self-defence are too
complex and difficult to be readily comprehended. For this simple reason, the
doctrine has since been abandoned without any serious effort at its revival even by
Mason C.J., whose formulations are responsible for its demise.
In Canada, by virtue of Brisson v. The Queen,19 the doctrine has been said not
to be in accord with the law stipulated in the Canadian Criminal Code. The Canadian
Supreme Court has since followed this conviction against the doctrine in subsequent
cases. In England and Wales, the doctrine has never been recognised but, it has to be
20
said that in the light of the case of R. v. Clegg, the main obstacle to the doctrine is
the absence of any legislation in support of its introduction.
These are the explanations which have been given for the doctrine's failure
even though Mason C.J. in the High Court of Australia in Zecevic, the Canadian
Supreme Court in Brisson v. The Queen}x R. v. Gee2 and R. v. Faid23 as well as the
House of Lords in R. v. Clegg24 had all admitted the attractiveness of the essential









7.2 SELF-DEFENCE AND THE THEORY OF THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME
7.2.1 The theory of the battered woman syndrome in English courts
The theory of the battered woman syndrome, which requires a consideration
of the mental condition of the battered woman accused at the time of committing the
offence, was discussed quite extensively in the case of R. v. Ahluwalia,25 where the
theory helped to substantiate the defence of the diminished responsibility. This
judgement of the Court of Appeal was acclaimed as the beginning of the acceptance
of the theory in the English courts.
Some three years after the judgement was made, the Court of Appeal in 1995
in the case of R. v. Thornton (No 2)26 again reaffirmed its previous decision and
ordered a new trial for a battered woman accused on the ground that the appellant's
mental condition was not satisfactorily considered, and thus to reach a decision
without reference to the appellant's psychological state of mind would be unjust and
unsafe. In the retrial of the case, evidence as to the theory played a major role in
having the appellant's conviction reduced to manslaughter.
At that stage the impact of the theory in English courts was that the mental
abnormality of the accused is a relevant characteristic for the purpose of the objective
test in the law of provocation. However, the Privy Council's decision of Luc Thiet
Thuan,21 an appeal case from Hong Kong, took the view that in determining the
25 [1991] 4 All ER 889.
26 [1996] 2 All ER 1023.
27 [1996] 2 All ER 1032.
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objective standard of the accused's belief, no special consideration is to be given to
any special characteristic possessed by the accused at the time of committing the
criminal act. An objective test is purely objective standard based on a hypothetical
reasonable ordinary person and not on a hypothetical person having the same
characteristics as the accused.
The defence set up by the appellant in Luc2S was one of provocation, hence
whether or not it will later effect the claim of other defences, especially the defence
of diminished responsibility and also the defence of self-defence, would be a matter
of conjecture. However, it might be said that the issue of the belief of the accused in
the criminal law defences is inter-related between the various defences and therefore
it is probable that the same judgement would affect the objective reasonableness test
in other defences. On the issue of whether or not the Privy Council's decision in Luc
will influence the attitude of the English courts, it might be pointed out that as the
case of Palmer v. R..29 (a Jamaican case) was influential in the English courts on the
issue of necessary self-defence, and as the case of Beckford v. R,30 (another Jamaican
case) was widely referred to in the determination of the question of the accused's
belief in the existence of an attack in the law of self-defence, there is no reason why
the present case could not have a similar effect in the English courts.
One point which is clear as far as the theory of the battered woman syndrome
in English courts is concerned is that the English concept of the syndrome is one of
mental impairment or abnormality. This may be contrasted with the view taken in
other jurisdictions where the syndrome is seen as a mental state which normal people
might possess. Until now, there has been no reported case where a battered woman
28 ibid.
29 Supra, fn. 2.
30 [1987] 3 W.L.R. 611, [1987] 3 All ER 8.
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who has killed her partner has attempted to set-up the defence of self-defence as the
principle ground of defence. It would be interesting to see the outcome of such a
case where self-defence is the main defence put forward by a battered woman
accused. This is more so if one were to look back at the essence of a successful
claims of self-defence in English courts. In this context, reference to two cases
would be inevitable: firstly the case of Palmer v. R,.31 which underlined the concept
of necessary self-defence in English criminal law, and secondly, the Criminal Court
of Appeal decision in Gladstone Williams32 which suggested the theory of subjective
reasonableness in the accused's belief at the time warranted the taking of necessary
action in self-defence.
Now, when the law requires that the accused have a purely honest belief in
the necessity to take self-defensive action, would this requirement not, in a way,
serve well the case of a battered woman who kills her violent husband? Perhaps, at
this stage, if the court is satisfied that she honestly believed that her life would be in
danger if she were not to take action, she has at least satisfied the test of the necessity
of taking action in self-defence. The case would then be decided on the aspect of the
reasonableness of the quantum of defensive force employed in the defence. But
again it has to be stressed that her action would be acceptable as one that falls within
the ambit of self-defence. To add strength to the accused's case at this point, perhaps
the stressful relation with the deceased, coupled with evidence of battering incidents
would help to authenticate her fear of being killed. The battering story would not be
regarded as a syndrome which is a manifestation of mental abnormality, rather, the
actual traumatic experience of the battered woman demonstrates the battered woman
accused's honest belief of the need to take pre-emptive action to save her live. Thus
not only does it dispel the myth that a battered woman is a mentally impaired person,
31 Supra, fn. 2.
32 [1984] 78 Cr.App.R. 276.
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it could, upon the satisfaction of other requirements of self-defence, lead to an
acquittal of the accused.
7.2.2 The theory of the battered woman syndrome in the Australian
courts
The modern doctrine of self-defence in Australia is principally developed in
two cases, Viro v. The Queen,33 and the case of Fadil Zecevic.34 The law in Viro
stipulated that for a claim of self-defence to be successful, the jury must satisfy that
at the time the killing occurred the accused reasonably believed that an unlawful
attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily injury was being or was
about to be made, thus, permitting self-defensive conduct on the part of a person
whose life is threatened.
In the South Australian Supreme Court's decision in Morgan v. Colman,35
the court paraphrased Mason C.J.'s formulations in Viro v. The Queen and in doing
so modified the law of self-defence to the effect that even in a situation where no
actual attack was on the way, the accused's repelling force could be considered as an
instance of self-defence. This decision was later followed in the case of R. v. Lane3b
which was decided in the Supreme Court of Victoria; the employment of force by a
person at the time where no actual physical attack is aimed at him would be
considered as an act of self-defence.
Supra, fn. 10.
Supra, fn. 1.
[1981] 27 S.A.S.R. 334.
[1983] 2 V.C.R. 449.
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Even though these two cases seemingly extend the prospect of a successful
plea of self-defence to a person who exercises force in repelling an attack which was
not, strictly speaking, physically directed at him, the fact is, in the context of a
battered woman's killing in self-defence, these cases were not strong enough to
substantiate the battered woman's claim of self-defence in the manner in which they
take the purported defensive action. In the case of Morgan v. Colman,37 the reason
is because the case itself did not involve a charge of murder, whereas in most
battered woman cases, the woman accused was charged after killing the abusive
partner. In the case of R. v. Lane,38 the fact on which the appellant killed his
purported attacker was different from that of the battered woman. In R. v. Lane, the
accused killed at the time when the purported attacker was already behaving
violently, though it is admitted that no direct assault had yet been made on the
accused. On the other hand in most murder cases involving a battered woman, the
battered woman kills her partner during a lull in the violence.
The formulation in Viro v. The Queen,39 after being strongly criticised by
both bench and bar, were ultimately abandoned and refined in the case of Fadil
Zecevic.40 The law as expressed by Mason C.J. conformed to the law in the United
Kingdom, especially to the Privy Council's decision in Palmer v. R.4' The law is
thus based on the necessity to defend. The fundamental focus will thus be on the
reasonable belief of the accused that it was necessary to defend her life in the manner
in which he had exercised her defence. If the jury is satisfied that the accused had
reasonably believed, in the circumstances in which he found himself, that the way he
37 Supra, fn. 35.
38 Supra, fn. 36.
39 Supra, fn. 10.
40 Supra, fn. 1.
41 Supra, fn. 2.
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or she exercised the right to defend was the most appropriate way in their defensive
action, this would be a good ground for a successful claim of self-defence.
The introduction of the battered woman syndrome in the Australian courts
was successfully made some four years after the decision in Zecevic. This was made
however not on the basis of supporting the battered woman's claim of self-defence
but rather on the defence of duress. Nevertheless the South Australian Criminal
Court of Appeal had indicated in its judgment that the same theory could also be
adduced explaining the state ofmind of the accused in a case involving the claim of
self-defence. The dictum of King C.J. in the case of Olga Rujanjic and Eriika
Kontinnen42 was taken seriously and applied in the case of Kontinnen43 which was
decided in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The judgement had therefore
essentially pronounced that the evidence of battered woman syndrome is potentially
relevant to the battered woman's subjective view of necessity to kill the deceased,
and that it would be equally relevant to the objective standard of the reasonableness
of the battered woman's claimed apprehension of death or serious bodily harm.
In the Australian state of the Northern Territory, in a case where a battered
woman shot dead her husband for fear of her own safety, the judge approach the case
in a completely different manner.44 By referring to the provision on the law of self-
defence which was stipulated in section 28 (f) of the Criminal Code, the judges took
the view that the paramount issue to be solved is whether the battered woman in this
case was defending herself against an assault from the deceased at the time of the
claimed act of self-defence. This necessarily lead to a discussion on the meaning of
"assault" as intended by the Code.
42 (1991) 53 A.Crim.R. 362.
43 (1991) 16 Crim.L.J. 366.
44 The case of R v. Helen Patricia Secretary (1996) 107 N.T.R. (n.p. Lexis Transcript)
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The Supreme Court finally concluded that a death threat by the deceased
amounted to an assault by virtue of the fact that he had a history of abuse and
violence against the accused, and that this also showed that his ultimate purpose to
kill the accused was real and well grounded. Therefore, even though at the time
when the fatal shot was fired the deceased was asleep, this did not vitiate the
accused's claim of self-defence. The deceased's temporary inability to behave
violently was not a reason to prevent the accused from claiming self-defence.
It would be interesting to see whether the judgement by the Supreme court of
the Northern Territory on this issue will have any legal impact on the Australian
states still employing the common law. As it is now, it seems likely that battered
women who kill their partners will have the benefit of the theory in assisting their
claim that the killing was merely for self-defence. This, however, is far from saying
that the battered woman in the Code states is less fortunate. The judgement in
Secretary's case proved that a battered woman could still have their claim of self-
defence considered without any reference to the battered woman syndrome.
7.2.3 The theory of the battered woman syndrome in R. v. Lavallee:
The final analysis
So far as it can be traced , the case of R. v. Lavallee45 is the first case where
Lenore Walker's work on the theory of battered woman syndrome was put into
practice. Expert evidence explaining the mental condition of the battered woman at
the time she killed her husband was decisive. In this case, this testimony proved that
the appellant (the battered woman accused) was suffering from the battered woman
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
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syndrome and that the theory necessarily explains the reasonableness of her act at the
time of pulling the trigger.
The judgement of Supreme Court of Canada was marked as a turning point in
the history of a woman in court pleading self-defence after killing her violent partner.
The judgement has evidently been influential in the courts in other jurisdictions. In
English courts, the cases of R. v. Ahluwalia46 and R. v. Thornton (No 2)41 have to a
certain extent benefitted from the theory. In Australia, the case of Olga Rujanjic and
Eriika Kontinnen48 in the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, the case of
Kontinnen49 in the Supreme Court of South Australia, and the case of Hickey50 in the
New South Wale Supreme Court all adopted the theory.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter,51 the difficulty in a battered
woman's case is the fact that she has actually taken a life. The incorporation of the
theory of the battered woman syndrome in the defence of self-defence, which could
lead to a complete acquittal of the woman accused, would be welcome by feminists
and others who are sympathetic to the plight of battered women. But the law is not
something to be articulated emotionally and sentimentally. When a battered woman
kills her husband, she has committed an offence but at the same time she had also
suffered from violent behaviour on the part of her victim. An argument could be put
forward, and could indeed be rightly put forward, that it is a matter of who kills first.
If no decisive action is taken by the battered woman she could end up losing her own
46 Supra, fn. 25.
47 Supra, fn. 26.
48 Supra, fn. 42.
49 Supra, fn. 43.
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